Selection before Election: The Direct Primary and Responsible Party Nomination by Kurlowski, Drew A.
SELECTION BEFORE ELECTION:
THE DIRECT PRIMARY AND
RESPONSIBLE PARTY NOMINATION
A Dissertation presented to
the Faculty of the Graduate School
at the University of Missouri
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
by
DREW A. KURLOWSKI
Dr. John Petrocik, Dissertation Supervisor
MAY 2014
© Copyright by Drew Kurlowski 2014
All Rights Reserved
The undersigned, appointed by the Dean of the Graduate School, have examined the
dissertation entitled:
SELECTION BEFORE ELECTION:
RESPONSIBLE PARTY NOMINATION AND
THE DIRECT PRIMARY
presented by Drew A. Kurlowski,
a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and hereby certify that, in their
opinion, it is worthy of acceptance.
Dr. John Petrocik
Dr. L. Marvin Overby
Dr. Peverill Squire
Dr. J. Brian Houston
For my family.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am greatly indebted to the University of Missouri, and especially the faculty of
Mizzou Political Science department. Both the faculty and staff of the department have
contributed greatly to my graduate success and this dissertation would not be possible
without them. I would particularly like to thank the staff of the department, Debbie
Esser, Sarah Turner, Laurel Youmans, and Audra Jenkins for their encouragement and
assistance not only with this dissertation, but all aspects of my graduate education at
Mizzou. I owe much of my success to their thoughtful help. Additionally, I would like to
thank my doctoral committee, John Petrocik, Marvin Overby, Peverill Squire, and Brian
Houston for their guidance during this process. Their feedback and support have greatly
contributed to the quality of this project.
Additionally, the offices of the Secretaries of State provided valuable information re-
garding the nuance of laws and assisted greatly in their interpretation. Further, Project
Vote Smart, the Lucy Burns Institute, The Green Papers, and the Federal Election Com-
mission resources greatly improved the accuracy of the data contained within this dis-
sertation.
Finally, thank you to all of my colleagues who provided valuable feedback on both
the proposal and drafts of this dissertation. There are too many friends, colleagues, and
mentors who provided specific feedback and served as a sounding board throughout the
process to mention here. It goes without saying that any errors and omissions within
this dissertation are solely my responsibility.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
CHAPTER
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 The Old Convention and the New Primary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.5 Chapter Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2 Primaries: Classification and Restriction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.1 Studying Primary Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.1.1 Primary Adoption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.1.2 Primary Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.1.3 Classifying Primary Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2 A New Variable: Restriction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.1 Retesting Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3 Rules of the Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.1 Who May Vote? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.1.1 Classification Schemes for Voting Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
iii
3.2 Who May Run? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.3 When is the Primary? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.4 Crafting a New Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4 The Rules in the States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.1 An Overview of State Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.1.1 2014 Law Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.2 Restrictiveness: A New Measure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5 Adoption Traditions and Rule Inertia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.1 Adopting the Direct Primary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.1.1 Party, Progressivism, or Both? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.1.2 Consequences of Adoption Motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.2 The Status Quo and Inertia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.2.1 The (Relative) Status Quo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.2.2 Adoption Inertia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.3 Recent Experimentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6 The Correlates of Restrictiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
6.1 Competition and Divisiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6.1.1 Competition as Field Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
6.1.2 Divisiveness as Vote Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
6.2 Extreme Candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.2.1 Tea Party Candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.3 The Ill Effects of Restrictiveness? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
7 Discussion and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
iv
7.1 The 21st Century Primary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
7.1.1 The Candidate Centered Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
7.1.2 Citizens United vs. The Direct Primary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
7.1.3 Tea Party Insurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
7.1.4 Primaries from the Bench . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
7.2 Bringing Back Responsible Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
7.3 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
APPENDIX
A State Narratives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
A.1 State Narratives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
VITA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
v
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
3.1 Primary Rule Criterion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2 Traditional Primary Classification Crosswalk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3 Alternative Primary Classification Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.4 Primary Rule Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.1 Party Registration by State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.2 Unaffiliated Voter Participation in Primaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.3 Fee And Signature Requirement Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.4 Independent Candidate Deadlines and Knowledge of Party Slate . . . . . 59
4.5 2014 Campaign Seasons (in Days) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.6 Summary of Rule Restrictiveness by State (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.7 Weighted and Raw Restrictiveness Scores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.8 Traditional Classification and Restrictiveness Quartile . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.1 Date of Adoption of Mandatory Primary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.2 Date of Adoption of Sore Loser Law By Decade and State Classification . 96
6.1 Number of Primary Candidates by Restrictiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.2 Proportion of Uncontested Races by Restrictiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6.3 Vote Fragmentation by Restrictiveness in Contested Races . . . . . . . . 110
6.4 Margin of Victory by Restrictiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
6.5 Proportion of Close Races by Restrictiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.6 Frequencies of Extremism and Restrictiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.7 Frequency of Extremist Primary Candidates by Restrictiveness Quantile . 115
vi
6.8 Percentage of Extremist Candidate by Restrictiveness Quantile . . . . . . 117
6.9 Frequency of Extremist House Members by Restrictiveness Quantile . . . 118
6.10 Tea Party Members by Restrictiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
5.1 Primary Adoption by Party Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.2 Date of Adoption by Progressivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.3 Date of Adoption by Political Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.4 Days Between Primary and General Election, 1918-2012 . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.5 Mean Primary Restrictiveness by Adoption Tradition . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.1 Candidate Ideology and Restrictiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
viii
ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores the rules which govern the direct primary in the states.
Operating within the framework of responsible party nomination, I explore primary
rules in the states across their 100-year history, and examine arguments regarding the
adoption of the primary and correlates of its use.
First, this project introduces the traditional classification system of primaries, which
is based on ballot choice. I argue that this classification is a shortsighted one, which is
in need of enlargement. Drawing on state statute and other official sources, I examine
other rules which govern primaries in order to create a more comprehensive measure.
With this measure of primary restrictiveness, the dissertation sets out to examine the
adoption of the direct primary in the states, arguing against conventional wisdom and
suggesting that there were multiple reasons for the adoption of the primary. Examining
the motivations of progressive reformers in the west and party officials in the east, I
examine how rules were shaped based on the motivation for their adoption, and show
that these relationships continue to persist today.
Finally, I examine correlates of primary rules by investigating primary competition
and candidate extremism. The responsible party framework advocates for restrictive
primaries, yet recent scholarship has suggested that restrictiveness may be a cause of
reduced competition and increased polarization and extremism. I show that there is
little evidence for these relationships, and, using the example of the recent Tea Party
movement, suggest that restrictiveness may inhibit the success of insurgent party factions.
To conclude, the final chapter discusses recent developments and their potential to
impact the way we view the primary. Specifically, that recent political developments may
prompt an increased interest in the direct primary, leading to change or innovation in
the way primaries are structured.
ix
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The Old Convention and the New Primary
A knife is drawn, but its use prevented. A chairman made a ‘floor man’ when his seat is
abruptly taken from under him. One man is assaulted and bitten ferociously by nearly
half a dozen of his own partisans. This description of an 1826 caucus in Philadelphia
does not paint an image of American politics like the paintings of John Trumbull. Other
stories of caucus violence and corruption are not hard to come by. Viva voce votes at an
1890s caucus take place where whispers of aye defeat boisterous nays. In an attempt to
ensure a clean election, one candidate for nomination requested to see the open ballot
box before voting commenced to ensure it was empty. His written request was torn
up, thrown in the fire, and police escorted the candidate out. In the final tally, the
man lost 510-234, a staggering defeat considering the 300 who were in attendance that
day (Dallinger 1903).
The story of the corruption of nomination procedures in the 19th century is not a
new one. Anecdotes such as those presented here are often retold in studies of candidate
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nomination and the emergence of the direct primary. In their seminal study of the direct
primary, Merriam and Overacker (1928) presented these caucus evils as the driving force
behind the adoption of the direct primary. Indeed, much of the scholarly literature on
primaries has suggested the adoption of the primary as a progressive panacea to the ills
of the caucus and convention systems. The primary system promised to elevate politics,
to reduce fraud and corruption, remove political bosses from control, and improve the
party system.
While some recent scholars have examined the veracity of the claim that predomi-
nantly progressive principles drove the adoption of the direct primary system, the pro-
gressive narrative still dominates. It is important, however, to examine the entirety of
the progressive promise. Part of this promise was to increase citizen participation and
eliminate corruption; however, an equally important promise was the reformation of
our party system. Given this promise, has the direct primary fulfilled its goals? To be
sure, the introduction of the direct primary reduced fraud, corruption, and violence,
and lessened the influence of political bosses, but has the direct primary improved the
party system? Further, what can be said about the evolution and current state of the
direct primary? This dissertation aims to not only address the veracity of the traditional
progressive narrative of the direct primary, but also investigate the rules that govern the
primary and their relationship to the goal of responsible party nomination. By revisiting
our classification and building on our knowledge of current primary systems, our current
notions about the arrangement of primary rules, and how those rules affect nomination
my need revision. Further, while the promise to enhance and improve the party system
may be currently unrealized, this dissertation will explore the possibility that the direct
primary still holds the potential to strengthen our nominating procedures, our parties,
and perhaps, improve American electoral politics.
2
1.2 Purpose and Scope
The central argument of this dissertation is threefold. First, while progressive, anti-party
sentiments were instrumental in the adoption of the primary in many locations, party of-
ficials themselves also welcomed the direct primary as a way to bring political legitimacy
to their strong party organizations and gain legal control over the most distasteful as-
pects of the convention system. Additionally, parties in southern states also looked to the
direct primary as a way to exert more control over nomination in their one-party states.
Second, the direct primary is a unique institution in the states, governed by sets of rules
which, when examined closely, speak to the varying degree with which parties may ex-
ercise control over nomination. Further, traditional classifications of primary rules have
omitted important institutional aspects of party control which speak directly to the con-
sequences of rule systems. Expanding this classification can shed light on restrictiveness
and party control over the primaries. Third, I operate within the framework of respon-
sible party government and, more specifically, responsibly party nomination. Within this
framework it is assumed that more restrictive systems should benefit democracy writ
largely. However, many state parties have failed to adopt restrictive primary systems.
Further, traditional critiques of the primary system are in conflict with the conclusions
of the responsible party framework. By reevaluating primary systems, and the effects of
restrictiveness it is possible to determine whether concerns regarding polarization and
reduced competition are legitimate. Finally, I will discuss recent political developments
which may yield increased attention to the structure of primary laws. In order to unpack
this threefold argument, I will spend a brief time elaborating on the general tenets of
these three arguments.
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Argument 1
Progressivism in the late 19th century is commonly regarded as the primary motivating
factor for the adoption of the direct primary. The moral imperative to increase and
open participation in nomination drove unwilling parties into releasing their grasp over
nomination and weakened parties. While this narrative is a compelling one, with ev-
idence from contemporary scholars as well as current students of parties, it does not
tell the complete story of the adoption of the direct primary. While anti-partyism was,
to be sure, a contributing factor in the adoption of the primary, particularly in more
progressive western states, it does not fully explain the quick spread of the primary to
states with strong party organizations in the eastern United States.
Reexamining the timeline of the adoption of the direct primary we can see strong
party states in the east adopting the direct primary during the same period, and at
a rate similar to progressive western states. Further, southern states with decidedly
partisan motivations also adopted the direct primary quickly in this early stage. This
dissertation will argue that there were motivations for party elites in strong party states to
adopt the primary including an increase in control over nomination (party organizations
were similarly exhausted by the lack of control over the chaos of the convention system)
and an institutionalized and privileged place in the electoral process. This argument
is not a novel one, but it is one that has received scant scholarly attention. Further, it
is important to the theoretical underpinning of this dissertation because it lays out the
argument that the direct primary need not be wholly anti-party. With this possibility, we
can reevaluate the direct primary in order to examine what features could bolster party
strength. Within the framework of responsible party nomination, these features reflect
the restrictiveness of primary laws. This sets the stage for the second central argument of
this dissertation: that unique sets of rules in the states reveal an opportunity for parties
to continue to exert responsible influence over candidate nomination.
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Argument 2
Primaries in the several states are often thought of in terms of simplistic classifica-
tion schemes. These classification schemes revolve around who may participate in the
primaries, and classify states on a rough ordinal scale of openness. This dissertation
unpacks this classification scheme and shows a broader framework of primary rules.
Focusing less on the question of ‘who may vote’ and emphasizing the question of ‘where
is party power’ yields a new and empirically distinct classification scheme for primary
systems. Incorporating new variables and reconceptualizing old ones allows the cre-
ation of a new classification of primary types which is unique in the study of primaries.
It is through this new classification that I evaluate the potential for party control over
nomination within the framework of the direct primary.
The new classification scheme introduced here not only affords an analytical leverage
on party control over nomination, but allows us to retest some of our current understand-
ing of primary elections, and reevaluate the common criticisms of closed or restrictive
primary systems. Studies of the relationships between primary type and turnout, divi-
siveness, competitiveness, and ideological extremism have utilized classification schemes,
which omit important institutional variables. Focusing only on the pragmatic implica-
tions to voters, we have not considered how other variables may structure the choices of
voters. Incorporating party control, ballot access, and election timing, as will be done
here, adds additional institutional components to previous analyses, and enhances our
understanding of primaries.
In sum, Argument 2 reasserts the traditional institutional notion that rules matter,
and posits a specific and novel understanding of primary rules before examining the
correlates and consequences of these rules. This brings us to the final argument of this
dissertation.
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Argument 3
Given that some strong parties may have pursued the direct primary during its early
adoption, and that malleable rules may allow parties to exert some control over the
direct primary, Argument 3 states that parties have generally failed to maximize their
potential for responsible party nomination within the framework of the direct primary.
Operating in the theoretical tradition of responsible parties, I suggest that restrictive
primary systems, while often blamed for polarization and ideological extremism, are
actually the ideal form of primary in terms of maximizing responsible party nomination.
This ideal form of primary affords parties a maximum of leverage over primary elec-
tions, in keeping with the notion of responsible parties. Additionally, I intend to show
that common critiques of restrictive systems need reevaluation based on new evidence
presented through the analytical innovation of a new classification of primary systems.
Finally, with this model primary system in hand, I will assess how the states stand in
adopting such a system. With the assertion that responsible parties are possible within
the framework of the direct primary, it is notable that many parties have not pursued
these primary forms, opting instead to shy away from the potential for responsible party
nomination. While it is unclear the precise motivations for this trend, the concluding
chapter examines the tensions between candidate-centered campaigns and party nom-
ination, as well as new political developments, which may prompt a reevaluation of
primary systems in the United States.
1.3 Conceptual Framework
With an understanding of the general arguments of this dissertation, it is worthwhile
to examine some of the extant literature on the direct primary and define the concepts
that this dissertation will build upon. First, it seems prudent to introduce the generally
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accepted narrative regarding the adoption of the primary (although Chapter 5 will dis-
cuss this at length). Second, it is appropriate to discuss the theoretical justification for
considering rules as institutionally important to the primary and parties. Finally, I will
briefly discuss the concept of responsible parties and responsible party nomination, a
concept, which will be more fully developed and analyzed in Chapter 5.
Adopting the Direct Primary
Examining the initial adoption of the direct primary at the turn of the 20th century,
we are presented with a common narrative about the motivations of primary advocates.
Contemporary observers of politics and scholars alike generally regard the adoption of
the direct primary as having a progressive, anti-party purpose. The work of Merriam and
Overacker (1928) is a seminal example of this line of thinking. Scholars who followed,
studying the impact of the direct primary would often point to this scholarship when
explicating the theory of the decline of party strength and influence. Epstein (1986), for
example, points out that the direct primary created a fundamental transformation of a
once private membership organization, stripping parties of much of their power. Even
modern scholars such as Ware (2002), who has taken the progressive narrative to task,
admits the dominance of this narrative, and its accuracy in many western states.
Examining these sources further, it is not clear that we have represented their argu-
ments fully in our current conventional wisdom of the impact of the direct primary. It is
clear from the vignette that opened this introduction, that there were clear and urgent
needs for reform of the traditional caucus system. Indeed, some of the earliest efforts at
reforming nomination were at the behest of parties, even in western progressive states.
California, for example, suffered from the ills of the convention system as much as any
state in the 19th century. The state, in an effort partially driven by the parties, adopted
an optional primary law, which criminalized the worst offenses of election fraud in 1866,
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and afforded primaries with a legal avenue to secure the integrity of their party nomina-
tions (Merriam and Overacker 1928). Epstein (1986), in the same breath as his assertion
about the transformation of private parties, points out that the advent of the direct
primary institutionalized and legitimized the parties, solidifying the two-party system.
Perhaps the strongest proponent of an alternative narrative is Ware (2002) whose central
thesis revolves around the adoption of the direct primary as a party-endorsed reform.
The potential for the existence of an alternative narrative begs one of the central
questions of this dissertation: is there the possibility for responsible party control over
nomination within the framework of the direct primary? I suggest that, in line with the
responsible party framework, increased restrictiveness leads to increased party control.
Additionally, common concerns associated with restrictiveness do not seem to be well
founded. With this in mind, it is worthwhile to briefly discuss the institutional importance
of these rules.
Primary Rules
As with any political institution, the direct primary is governed by sets of rules. These
rules exercise control over who can run for nomination, who can vote for those candi-
dates, how they vote, and when they will cast their ballot. Over time, the states have
evolved unique sets of rules, and in turn, party control over nomination has changed
in different ways. Some of these frameworks allow for little to no party control, while
others give parties a comparatively heavy hand in nomination. These are the trees we
have missed while examining the forest. The story of the direct primary is not a singular
story, and it has not had a singular effect on parties and electoral politics.
The rules that this dissertation explores are those that are most central to party con-
trol over nomination. Party registration and restricted access to primaries are perhaps
the most visible. Political science and political observers alike often categorize primaries
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into classification schemes of varying levels of openness based on these rules. A closed
primary is open only to members of the party, whereas an open primary is open to all
voters. Being the most visible, this categorization is a main focus of the dissertation and
the classification of primary schemes, however, the attempt will be made to focus on a
larger definition of openness. Do primary rules allow the parties to endorse candidates
in the primaries? Is access to the primary ballot heavily restricted? These features are
not always examined in combination with voter laws, however they lend great insight
into the level of control a party may exert on the primary election. Further, how are
independent or third party candidates treated within the system? Are these candidates
allowed to see the final primary slate, or victorious party nominees, before registering
for the general election?
By combining multiple facets of the direct primary system, we can begin to see a
larger picture of primary restrictiveness, or synonymously, party control over nomina-
tion. In closed systems, we not only see restrictions on voters, but the use of primary
endorsements, ballot access restrictions, sore-loser laws, and other features which give
the party considerable clout over nomination. Thus, the entirety of our understanding
of an open or closed primary is not limited to the voter. The myriad rules of the direct
primary all shape the relative restrictiveness of various primary systems in the state.
Responsible Party Nomination
The central arguments of this dissertation rely heavily on a particular understanding
on the definition of parties. Moreover, this dissertation relies on a specific notion of
the purpose of these parties in the American political system. The search for party
responsibility is not a new endeavor. Ranney (1951) and other scholars have sought
to use political science to improve politics in America. To these scholars the culprit,
and the solution, was the party. The culmination of this thinking was the Report of the
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Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association (1950) which
put forth important recommendations relating to the concept of party responsibility.
Examining the Report closer, the authors cited party as an indispensable part of
government in America, and yet, one raked with troubling problems and unrealized
potential. The indispensable nature of parties, to the committee, was rooted in their
ability to be responsible, as defined as a two-fold concept. First, parties were responsible
to voters, to bring clarity to electoral choice and policy, and then to be responsible
for the execution of that policy. Parties were the essential actor in a complex political
system in which voters needed such clarification, and the ability to focus electoral blame.
A second feature of this responsibility was an internal responsibility to party members
via the nomination of candidates. Thus, parties act not only as a way to offer clear
competition between two alternatives, but as the instrument to produce the candidates
that would provide this choice to voters. Parties, however, were not living up to this
responsibility.
Among the collection of concerns and suggestions of the committee was a focus on
the nomination of candidates. The Report stated not only how party responsibility en-
tailed the necessity of responsiveness to party members via nomination, but the criticism
that this function was not being adequately met. Authors of the Report advocated for
a stronger role for parties in the nomination of their members, including pre-primary
endorsements, the closing of primary systems, however they stopped short of advocating
a return to the convention system. The direct primary being such an integral party of
the nominating systems of nearly every state, they thought it impracticable to suggest its
demise. Similarly, a national standard to election laws in the states was also seen as an
alluring but impossible reform.
Since the publication of the Report, numerous scholars have assessed party and
primary in terms of party responsibility and examined the promise of the suggestions
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offered by the committee (Turner 1951, Ranney 1951, Kirkpatrick 1971, Pomper 1971).
These evaluations differ in their assessment of the current party system, but largely cite
the failure of responsible parties. Continuing in this tradition, this dissertation will again
examine where American parties stand, 60 years after the Report.
In order to evaluate responsible party nomination in the parties, I suggest an ap-
proach that examines primaries on a larger and more detailed dimension than previous
analyses. Further, I intend to test hypotheses relating to negative effects of restrictiveness
such as reduced competition. Further, I examine how candidate extremism is affected by
restrictiveness. This argument is a noteworthy one as restrictive systems are often criti-
cized as being a cause of extremism, not a cure for it, as the responsible party narrative
suggests. Additionally I will examine one interesting feature of responsible parties in
their ability to enhance party cohesiveness. Using the Tea Party movement as an exam-
ple of party factionalism, I will test to see if enhanced restrictiveness does indeed reduce
the success of Tea Party candidates as is suggested by the responsible party framework.
1.4 Approach
With the general argument of the dissertation laid out, and basic concepts established,
I will now lay out the general approach of the dissertation. In order to support the
three general arguments laid out earlier, I suggest a four-fold path for this project. First,
it is necessary to build on the concepts introduced in this introduction by explaining
the rules that govern the direct primary. By developing an understanding of primary
rules in the abstract, we can then proceed to examine how they have evolved and how
they are currently arranged in the states. Second, I will discuss the history of the
adoption of the primary and examine its general course over the past 100 years. This
will establish the promise that the direct primary could strengthen parties, and show
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how the primary generally impacted our view of parties over time, establishing them as
quasi-governmental organizations. Further it will examine how parties have lost leverage
over nomination, but set the stage for current attempts to regain some of that control.
Third, I will present a comprehensive categorization of the various rules as they currently
exist in the states, and present a new classification scheme based on party control. I will
reexamine previous scholarship, substituting this new classification variable in order to
determine how party control over primaries impacts turnout, divisiveness, competition,
and ideological extremism. Fourth, and finally, I will examine a model form for the direct
primary, and investigate how the states fare in their adoption of this form. Discussing
recent trends regarding the candidate-centered campaign, the Citizens United decision,
and tea party insurgent candidates, I will suggest that strengthening party control over
nomination, while not a panacea, may be a step toward more responsible nomination.
Understanding The Rules
The first primary goal of this dissertation is an elucidation of the various rules that
govern the direct primary in the states. Before we can examine the central arguments of
this dissertation, it is imperative to understand what is meant by primary rules and the
form that these rules currently take in the states. While traditional notions of the classi-
fication of primaries focus on voter access to party ballots, I argue that a much broader
understanding is needed. While the commonly used and much simplified classification
is useful for an analysis of who may vote in primary elections, it omits a larger un-
derstanding of primary restrictiveness. Understanding primaries broadly, restrictiveness
can be seen as a measure of control over primaries, and includes not only control over
voters, but rules regarding endorsements, the timing of elections, filing fees, and dead-
lines. A more refined understanding can come from unpacking traditional classifications
into into their constituent parts, and adding detail on other facets of primary laws. As
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a full understanding of the primaries in the states can not come without attention to,
and classification of, rules which affect candidates, voters, and the timing of the primary
election, I argue that this new measure more comprehensively classifies primary systems.
In order to facilitate this understanding, the beginning of this dissertation will detail
the various rules in isolation in order to explain their purpose and significance. Explain-
ing the various ways in which laws may be constructed, along with ways in which they
may affect primary outcomes, I hope to build an understanding of the basic framework
of primary rules. With this groundwork in place, the project then moves into cataloging
and classifying the rules in the states. Great care was taken to appropriately catalog
the current primary systems of the various states, and classify each rule as either being
restrictive or permissive. Following this, the primaries are then classified into a new
scale of openness, not based on voter ballot access alone, but also taking into account
candidates and election timing as well. This new classification, a measure of primary
restrictiveness, then becomes the variable of interest for analysis in later chapters
Rule Evolution
A second goal of this project is to attempt to place the current rules that govern the
primary into historical context, and address the notion that the direct primary was a
wholly anti-party reform. While a difficult task, historical sources were consulted, and
when possible, a narrative of the general movement of direct primaries over the last 100
years is constructed. This evolution not only brings context to our present situation but
sheds light on the broader trajectory of primary rules in the states. Generally, there has
been little movement in primary rules. I argue that this is due to a path dependent
inertia, springing from the way primaries were initially structured upon their adoption.
In order achieve this goal, and solidify Argument 1 of this dissertation, some hypothe-
ses must be tested about the adoption of the primary. Conventional wisdom speaks to
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the dominance of a narrative that progressive impulses drove the adoption of the pri-
mary. I assert that this is not entirely true, nor entirely false. In order to test this, I
test the hypothesis that states with strong parties adopted the primary at a similar rate
as more progressive, western states. Examining dates of adoption in relation to our
understanding of party strength at the turn of the century, this hypothesis suggests we
will see little distinction between the timing of adoption of progressive and strong party
states. Additionally, I identify a possible third adoption motivation in the south. In line
with our understanding of the one-party south, primaries were quickly adopted in these
states as a way to solidify control over nomination, and in turn, the general election.
Second, I attempt to unpack how the adoption of the primary the initial structure
of primary rules set long standing trends in the states, explaining much of the variation
between current state primary systems. Here I argue that the presence of a progressive
or strong-party political culture related directly to the form that the direct primary took
in these states at the time of adoption. Further, this initial adoption led to an inertia, or
path dependence, which would leave its mark on how primaries are currently arranged.
By examining the classification of rules in states which had a different adoption tradition,
we should see marked relationships. Specifically, I expect that states with a strong history
of party organization adopted more restrictive primary systems initially, carrying over
to present day. Conversely, states with a progressive history should have adopted more
permissive systems, in line with the participatory ideals of the progressive movement.
The states of the south generally favored a very relaxed system of primaries in terms
of statutory oversight, however, parties were given a great deal of latitude. Over time,
increased party competition and an easing of controversial party limitations on voting
has left these states without the strong party rules they once had, leaving only the relaxed
state statutes behind.
Finally, I will show that relatively little change has occurred with respect to primary
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rules over much of that latter half of the 20th century. Thus, the adoption tradition
of the various states, and the relative lack of change in primary laws, explain a vast
majority of the variance in the rules of state parties. This also shows the curious lack of
effort on the part of parties to fashion their primary into a model form which would best
allow them to exert control over nomination in many parts of the country. By drawing
on historical scholarship and the Report of the Committee on Political Parties, I suggest
that strong parties should generally desire a more restrictive primary system. In one
interesting exception to the general lack of primary rule change, I will examine how a
handful of western progressive states have changed their primary system coincidental
with the emergence of strong parties in these states.
Rule Consequences
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this dissertation places the current rules and the
new classification scheme developed here, into the context of parties, voters, and Ameri-
can politics more broadly. One focus of this effort is to assess the current state of primary
rules in the framework of responsible party nomination. After 60 years of evolution, how
does the direct primary look in the context of the original report on responsible party
government? Operating in this framework, I assume the conclusions of the Committee
on Political Parties. Specifically, these conclusions state that, democratically, more re-
strictive primaries should induce greater party control and responsibility. Additionally,
the Committee suggests that a lack of this responsibility could lead to increased polar-
ization and extremism, a curious conclusion given the conventional wisdom on primary
elections.
In order to test these conclusions, I examine two potential correlates of primary
restrictiveness, competition and extremism. A common criticism of increased restric-
tiveness is that these closed primaries reduce competition. If this is indeed true, it
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calls into question the normative arguments of restrictiveness and party responsibility.
Further, conventional wisdom also suggests that restrictive primaries create more ide-
ologically extreme candidates and promote divisiveness and polarization. Interestingly,
the responsible party framework suggests the exact opposite. Citing reduced control as
a key problem, the Committee argued that polarization and candidate extremism should
appear in more permissive systems. Thus, primary candidate extremism and the ideol-
ogy of successful candidates should be examine to reconcile these divergent hypotheses.
In examining competition, I argue that four features, size of the field, and number
of uncontested races, margin of victory, and number of competitive races, should all be
unrelated to primary restrictiveness. While there is the potential for restrictiveness to
enhance competition, this is not a specific conclusion of the responsible party frame-
work. Thus, we are generally only interested in whether or not restrictiveness reduces
competition; it need not necessarily enhance it.
In examining extremism, I attempt to reconcile two competing arguments regarding
restriction. One suggests that restrictiveness is a direct cause of candidate extremism.
This is commonly attributed to the polarized electorates that participate in primaries. In
order to look at these arguments I intend to test both the extremism of primary candi-
dates and House members, as well as examine the success of Tea Party candidates in the
states. I hypothesize that there should be no relationship between candidate extremism
and restrictiveness, and that primary permissiveness may actually be positively related
to the success of Tea Party candidates, as parties (specifically the Republican Party) is
unable to exert control over insurgent candidates in these systems.
The final part of this third goal is to assess this new classification of party systems in
the context of the 21st century political environment. By discussing long term changes
such as the development of the candidate-centered campaign, as well as newer phenom-
ena like tea party factionalism within the Republican party and campaign finance law
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changes, I suggest that recent political developments may interact with primary rules in
ways which may bring their discussion back to the forefront of politics. Specifically, I will
cite recent examples of how state have reevaluated their primary systems in response
to these new political events, a drastic change from the lack of movement in the last
century of primary history.
1.5 Chapter Outline
This dissertation will proceed to in the following manner: First, a short overview of
restrictiveness in terms of primary elections will be discussed in Chapter 2, setting the
framework for the rest of the dissertation. Chapter 3 will outline the various primary
rules that exist in the states, their meaning, their intent, and how they may be classified.
Further, this chapter will lay out the logic behind possible causal mechanisms between
rules and outcomes. Chapter 4 then brings us to present day, laying out and classify-
ing the current primary systems in the states, with a particular attention to the nuance
between states. Further, I will introduce a new classification scheme which focuses on
classifying primaries not based on the voter, but based on party control and restrictive-
ness. This chapter presents the bulk of the data that will be used in later analysis. This
groundwork sets the stage for Chapter 5, which then discusses the traditional narrative
of the adoption of the direct primary as well as our understanding of party power vis-
a-vis the direct primary in light of the nuance of the primaries. This chapter shows that
competing but not exclusive reasons were in place for the adoption of the primary, and
these traditions are directly related to how the primaries are currently configured in the
states. Chapter 6 asserts one of the central themes of the dissertation: the direct primary,
in its many forms, offers parties an avenue (often unrealized) through which to maintain
responsible party control over nomination. While our current understanding often as-
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signs blame for the most negative aspects of primary elections on closed rule systems,
I argue that our flawed classification system often conflates a classification of ‘who may
vote’ with a classification of ‘party control.’ Thus, using a new measure of restrictiveness
I test criticisms of the responsible party framework and restrictive primaries by examin-
ing competition and candidate extremism. In conclusion, Chapter 7 discusses the direct
primary in the context of 21st century politics, and how the direct primary could help to
bring stability and coherence to a fragmented political environment. Recent trends such
as the continued domination of candidates over parties in elections, the introduction
of increased outside money in campaigns, and the rise of insurgent candidates in both
parties all require a reassessment of the direct primary. Parties and legislators alike are
beginning to turn to some of the primary rules explained in this dissertation as tools to
combat these trends.
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Chapter 2
Primaries: Classification and
Restriction
Before embarking on the central arguments of this dissertation, it is worth noting one key
distinction of this study. While many of the aims of this dissertation have been explored
(whether 100 years ago or today) one key feature of these analyses is the use of ‘primary
type’ as the independent variable of interest. Examining previous scholarship we see a
multitude of dependent variables, statistical techniques, and time periods of study. This
chapter will examine how these analyses are frequently implemented, and suggest that a
key feature that scholars are often trying to capture, primary restrictiveness, should be
operationalized differently. Rather than a narrow focus on rules surrounding the ballot
choice of voters, as is commonly done, we must also look largely at other institutional
factors that drive restrictiveness such as candidate filing, independent candidate ballot
access, endorsement features, and the timing of elections. By incorporating a larger set
of primary law features, we can more accurately assess the restrictiveness of a primary
system, enhancing our analytical leverage over questions of party and primary.
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2.1 Studying Primary Rules
Examining existing studies of the direct primary, we can classify these analyses into two
categories which will be addressed later in the dissertation. First, studies regarding the
adoption of the primary, and second, studies regarding the impact of rules. Studies re-
garding the adoption of the primary have sought to examine the circumstances surround
how the primaries were instituted, and their immediate effects. Studies regarding the
impact of rules have generally attempted to discern whether or not traditional primary
classifications were related to electoral phenomena.
2.1.1 Primary Adoption
A first type of scholarship on the primary that this dissertation will examine relates to the
adoption of the primary. In this line of analysis, a hypothesis can be generalized as being
of the form: Primaries in (Progressive/Party) states were adopted in (earlier/later) years. A
second form of hypothesis (although no example of this was found in the literature) could
take the form: Primaries adopted in (Progressive/Party) states took a (weak/strong) form.
Generally, a hypothesis in the first form has been taken as evidence as to, universally, the
motivations for the adoption of the primary. Evidence that progressive states adopted the
primary first has been taken as confirmation that the adoption of the direct primary was
an anti-party, progressive reform. While I reevaluate these claims, I also add a second
type of hypothesis to this line of scholarship. Here, I argue that multiple adoptive
traditions may have existed, and that these traditions are critical in understanding how
primaries are structured today. Drawing on the idea of path dependence and the stability
of institutions, I suggest that strong party states adopted a restrictive style of primary
that continues today, while more progressive states adopted a more permissive form.
In the first example, the classification of primaries is a moot point, as it does not
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factor into the analysis. We need not know anything about how primaries are structured
to determine if they were adopted first in one area or another. However, the second
form, which this dissertation aims to address, requires a dependent variable directly
relating to a classification of primary systems. The question in this case becomes, how
do we operationalize primary classification when used as a dependent variable?
2.1.2 Primary Consequences
A second broad line of scholarship attempts to address questions relating to the impact
of rule systems. Generally, a hypothesis would take the form: (Primary consequence)
should exist in states which have (weak/strong) primary rules. In this case, the conse-
quence of the primary becomes the dependent variable, and the primary rule system
becomes the explanatory independent variable. Examples of this line of inquiry include
studies by Rogowski (2014) and McGhee, Masket, Shor, Rogers, and McCarty (2014) ex-
amining candidate extremism as dependent variable, Ansolabehere and Snyder (2007)
examining party loyalty, and Norrander and Stephens (2012) examining polarization
in the electorate, among many others. As with the example of primary adoption, we
must again be concerned with how we operationalize primary type, in this case, as an
independent variable.
2.1.3 Classifying Primary Type
In both forms of inquiry presented here, primary type is often utilized as a variable of
interest in quantitative analysis. Theoretically, the rationale for its inclusion is that the
type of primary can structure other features of the institution. The mechanism of this
influence is rooted in the ability (or lack thereof) of voters to select ballots, and cast votes.
The rules of the primary regarding party enrollment and ballot choice are assumed to
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affect the partisan and ideological makeup of the electorate. When the makeup of the
electorate changes based on primary rules, then too we should expect the choices that
electorate makes to change.
If we are to look at this assumption through a wider lens, we see that the key theo-
retical claim is that the relationship between primary type and other variables discussed
here is based on the argument that rules structure choices. However, the primary is
governed by a larger set of rules than just those which structure ballot choice. Regard-
less of which ballot voters select, the candidates on that ballot are structured by rules
which set requirements for access. Further, rules relating to the primary can structure
the choices offered to voters seeking an independent candidate. The endorsement of
candidates cannot only structure the ballot itself in terms of special ballot designation
but also inform and influence the choices voters make. Finally, the timing of the primary
and length of the primary season could presumably influence both candidates and vot-
ers. While the discussion of the precise theoretical mechanisms discussed here is saved
for a later chapter, it is clear just from this cursory listing of primary rules, that ballot
choice may not be capturing the complexity of primary systems in the states, and that
a number of features which structure choice are also present. Perhaps the underlying
variable that is truly of interest is not a classification of who can vote, but a broader
measurement of the restrictiveness of a primary system.
2.2 A New Variable: Restriction
If we are to take restrictiveness to be the key measurement of primaries for this disserta-
tion, it is worth briefly discussing the merits of a new classification versus the traditional
open/closed system. The traditional classification scheme for primaries is deficient in
measuring restrictiveness for two broad reasons. First, while traditional classifications
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of primary type do well to classify states into more or less permissive states broadly,
this permissiveness is centered on the voter, and does not capture restrictiveness or per-
missiveness of the larger electoral system. Second, the traditional classification scheme
is plagued with methodological issues which question its utility as an useful ordinal
measure.
To briefly address this first issue, I refer back to the opening of this chapter which
discusses the various aspects of primary elections that are not incorporated into tradi-
tional measures of primary type. While a traditional classification does speak to the
permissiveness or restrictiveness of a primary system inasmuch as it relates to ballot
choice, it cannot speak to a host of other primary rules. In order to capture restrictive-
ness, it is necessary to take account of more than just the voter. By incorporating data
on candidate entry and primary timing among other variables, we can identify primary
systems that exhibit characteristics of party control, or restrictiveness, which are absent
from a traditional open/closed measure. These additions yield a more complete and
nuanced understanding of primary restrictiveness.
Addressing more methodological concerns, we have cause for concern when exam-
ining the utility of an open/closed classification when attempting to make comparisons
between groups. All closed primary states, for instance, are not equally closed. Voters
in New York and Connecticut must make any changes to their party preference months
before the actual primary. In Wyoming and Iowa, voters may do this on election day.
Even if we account for these concerns and reclassify some of these states, we are still
faced with analysis problems. If we recode Iowa because of their late deadline, we then
place it into the same category as Missouri. Again, these states are wholly different in
terms of their laws, a fact that this coarse classification can disguise. Missouri has no
laws regarding primary enrollment, a stark contrast from Iowa. Further, Iowa has much
stricter ballot access laws, possibly winnowing the field of candidates, and altering the
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possible field of candidates. Finally, in 2014, Iowa’s primary season will last 81 days,
whereas Missouri’s will run for 133 days, the longest in the nation. Clearly it is at least
plausible that these systems differ to a degree that calls into question their analytical
use as equivalents. States with equivalent traditional classifications vary on the latitude
given to parties, on the use of pre-primary endorsements, sore loser laws, and a host of
other laws. We must pay more attention to the existence of broad sets of laws in order
to construct a variable which has the sensitivity to offer meaningful comparisons across
states.
One of the key features of this dissertation will be the introduction of a new variable
through which we can more completely conceptualize primary type through the concept
of restrictiveness. Each primary rule, whether it be party enrollment, or candidate
filing fees can be classified as being more or less restrictive. Each law offers parties,
in theory, more or less control over nomination. This new coding continues to capture
traditional measures of ballot choice but allows us access to a wealth of additional data.
By combining these rules together to form a summary variable of the restrictiveness of an
election we create a new and novel measure through which to reassess the direct primary.
Chapter 3 will fully introduce the varying rules and how they relate to restrictiveness,
explaining the rationale for coding and discussing the variation that exists within the
states. Chapter 4 will then classify the rules and the states and create the measure itself.
Before beginning this, we can first elaborate on testable hypotheses to provide a road
map for the rest of the dissertation.
2.2.1 Retesting Findings
Using this new measure of restrictiveness we can address the two lines of research that
will be reexamined within this dissertation, the adoption of the primary, and conse-
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quences of primary rules. How can we better understand these phenomena with a
broader, more complete understanding of the full range of primary rules which govern
nomination?
Primary Adoption
The adoption of the primary is an important avenue to investigate for two reasons.
First, it is worthwhile to investigate the motivations behind the adoption of the direct
primary in the states. A second reason for investigating the adoption of the primary
arises out of the concept of path dependence; that current institutional structures are
a product of their history. One hypothesis which will be introduced in Chapter 5 is
that the various motivations for the adoption of the primary influenced the level of
primary restrictiveness in a state. Specifically, I posit that progressive influences during
the adoption of the primary led to enduring primary rules which can be summarized
as permissive or less restrictive. As progressive reformers sought solutions to the ills of
the convention system, they incorporated progressive ideals of enhanced participation
and openness into the construction of their primary rules Conversely, states which had a
strong party tradition adopted enduring rules which are much more restrictive. Parties
in the west were equally fed up with the convention, but for a different reason. In these
states, parties were losing control over nomination due to the unwieldy nature of the
convention. Rather than reform this broken institution, they crafted the direct primary
as a restrictive institution which would allow them to continue to exert control over a new
method of nomination. If true, this conclusion would go far in helping us understand
why the primary laws of the states vary so widely, and seemingly, randomly.
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Primary Consequences
Examining the consequences of primary laws, I propose an analysis of two consequences
of primary laws in Chapter 6: primary competition, and candidate extremism. In or-
der to do this, I utilize the framework of responsible parties and responsible party
nomination as explained in the introduction. Given this line of thinking, increased re-
strictiveness, and thus, increased party control over nomination should not lead to the
traditional evils associated with the current state of parties and primaries. Responsible
party nomination should enlarge and refine the ideological predispositions of the party,
reducing primary competition to established party candidates, diminishing the potential
for the nomination of extreme candidates, and reducing polarization in the electorate as
the party moderates in order to build stable and broad electoral majorities nationwide.
Thus, increased restrictiveness within the responsible party framework suggests three
testable hypotheses. First, increased restrictiveness should reduce primary competition.
Second, and inextricably linked to the first hypothesis, is that increased restrictiveness
should reduce the nomination of extremist candidates. Finally increased restrictiveness
should be correlated with low polarization in the electorate. While less restrictive pri-
maries allow weakly attached partisans to flow freely between the primaries, restrictive
systems within the responsible party framework would do much to increase partisan
attachment, even among more ideologically moderate voters, in line with the idea of
casting a large ideological net.
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Chapter 3
Rules of the Game
Before proceeding into an in depth analysis of the current primary laws of the states,
their evolution, and the impact that these rules have, it is worthwhile to spend time
examining rules in the abstract. By explaining rule types and their many variations,
later references to these variations will be much easier for the reader.
In order to simplify the presentation of different rule types, they have been bro-
ken down in this chapter into three types. First, are rules which affect who may vote
in an election. Commonly this set of rules are summarized into the familiar Closed,
Semi-Closed, Semi-Open, and Open classifications, or some variation thereof. To move
beyond this simplified typology, this chapter will explain the constituent rules that com-
prise the summary classification, and explain variation in this categorization. A second
type of rule is that which affects primary ballot access and the candidate. Here, I will
address laws which relate to candidate access to the primary ballot, endorsement pro-
cedures, sore-losers, and independent candidates. Third, I will briefly address primary
election timing. While the timing of the primaries does not entail an overly complex
set of rules, it is worth explaining the rationale for the investigation of primary timing
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before proceeding to an analysis in later chapters. At the end of this chapter, it is worth
taking note of how these three sets of rules interact to form a larger notion of primary
openness. Rather than focusing on voter ballot access in isolation, I will present a rubric
which describes a broader classification of primary systems, incorporating the candidate,
and timing, of primaries.
3.1 Who May Vote?
In order to utilize as much data as possible about the nature of primary systems, es-
pecially in light of the end goal of this dissertation —to examine party in terms of the
direct primary, we must move past commonly used summary classifications, in order to
add the detail and nuance necessary to afford meaningful analysis. With this in mind,
it is necessary to classify which features are of the greatest import to the study of party
influence over nomination and to the ability of voters to participate in primaries.
Party Registration
The registration of voters according to party affiliation is perhaps the most basic of
characteristics that is meaningful to the analysis of parties and the direct primary. In
terms of basic logistic considerations, voter restrictions are essentially impossible without
party registration. Considering party registration further, the maintenance of lists of
party voters is also of great importance to the power of a party in terms of its ability to
understand and gain access to its base of voters.
Kansas offers us some anecdotal insight into this motivation. For over 100 years,
Kansas law has mandated a purely closed primary system (in both intent, and prac-
tice). Recently courts have overturned this mandate on grounds of a party’s freedom
of association. Now, Kansas law mandates a default position of closed, but allows both
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parties to determine who may vote in their respective primaries. The Republican party
of Kansas has maintained strictly-closed rules, however, until recently, the Democratic
Party allowed both registered Republicans and unaffiliated voters to vote in their pri-
mary. In the 2014 election, Kansas Democrats will hold a strictly-closed primary as well.
A spokesperson for the party acknowledged voter identification as a large part of the de-
cision to close the party primary. Specifically, the party cites the ability to better identify
and target party members and encourage them to vote in the general election. Under
previous rules, Democrats may have masqueraded as unaffiliated or even Republican
voters in official voter lists because they were not required to officially align themselves
in order to participate in the Democratic primary. The hopes of party officials in Kansas,
in that the new closed rule will provide the impetus for misaligned members to become
official Democratic Party members, enhancing the party’s ability to contact these voters
in the general election.
Given these benefits to parties, the existence of party registration in the states can be
seen as beneficial to party power and party control over nomination, and coded as such
when classifying primary systems.
Ballot Choice
With the first criteria of party registration in place, we can delve deeper into the clas-
sification of primary openness by examining whether or not party affiliation is tied to
ballot choice. Here, states can be classified by whether party registration is linked to
a voter’s ability to choose a ballot. This criterion is perhaps most directly linked with
our traditional notions of a closed or open primary, but again, in isolation it does not
tell the entire story. In order to facilitate analysis, states can be classified by whether or
not their ballot choice must align with official party registration. These systems may or
may not allow unaffiliated voters, but the distinction is made that if someone is affili-
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ated with a party, they must vote in the primary of that party. We can later distinguish
states with a public declaration but not registration, and states which allow unaffiliated
voters to participate. These characteristics are accounted for separately in order to re-
tain information about party members while separating out the nuances of the various
systems. As with party registration, ballot choice restriction is again associated with a
more closed system, and one which affords more control to state parties.
Public Declarations
Closely related to ballot choice, is the necessity of a public declaration of party affiliation.
In many states without voter registration, and with open access to party ballots, voters
must still make public declarations as to which ballot they intend to vote. While this
distinction may seem trivial, in terms of the psychology of party identification, there is
still a valuable difference between the requirement to state an affiliation and the ability to
make this decision in private. As mentioned earlier, in states which do not require some
public statement of ballot choice, voters are given either one ballot with both parties’
candidates, or they receive two separate ballots. In the case of the former, voters may
only vote for candidates of one party, and that choice is made privately, and in the latter
case, the voter privately discards the unused party ballot. While the former may sound
like a form of the California blanket primary, the restriction that voters may only vote
for candidates of one party distinguishes this practice from the California practice which
was ruled unconstitutional.
Unaffiliated Voter Participation
The inclusion or exclusion of unaffiliated or independent voters is another important
criteria when classifying primary voter rules. In some states unaffiliated or independent
voters may participate in party primaries. It is important to note, however, that unaffili-
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ated participation differs in one important aspect across many of the states. This distinc-
tion revolves around the ability to maintain unaffiliated status throughout the primary
voting process. Two examples delineate this difference. In Iowa and New Hampshire,
scholars and political observers alike often cite the ability of unaffiliated voters to partic-
ipate in party primaries. What is often left out of this assertion, is that unaffiliated voters
are actually changing their party affiliation when they request a ballot. In both states,
unaffiliated voters may choose either party ballot on Election Day, however, they are then
enrolled as party members and retain this affiliation. While the difficulty of returning to
an unaffiliated status differs across states, it is important to note that an actual change
of party affiliation takes place in these cases. In other states such as Arizona and North
Carolina, unaffiliated or independent voters are allowed to choose either party ballot on
Election Day, and no record of their choice, and no change in their affiliation takes place.
The ability of a voter to retain their unaffiliated status throughout the entire voting
process is a situation distinct from the ability to easily change affiliation (and perhaps
change back to an unaffiliated status) in order to participate. Therefore, in classifying un-
affiliated voter participation, we must keep distinct those states which specifically allow
unaffiliated voters to participate and remain unaffiliated. The psychological attachment
to party identification (and to partisan independence) is too important a factor to ignore
when considering party affiliation change. If we are to say that a temporary change
in affiliation is an insignificant barrier to voter ballot choice (as is often done when
considering Iowa and New Hampshire), what cutoff becomes significant? If unaffiliated
voters were able to change their registration up to, but not on Election Day, and then
subsequently unaffiliate when exiting the polls, would this situation be equivalent? Alter-
natively, if unaffiliated voters could choose a party on election day but had to wait one
week to regain their independent status, could this situation be seen as equivalent? The
meaningful difference in these situations is the necessity of changing party affiliation,
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regardless of the length of time the change is in effect.
In order to take unaffiliated voter participation into account when classifying primary
rules, we should only consider those states which allow unaffiliated voters to participate
without jeopardizing their independence. Further variables which set out registration
deadlines can then facilitate the analysis of more or less restrictive systems. The question
of when party affiliation change may take place still has an important place in this
analysis, however we must be sure to distinguish these deadlines from considerations of
unaffiliated voter participation. The ability of state parties to require party affiliation or
allow unaffiliated participation is the crucial criterion here, not the deadline for changing
affiliation.
Registration Deadlines
With the discussion of unaffiliated voter participation settled (inasmuch as it can be), we
must now turn to registration and change of affiliation deadlines. States vary widely on
the relative ease with which both party members or unaffiliated voters may change their
party membership. Two distinctions must be made in order to capture the differences
across states. First it is necessary to capture the deadline for party members to change
their affiliation. Second, we must capture the deadline for unaffiliated members to reg-
ister a party affiliation. This classification not only allows us to determine the strictness
of party affiliations, but the degree to which independents have access to more closed
systems. Generally, deadlines for a change in registration should fall close to, or on
Election Day in more open systems. If these deadlines are significantly in advance of
Election Day, they suggest a benefit to parties in terms of their control over nomination.
This is due to the relative emphasis on party over candidate in the early stages of an
election, and the emphasis on candidates in late stages of the election.
It should be noted that the relative distance of the registration deadline to Election
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Day does not offer much substantive insight into party control over nomination, or the
emphasis on party over candidate. It is unclear the difference between a deadline one
day, two weeks, or even one month before Election Day. Theoretically, the candidate fil-
ing deadline marks a significant and substantive cut-point in the election calendar. Carr
and Scott (1984) suggest this approach when examining primary elections. A system
which emphasizes party considerations in nomination would have registration dead-
lines before the candidate filing deadline, thus emphasizing party and party label, and
deemphasizing the slate of candidates. A registration between the filing deadline and
including Election Day would be likely favor a candidate-centered considerations over
party. While one could argue that primary nomination campaigns would lend to sub-
stantive differences in deadlines that fall into this second category, we should be wary of
over-analyzing these differences with the attempt to classify deadlines any further than
this. While campaigns likely have an impact on voter knowledge and knowledge of can-
didates, it is impossible to determine where to place additional cut points between the
filing date and the primary.
Taking these considerations into account, registration deadlines can be classified into
two meaningfully substantive groupings: deadlines before primary ballots are finalized,
and deadlines between the filing deadline and on Election Day. This point delineation
allows for the variation needed for analysis, a theoretical rationale rooted in the distinc-
tion between party and candidate, and avoids over-classification and the potential for
negating the analytical utility of the classification.
Loyalty Oaths
One last feature that deserves mention, is the loyalty oath. In some states, rules exist
which (with varying legal weight) bind voters through an oath or pledge. These oaths
usually take one of two forms. In some cases, ballot choice may be restricted to only
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those voters who attest that they have voted for a majority of one party’s candidates in
a previous election. A second form exists in which a voter pledges to support the same
party in the general election that they choose in the primary. Again, it is important to
note that these oaths are enforced with varying degrees of legal fortitude. In Indiana, for
example, a voter is attesting to these two conditions when they sign the poll book and
receive their ballot during the primary. Legal challenges to these oaths exist, however
they are rare, and often, evidence of malfeasance is difficult to obtain. Further, few mod-
ern loyalty oaths are explicitly part of the voting process. In many cases, references to
loyalty oaths only appear in party bylaws or state statute, leaving voters largely unaware
of their existence or effect. Due to the relative lack of power of these rules and their
largely informal nature, they will be mentioned in synopses of state laws only in the case
that they are central to voter ballot access, and will not be part of the larger analysis of
this project.
Table 3.1: Summary List of Primary Rule Criterion
Criterion Explanation
Party Registration Does state register voters by party affiliation?
Ballot Choice Is ballot choice restricted by party registration?
Public Declaration Do voters make a public declaration for a ballot?
Unaffiliated Participation Are unaffiliated voters allowed to participate in party
primaries and retain unaffiliated status?
Registration Deadline When can partisans change affiliation?
When can independents affiliate with a party?
Loyalty Oaths Are voters required to make statements with regards
to past or future voting intentions?
3.1.1 Classification Schemes for Voting Rules
As previously noted, rules regarding voter ballot access are often summarized into cat-
egories consisting of Closed, Semi-Closed, Semi-Open, and Open. What is unclear,
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however, is the exact nature of this classification. Often, these labels are used by parties,
states, and scholars, in varying ways, and with varying meaning. It is for this very rea-
son that this chapter lists the constituent parts of these classifications in order to better
facilitate and understanding of their meaning and impact. Before proceeding it is worth
examining some of the ways in which these terms are used and discussing their relevance
to party control over nomination.
In the traditional classification scheme of primaries, a four-fold (and sometimes five-
fold, including nonpartisan systems) is used to designate primary systems. To reiterate,
these terms include Closed, Semi-Closed, Semi-Open, and Open systems. One possi-
ble fifth classification is that of non-partisan, blanket, top-two, or jungle system. This
distinction refers to states such as Louisiana which do not place official party labels on
primary ballots, and do not fall on the four-part ordinal spectrum. For the purposes of
this analysis of voter laws, I will treat these systems separately. Before proceeding, it is
important to note that not all scholars have utilized this spectrum of classification and
some have opted for a much simpler Open/Closed typology. Further, others have also
used three-category classification systems, such as Maisel, Gibson, and Ivry (1998) who
use two classes of closed primaries and only one class of open primary.
In the ordinal scale of classification, a primary system is generally referred to as
purely open if voters are allowed to choose to participate in any party primary, and they
make this choice privately. Purely open systems are contrasted with semi-open systems,
in which voters may choose any party primary but must make some public declaration
of their party affiliation. Most often this declaration consists of publicly asking a poll
worker for the ballot of one party or the other. In purely open systems, voters are either
given one ballot which contains candidates from both parties, or they are given both
party ballots and instructed to discard one privately. As mentioned earlier, in the former
case, voters may only choose candidates from one party, even if they are all placed on
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the same ballot. A violation of this requirement generally spoils the ballot, negating
votes for all candidates.
These open systems can be contrasted with the two closed classification systems. In
purely closed systems, only voters who are registered with the parties may vote in that
party’s primary election. These closed systems are contrasted with semi-closed systems
which open voting to independent or unaffiliated voters. In both cases, states generally
perform party registration during voter registration and these lists are used to enforce
proper party ballot selection.
Traditional classification schemes are generally utilized in two ways. In order to
properly classify a state, one can examine the wording of a law, or how that law operates
in practice. When examining legal wording, a reading of state statute determines the
classification of a primary based on sets of relevant characteristics. State election statutes
will often state that the party primary is closed except to members of a given party.
Likewise, a statute may state that the primary is open to all voters. How these primaries
operate in practice, however, is often quite different from the intent of a primary rule
system. There are, for example, states whose election code specifies a closed primary
system, however, rules regarding the actual implementation of this system may mean, in
practice, that the primary system is open. Iowa currently presents a good example of
this type of confusion. Both the Iowa secretary of state, and the Iowa election code state
that Iowa runs a closed primary. However, due to the ability of voters to change their
party registration on the election day, Iowa has a fairly open primary. What, then, is the
measuring stick for classifying these primaries into this traditional scheme?
To examine the occasional conflict between the wording and practice of primary laws,
different rubrics could be established for classifying primaries. Most often, scholars look
to practice, rather than the wording of the law in order to clarify confusion. This,
however, is only one potential way to bring clarity to confusing statutes.
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Table 3.2: Traditional Primary Classification Crosswalk
Party
Registration
Open Ballot
Choice
Public
Declaration
Independent
Voting
Pure Closed Yes Yes Yes No
Semi-Closed Yes Yes Yes Yes
Semi-Open N/A No Yes Yes
Pure Open N/A No No Yes
Possibility 1 —examine how state laws or officials refer to their primary, regardless
of practice or actual implementation. This possibility does not offer the most complete
examination of rule systems, but does contain information valuable to the classification
of primary systems. Returning to the example of Iowa, state law and the secretary
of state consider Iowa’s primary system closed because, by the letter of the law, only
members of a party may vote in a party primary. Further, voters who are registered as
unaffiliated or independent may not vote in party primaries, therefore, a classification
under this system would be ‘purely closed’.
Possibility 2 —examine who may realistically vote in primaries, in practice, regardless
of language in statute, or interpretation by officials. A rubric of sorts can then be created
to ‘back in’ to a classification. Table 3.2 shows a crosswalk between the various criteria
explained here and their relationship to traditional open/closed coding. The table also
shows the aforementioned flaw with our traditional notions of voting in primaries. Again,
using our example of Iowa, the state would be classified as a pure closed system. This
aligns with some scholarly interpretations of Iowa’s primary, as well as with state law. An
appeal to a more detailed view of the practice of Iowa’s primary would include the state’s
highly relaxed registration deadline, thus garnering a more open designation. In Iowa,
all voters, those affiliated with a party, and those unaffiliated, may easily change their
party registration up to, and on, election day. Ignoring the question of the psychological
attachment to party identification for the sake of the exercise, this system would allow
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such an easy change in registration as to render the party restrictions moot. Therefore,
using practice as a way to examine primary rules, we would likely classify Iowa as a
‘semi-open’ primary, as any voter (again, in practice) may vote in any primary, so long
as they fill out a change of affiliation at the polling place on Election Day. A recent
paper by McGhee et al. (2014) classified Iowa as Semi-Open on this basis, creating a
classification scheme which would look like Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Alternative Primary Classification Scheme
Party Regist. Open Ballot
Choice
Public
Declaration
P.R. Change
Deadline
(partisan)
P.R. Change
Deadline
(unaff.)
Pure Closed Yes Yes Yes Early Early
Semi-Closed Yes N/A Yes Early Election Day
Semi-Open N/A N/A Yes Election Day Election Day
Pure Open N/A No No Varies Varies
Possibility 3 —examine all applicable laws in order to create a scale of party control.
In taking on this third possible classification scheme we look at both intent and practice,
as well as a host of other laws which are often overlooked. Does a state refer to its
primary as closed or open (wording of the law)? Does the state perform party registra-
tion? Does state law restrict primary voting based on party registration? Do state parties
restrict primary voting based on party registration? How difficult/easy is it for a voter to
change his or her party affiliation? This last question entails an examination of not only
registration deadlines but record-keeping on behalf of states and parties. In some cases,
records are kept detailing changes in affiliation, and those who switch between parties
are treated differently from unaffiliated voters who affiliate with a party. Finally, we must
also look at the potential for pledges of loyalty to parties in primary voting. In some
cases (regardless of their force of law), voters are required to pledge to support parties in
the future, or may be required to state their allegiance to the party in the past in order
to vote in a party primary.
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Examining Iowa under this third possibility we are able to see a wealth of detail
and nuance in the primary system. Iowa does consider its primary closed, it performs
party registration, it does not allow unaffiliated voters to vote in party primaries, it offers
easy Election Day affiliation change, and does not require oaths of loyalty or support
of candidates. Classifying Iowa as a closed system under Classification 1, or a semi-
open system under Classification 2, we lose important details regarding the nature of the
primary system.
In addition to the loss of detail, we cannot reasonably compare two states with the
same classification. Take Iowa, again, as an example of this problem:
Using only the wording of law, Iowa would be classified as a closed system. When
using this measure analytically, we would then group Iowa with other closed primary
states such as New York. Measurement problems appear when we look to the specifics of
these systems. New York does not allow easy change of registration, requiring a nearly 12
month advance notice of these changes. As noted earlier, Iowa allows party registration
change on Election Day. This distinction then suggests a fault with our classification
scheme, as two vastly different primaries would be treated as being empirically equal.
Using a more sophisticated classification scheme, such as the one shown in 3.3 on
the preceding page we now classify Iowa as a semi-open state. In this example, our
empirical equivalent is now Missouri, a state which also would be classified as semi-
open. When testing a particular hypothesis, we group Iowa and Missouri and treat them
as analytic equals, however these two primary systems are again very different. Missouri,
for example does not perform any party registration, in contrast to Iowa. Additionally,
Independent and unaffiliated voters in Missouri may vote in either primary without the
need to temporarily change their registration status. We have again equated to vastly
different primary systems.
To take the example further, a simple change in the registration deadline for Iowa
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would completely alter its primary process. If the voter registration deadline were to
be moved back one month, Iowa’s primaries would be drastically altered. This simple
change in Missouri would not alter its primary system at all. The ordinal categories
presented here are flawed in that they do not suggest similarity in primary systems and
they do not inform us as to the relative distance or separation between categories. .
This example shows the inability to compare states, and the problems associated with
treating such a classification as an ordinal measure.
The lack of analytical leverage afforded to us by classification systems which deal
mainly with the end result of the complete set of laws (who can vote?) can be overcome.
Given the nature of this inquiry, the question of ‘who votes?’ is much less important
than the classification of states into more or less restrictive states, given the number of
restrictive or open features, and their relation to party control over nomination. While
we lose the ability to easily discern who can vote from this type of classification (which
I assert is inconsequential to this analysis) we regain the ordinal aspect to this measure
and cannot only gain analytical leverage with this measure alone, but can combine it
with other features of the primary system to gain even more insight into primary systems.
In order to craft this new measure, I suggest two new questions to add to our analysis
of primary systems: Who may run, and when is the primary?
3.2 Who May Run?
The first new features of primary rules that I suggest we add to our classification of
primary systems are restrictions on ballot access. A key way for parties to influence
the nomination of candidates, is to control the field of challengers. Ballot access laws
take on many forms, from a candidate getting their name on the primary ballot, to
endorsements, and restrictions on the general election ballot. Further, these laws not
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only affect the parties themselves, but are central to the ability of independent and third
party candidates. Additionally, I suggest that they operate in tandem with questions
of ‘who may vote’ as these rules structure the choices that are presented to the vot-
ers. In order to examine these features more closely, I will elaborate on specific ballot
controls, endorsement procedures, sore loser laws, and rules which govern independent
candidacies.
Ballot Access
Hurdles to ballot access vary widely across the states and are the first test that a potential
candidate must face in the primary process. Generally, states select one of two barriers
to primary ballot access - a signature petition, or a filing fee. The rationale for the use
of some barrier is the need for a test of legitimacy. Whether these barriers actually filter
for candidate viability and legitimacy is less certain.
In the case of signature petitions, candidates are generally presented with one of two
qualification to meet. The first is a set signature requirement. Chapter 3 delves into the
specifics of these laws, but they range anywhere from a minimal 10 signatures to a more
substantial 2,000 signatures. Alternatively, candidates may face a requirement that is
tied to the number or registered party members, or more commonly, to the number of
ballots cast for a party candidate (for example, governor) in the previous election. Again,
Chapter 3 lays out these requirements more fully, but the general range of percentage
requirements is anywhere from .5% to 3%.
A second possible requirement for candidates is a filing fee, rather than a signature
petition. Again, there are two types of filing fees which states currently use - a percentage
fee and a nominal fee. When filing fees are set as a percentage, they are generally tied
to the salary of the office a candidate is seeking. These fees range from 1% to 6% of the
yearly salary of the office. In the alternative case, a set fee is assessed on the candidates.
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When these set fees are utilized, they are generally small, and do not exceed $500. Given
these small nominal fees, it becomes apparent that assessments based on a percentage
of office-holder salary are quite larger than their nominal counterparts. As an example,
Georgia, which assesses a 3% fee, ultimately will charge candidates $5,220 (given the
annual House salary of $174,000).
As a final note on ballot access requirements, it is worth pointing out that the courts
have struck down the constitutionality of filing fees as a sole barrier to ballot access
when they are nontrivial sums. In these cases, many states have put in place provisions
for candidates to gain ballot access through a signature petition if they cannot afford the
filing fee.
Endorsements
Pre-primary endorsements by the parties are a second feature of primary laws which
directly affect the candidate. While these laws have become more and more rare in
recent years, a fair number of states have provisions which allow the party to afford
certain candidates this endorsement advantage (if one exists, cite etc).
Formal party endorsements fall into two categories based on their authority. In
some states, statute dictates that state parties hold pre-primary nominating or endorsing
conventions. In some of these cases, multiple candidates are endorsed by the convention
(usually by meeting some moderate threshold of convention support) and gain preference
on the ballot through this distinction. For example, New Mexico law affords a pre-
primary endorsement to any candidate receiving 20% of the convention vote. In Utah,
the parties only designate two candidates for endorsement, and if one candidate manages
to garner 70% of the convention vote, they are automatically named the party nominee
without a primary election.
It is worth noting that in some of these states, including Colorado, Connecticut,
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New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Utah, and Virginia, pre-primary
conventions continue to be used for candidate nomination. Its use in Virginia is sporadic,
and in Connecticut, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, and Rhode Island there
are petition options for non-convention candidates. However, in cases with optional
petition access, candidates still regularly use the convention process to circumvent this
hurdle. In all cases, a primary will occur among the candidates receiving ballot access
through the convention, however, Colorado and Utah allow a candidate to circumvent
the primary entirely if he or she receives 50% or 70% of the convention vote, respectively.
In subsequent analysis, I will continue to classify these states according to all of their
primary features, however, there will be cases where it is worthwhile to separate out
those states which use this hybrid convention system.
In other states which allow for endorsements, they are done outside the legal frame-
work of state statutes. Endorsements in these states are allowed by party bylaw, and not
statute. In these cases, candidates are either chosen for endorsement by convention or
committee, and they do not receive the same preference on the ballot as those endorsed
under state statute. While they do not receive special designation on a ballot, it is plau-
sible that these candidates still maintain some favorable positioning compared to their
unendorsed counterparts.
Sore-Loser Laws
Sore loser laws represent a third type of primary rule that pertains to candidates. These
laws, introduced in the early 20th century, prohibit failed party nominees from running
on the general election ballot as independents or members of another party. Over the
course of the 20th century, nearly every state has adopted some form of sore loser law.
These laws vary in their execution, but generally fulfill the same goal. For example,
in some states, candidates who appear on a primary ballot are explicitly forbidden
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from appearing on a general election ballot for any other party, or as an independent.
In other cases, independent candidates must file for the general election ballot at the
same time as candidates file for the primary ballot, essentially excluding only those
candidates with extreme foresight. There are many other forms of sore-loser laws, but
their intent remains the same - the exclusion of failed party nominees from the general
election ballot. Generally regarded as protecting parties from spoiler candidates, their
actual effects are more nuanced. Nevertheless, they are one of the few examples of the
evolution of a new primary rule intended to directly benefit the party.
Independent Candidacies
It is worth noting that these three categories of candidate-related rules all have an equal,
and sometimes more deleterious effect on independent and third party candidacies. It
is for this reason that we can think of these rules not only as a source of party power
over nomination, but as a source of power for the two-party system over third parties.
In many states, ballot access requirements are different for minor party and independent
candidates. It is not often, however, that these requirements are more relaxed. In
many states, ballot access rules remain a impenetrable barrier for many independent
candidates without the support of a formal party organization. Endorsements can be
seen as equally deleterious to an independent or third party candidate as these ugly
ducklings have no formal party from which to garner an endorsement. Further, sore-
loser laws, which may be seen as only a protection of parties against spoiler candidacies,
also greatly minimize the potential talent pool for those looking for an independent
or third party candidate. Indeed there may be a vacuum of talent as the majority
of serious contenders (including those who may represent moderate factions of their
party) are ultimately excluded from seeking independent access to the ballot after a
failed attempt to do so through the major parties. In sum, these candidate-related rules
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all have the same effect - increasing the difficulty of running an independent or third
party election campaign, and strengthening the advantages of the two major parties in
American politics.
One set of rules, however, applies specifically to independent and third party candi-
dates. These are candidate filing deadlines. In the several states, these deadlines vary
throughout the election calendar. In order to gain leverage, I suggest a categorization of
these dates in order to simplify their use. Similar to voter registration deadlines, we can
point out important cut points in order to aid in the classification of independent filing
deadlines. In this case, the major party filing deadline and the primary date itself serve
as useful and empirically meaningful dates. Using these we can construct three windows
in which a deadline may fall. First, the deadline may fall before or on the major party
filing date. In these cases, independent and third party candidates are at a disadvantage,
as they may not have any information regarding the potential slate of major party candi-
dates. This knowledge is of critical importance when considering questions of candidate
entry. The appearance (or lack) of a strong major party candidate may inform decisions
on independent entry into the election. In the second window, from the major party
filing deadline until the primary, independent candidates have the marginal advantage
of knowing the potential general election candidates by virtue of knowing the primary
field. While they are not as disadvantaged as their counterparts who file before major
party candidates, they do not have the luxury of knowing the final general election field.
Finally, we can look at deadlines that fall after the primary. In these cases, independent
and third party candidates have full knowledge about the general election field and can
maximize the use of this information in their decision to enter the race. In sum, parties
retain a maximum of control over nomination when independent and third party filing
deadlines are placed congruous with, or before the party filing deadlines.
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3.3 When is the Primary?
A final set of rules deal with the timing of the primary. While general election dates
are set by federal law, two dates are set by the states and essentially set both the length
of the primary election and the length of the general election. The general election
date provides our end date for elections, but it is the placement of candidate filing
deadlines and the placement of the primary itself which divides the year into these
two specific election seasons. While the timing of elections may seem trivial, these
dates set the relative length of time in which we may see the effects of primary discord,
competitiveness, or voter fatigue. While the title of this section seems to place an
emphasis on the date of the primary election, it is important to remember that the
candidate filing deadline is an equally important date, determining the length of the
primary campaign season. In some states, a late summer or fall primary may suggest a
long primary season, however if candidate filing deadlines are appropriately placed in
the summer, the primary need not last an excessive length of time.
3.4 Crafting a New Classification
With the full set of rules explained, we can go about the business of merging this in-
formation into one analytically useful measure of party control over primaries. In con-
ceptualizing this measure I suggest comparing primary systems to a model system of
restrictiveness. By asking ‘What set of laws create the most restriction in a primary sys-
tem?’ and then comparing states’ rules, we can develop a measure of primary systems
based on party control.
In order to create this measure, I argue that all the rules presented above can be
classified as either being restrictive or open. In the few cases where multiple categories
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exist (timing rules), there is still a logical ordering to the relative restrictiveness of a rule.
Table 3.4 presents all of the above rules and their restrictive or open coding.
Table 3.4: Primary Rule Classification
Rule Conditional
Party Registration Restrictive State Records Affiliation
Open No Party Affiliation
Ballot Choice Restrictive Choice Tied to Affiliation
Open Free Choice
Public Declaration Restrictive Required
Open Not Required
Unaffiliated Participation Restrictive May not participate
Open Allowed to Participate
Registration Deadline Most Restrictive Before Candidate Filing
Restrictive Before Primary
Open Election Day
Ballot Access Restrictive Non-trivial Fee
Non-trivial Number of Signatures
Open Trivial Fee
Trivial Number of Signatures
Endorsements Restrictive Allowed
Open Prohibited
Sore Loser Law Restrictive Bars Sore Losers
Open Allows Sore Losers
Independent Candidates Most Restrictive Before Party Deadline
Restrictive Before Primary
Open After Primary
Primary Length Restrictive Short
Open Long
Crafting a scale from these binary (or ordinal) classifications can be done by simply
creating an additive measure, equally weighting all of the variables, and then scaling this
measure from zero to one. We have now created a measure which speaks directly to the
relative openness of a primary system.
In sum, this chapter has explained the deficiencies with traditional classification
schemes and presented a rubric for rating the openness of primary systems based on
a larger set of features. I have explained the relevant features of primary rules and
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with this understanding in hand, we can proceed to examining the current status of
these rules in the states and introducing the calculation of this measure in Chapter 4,
before proceeding to a discussion of the adoption narrative and crafting of these rules
in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 4
The Rules in the States
Given the diverse set of rules introduced in the previous chapter. I will now present sum-
maries of the various rules as they exist in the states today, as well as presenting a new
calculation of primary restrictiveness as previously introduced. While these quantitative
summaries do well to present the various rules of the states, there are many anomalous
and unique features of the various primaries which are not easily coded. In order to
preserve the brevity of this discussion, yet retain this nuance, state by state narratives
which include these other details are presented in the Appendix to this dissertation.
4.1 An Overview of State Rules
In order to best present the various rules of the states, this section will break down the
rules presented in the previous chapter along with summary tables of the states. In each
case, I also discuss any methodological or data issues which arise from coding.
49
A Note on Data Sources
The data in this section have been compiled in all cases from multiple sources. Most
often, state statutes serve as a baseline for this information. Each state’s most recent
election codes and state statutes were consulted in order to code these rules generally.
When confusion arose in a reading of the statute, the Secretaries of States’ offices were
contacted to clarify procedure. There were cases in which state statute may include
certain requirements that are antiquated or unenforceable. These government officials
were able to clarify how the primary worked in practice in order to present the most
accurate representation of the laws. In some cases, rules regarding the administration
of the primary are left to parties. Parties in some states are able to select their criteria
for membership, and determine who may vote in the primaries. Further, some states
incorporate informal practices such as pre-primary endorsements into the primary sys-
tem, requiring an investigation of parties in addition to statute. In these situations, party
bylaws were consulted to clarify procedure, and in cases of confusion, party offices were
contacted to verify information. In addition to these official sources, Project Vote Smart,
The Center for Voting and Democracy, the Lucy Burns Institute, and the Green Papers
served as important sources for the validation of this data. After completing the coding
of a state, these non-official sources provided a check on the accuracy of coding, and
another phase of re-verification in cases where there was not agreement. Finally, the
Federal Election Commission provided both primary election dates and candidate filing
deadlines. In all cases, this data presented in this chapter is presumed to be accurate for
the 2014 election, but could change before Election Day. With that in mind, this chapter
should be seen as a loose guide to primary rules and not a definitive compendium.
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Party Enrollment
One of the key primary rules that is discussed in Chapter 3 is that of party enrollment.
In order for a vast number of other rules to effectively function, a state must offer
registration by party and keep records of this registration. As party registration is
generally optional, this variable merely codes whether or not there are mechanisms in
place to record party membership. This variable does not connote the actual use of this
registration for electoral purposes, as some states record party membership but then
proceed not to use it in any meaningful way. As of 2014, 30 states enrolled voters by
party, while 20 did not. States are listed in Table 4.1 by their capacity to enroll voters
and record membership. Thinking in terms of primary restrictiveness, a party has more
control, and more rules at its disposal, when they are provided with lists of voters by the
states.
Table 4.1: Party Registration by State
States With Party Registration States Without Party Registration
Alaska Nebraska Alabama Montana
Arizona Nevada Arkansas North Dakota
California New Hampshire Georgia Ohio
Colorado New Jersey Hawaii South Carolina
Connecticut New Mexico Illinois Tennessee
Delaware New York Indiana Texas
Florida North Carolina Michigan Vermont
Idaho Oklahoma Minnesota Virginia
Iowa Oregon Mississippi Washington
Kansas Pennsylvania Missouri Wisconsin
Kentucky Rhode Island
Louisiana South Dakota
Maine Utah
Maryland West Virginia
Massachusetts Wyoming
In addition to party registration, it is worth noting the deadline at which voters
can no longer change their party affiliation. A late party enrollment deadline is not as
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restrictive as an earlier one, however courts have ruled that these deadlines can not be
so restrictive as to pose an unnecessary burden on voters. As mentioned in Chapter 3,
the date of interest when examining enrollment deadlines is the primary filing deadline
for candidates. If voters are allowed to change their affiliation after they see the slate of
candidates, a state is coded as having permissive party change rules. If however, this date
falls before the candidates are set, a state is coded as having a restrictive party change
deadline. This coding captures the potential for party shopping, or selecting a party not
based on ideological concerns, but on concerns specific to the candidates. Of the 30
states which have provisions for party enrollment, 8 states, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho,
Kentucky, New Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island require voters to
set their party choice on or before the candidate filing deadline. The remaining party
enrollment states have a deadline between the filing deadline and Election Day, with
Iowa and Wyoming notably setting their deadline on Election Day. While some states
allow unaffiliated voters to enroll in a party on election day, I have only listed those
which allow partisans to switch parties. The ability of unaffiliated voters to participate is
addressed in a later variable.
Ballot Choice
Examining ballot choice, I ask the question “Does statute or rule restrict the choice
of ballot based on party membership?" This question is separate from our first rule
regarding party enrollment, yet also inextricably intertwined. All the states listed in
Table 4.1 on the previous page as having party registration require that registration to
align with the choice of ballot at the primary with few notable exceptions. With the
non-partisan primary in California and Louisiana, ballot choice is a moot point, as all
candidates appear on one ballot. Additionally, parties are allowed to set their own ballot
choice requirements in Alaska, Idaho, and Utah, and Democrats in all of these states have
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chosen to allow Republican voters into their primary. It is worth noting that Kansas also
allowed this arrangement before closing their primaries for the 2014 election. Finally,
returning to Table 4.1 on page 51 statute in Illinois and Indiana specifically states that
only party members may vote in a party primary. However, without the party enrollment
lists to enforce this, the practical effect of the statute is uncertain and its enforcement
highly variable across the states. While these early forms of ballot restriction may have
been effective in smaller jurisdictions, their continued applicability or enforceability is
questionable at best. In deciding how to code these states, I opted to conform with
statute, as the intent of the law is to clearly bar crossover voting. At any time these
states may choose to enforce the law more vigorously, and it is unclear whether the
average voter is willing to flaunt the official position of these states - that crossover
voting is prohibited - because they do not fear penalty. Further, legal punishment does
exist in these states if election judges choose to pursue the matter.
Public Declarations
While a public declaration for a voter’s choice of ballot may seem a matter of course in
states with party enrollment, there is a fair amount of variation in states without party
registration. Examining states without party enrollment, Hawaii, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, North Dakota, Vermont, and Wisconsin do not require a public declaration,
allowing voters the opportunity to select their ballot of choice in private, discarding
the unused party ballot. In Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia, a voter must publicly
express their ballot preference. This distinction may seem trivial, however it makes up
the key difference in the traditional classification between semi-open and purely open
states. Further, the public declaration of a party preference may impact voter behavior.
In some states, the declaration merely consists of a ballot preference, whereas other
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states regard it as a verbal declaration of party membership. In either case, this public
declaration may discourage freely moving between the parties.
Unaffiliated Voter Participation
Thinking about the participation of unaffiliated voters, we uncover yet another form of
restriction in the primaries. The exclusion of unaffiliated voters is an important rule
to investigate as both states with and without party enrollment allow the participation
of these voters to some extent. In states without party enrollment, the participation of
unaffiliated voters is a given. No restriction can be made on a classification that does
not exist. Further, in states with enrollment, but without ballot choice restrictions, the
participation of these voters is, again, secured. There are currently no states which allow
enrolled members of a party to vote in either primary while simultaneously disallowing
those who are not enrolled at all.
Examining those states which allow unaffiliated voter participation, we see two dis-
tinct groups emerge. These two groups are then contrasted with states which disallow
unaffiliated voting. Table 4.2 on the next page shows the states in which unaffiliated
voters may vote, and the mechanism through which this opportunity is granted. In states
where unaffiliated voter participation is allowed, the mechanism can either be through
virtue of the state having no party enrollment, and in other cases, party enrollment may
exist but unaffiliated voters are allowed to participate in partisan primaries through ex-
plicit statutory permission. In the case where unaffiliated participation is not allowed, the
mechanism is always through an explicit prohibition on unaffiliated participation. Some
states are denoted with parties in cases where parties can set participation requirements
and have done so differently. In these cases, laws may change from year to year, as the
parties must inform the states of their intention to allow or disallow unaffiliated partic-
ipation, thus, these rules are representative of 2014 laws, but may not apply to previous
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years. As mentioned earlier, one recent change involved Kansas, in which Democrats
allowed unaffiliated participation in 2012, but subsequently ended this provision for 2014.
Table 4.2: Unaffiliated Voter Participation in Primaries
Unaffiliated Participation
No Party Enrollment Alabama Minnesota Tennessee
Arkansas Mississippi Texas
Georgia Missouri Vermont
Hawaii Montana Virginia
Illinois* North Dakota Wisconsin
Indiana* Ohio
Michigan South Carolina
Explicit Permission Alaska Nebraska West Virginia
Arizona North Carolina
Idaho (D) South Dakota (D)
Massachusetts Utah(D)
No Unaffiliated Participation
Explicit Prohibition Colorado Maine Oregon
Connecticut Maryland Pennsylvania
Delaware Nevada Rhode Island
Florida New Hampshire South Dakota
Idaho (R) New Jersey Utah
Iowa** New Mexico Wyoming**
Kansas New York
Kentucky Oklahoma
*IN and IL require party membership but have no enforcement mechanism
**IA and WY disallow unaffiliated voters, allow party change on Election Day
A coding decision was required when classifying unaffiliated participation in cases
where voters are allowed to participate by virtue of Election Day party enrollment
change. In Iowa and Wyoming this is allowed for any party member, whereas Maine,
New Hampshire, and Rhode Island allow unaffiliated voters to enroll on Election Day.
In the case of New Hampshire and Rhode Island, it is fairly easy to quickly disaffiliate
with a party and return to unaffiliated status. However, in Maine, a voter must remain
a partisan through a waiting period window until they are allowed to disaffiliate. While
these rules suggest a permissive system, I argue that the psychological attachment to
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party identification is such that these logistical hurdles likely discourage crossover vot-
ing, and enrolled partisans are unlikely to abuse the system. Further, the effort required
to affiliate and disaffiliate every election still poses a restrictive hurdle which is absent in
those states which allow unfettered access by unaffiliated voters. Thus, only those states
in which an unaffiliated voter may vote a party ballot and remain unaffiliated throughout
the primary are classified as permissive systems.
Candidate Ballot Access
In order to address barriers to candidate entry, we turn to examine ballot access require-
ments. These rules can be generally seen as trivial or non-trivial fees or numbers of
petition signatures required. Presenting extremes of this measure, in Alaska, candidates
must pay a $100 fee, an arguably trivial figure. Additionally it is interesting to note that
this is set as a specific fee and not set as a percentage of a variant figure. In terms
of signature requirements, Tennessee offers an example of triviality, only requiring 25
signatures. Again, this is set as a specific number of signatures and not a variable or
percentage based on population or previous election returns. On the other end of this
spectrum, Florida requires a fee amounting to 6% of the salary of the office sought, over
$10,000 for a Congressional seat. In terms of signatures, many requirements are difficult
to quantify as they relate to district and state population. A good example of a non-
trivial signature requirement would be Wisconsin, which requires 1,000 signatures for
House candidates. A key difficulty in this process is the specific delineation of triviality.
In an era of professional political campaigns, what constitutes a trivial sum? In order to
delineate triviality, I examined state requirements and discovered a large gap between
filing fee requirements set at $500 and those based on percentages which amount to
thousands of dollars. Likewise, signature requirements when specified are usually below
500, or based on a percentage well in the thousands. For this reason, both $500 and 500
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signatures serves as not only a useful analytical distinction, but also a theoretical one. As
mentioned earlier, fees or signature requirements which as specifically set have tended
to stagnate, increasing their triviality with inflation. Percentage based fees and signature
requirements signify an increased level of sophistication in primary rules, and thus, this
will delineate the difference between smaller trivial barriers and larger, non-trivial ballot
access barriers.
Table 4.3 on the following page presents a tabular view of the scope of both fee
and signature requirements for major party candidates in the states. In some cases
these requirements are the same for major and minor party/independent candidates.
Differences between these two groups, however, is addressed further in the following
section on independent candidacies. It is worth noting that in many states a petition
option must be given in addition to a filing fee option in order to conform with court
rulings regarding ballot access for indigent candidates. While indigence is not always
a requirement for opting to submit a signature petition, this distinction is not made in
table 4.3 and the data presented here are the standard state (or in some cases, party)
specified fees and requirements. Further, in some of these states, ballot access can be
gained via pre-primary convention, but these states generally allow for an alternate path
to the ballot.
Filing as an Independent
As noted earlier, one of the ways in which the two major parties can institutionalize
their position of prominence in the American electoral environment is to disadvantage
independent and third party candidacies. One way in which parties may do this is
through prohibitively high filing fees or signature requirements. However, these barriers
are less related to primaries and have more bearing on general elections. One way to
incorporate a meaningful measure of independent candidacies within the framework of
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Table 4.3: Fee and Signature Requirement Summary
Trivial Non-Trivial
Alaska Alabama Michigan
Hawaii Arizona Montana
Idaho Arkansas Nebraska
Kentucky California New Jersey
Maryland Colorado New Mexico
Mississippi Connecticut Oklahoma
Missouri Delaware Pennsylvania
Nevada Florida South Carolina
New Hampshire Georgia South Dakota
Minnesota Illinois Texas
North Dakota Indiana Utah
Ohio Iowa Virginia
Oregon Kansas Washington
Rhode Island Louisiana West Virginia
Tennessee Maine Wisconsin
Vermont Massachusetts
Wyoming
the party primary is to juxtapose the difference in filing deadlines between major party
candidates and independent or third party candidates. What may be of more interest
to a potential challenger is not the specific fee or signature requirement, but the field of
potential party rivals they would face. Considering how sore-loser laws prohibit losing
party primary candidates from running in a general election, a strategic major party
candidate may wish to pursue a challenge through an independent or third party avenue.
The decision to pursue nomination through the party primary or through an independent
candidacy would likely require knowledge of the party candidates. Thus, examining the
deadlines for independent and party filing offer us a look at what a potential independent
or minor party challenger would know about the major party nomination. Table 4.4
on the next page shows the various filing deadlines for independent and third party
candidates listed by a challenger’s possible knowledge of the eventual party candidate.
This is an important piece of information for these challengers, who may wish to reserve
58
their efforts and strategically enter the race once they have information about the party
nominees.
Table 4.4: Independent Candidate Deadlines and Knowledge of Party Slate
Little or no Knowledge Some Knowledge Full Knowledge
Before Party Deadline After Party Deadline After Primary
Florida Connecticut** California
Nevada* Delaware Colorado***
Kansas Georgia****
Same As Party Deadline Maine Illinois
Arizona Massachusetts Indiana
Arkansas Michigan Iowa
Hawaii Missouri Kentucky
Idaho Montana Maryland
Louisiana Ohio Nebraska (I)
Minnesota South Dakota*** New Mexico
Mississippi New York
New Hampshire Day of Primary North Carolina****
Oklahoma Alabama North Dakota
Rhode Island Alaska Oregon
Tennessee New Jersey Pennsylvania
Utah Virginia South Carolina
Vermont Texas***
Wisconsin Washington
West Virginia
Wyoming
* Third party candidates file between party deadline and primary
** Third party candidates file after primary
***Third party candidates file on same day as major party candidates
****Deadline is before potential runoff election
(I) Incumbents must register in advance of challengers
In the first case, independent and third party candidates have little or no knowledge
of the party candidate. In states where the filing deadline for these independents falls
before the party deadline, or on the same day as the party deadline, there is no guarantee
that information will be available about the slate of primary candidates. In the second,
less restrictive case, the independent filing deadline falls after the party deadline up
until, and including, the day of the primary. Here, independent challengers would have
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information regarding the slate of potential nominees, and perhaps some information
on those candidates’ relative strength in the primary election, however they would not
know the party nominee. Finally, in the third, and least restrictive case, independent
or third party candidates know the party nominee before they are required to file for
the general election. It is worth noting that in two states in 2014, Georgia and North
Carolina, the independent filing deadline is before a possible primary runoff election,
however I do not make this distinction in coding. Additionally, Nebraska has a unique
rule which requires incumbents to register in advance of challengers, but this unique rule
is not incorporated into the measure of restrictiveness.
Length of the Election Season
Revisiting the election calendar it is worth noting the diversity of election dates in the
states. Table 4.5 on page 62 demonstrates this diversity by showing the date of the
state primary election, and the major party filing deadline. These dates and lengths are
calculated using the 2014 election calendar, and general election date of November 4th,
2014. The length of the general election is calculated as the number of days between the
primary election and the general election, and the length of the primary is calculated as
the number of days between the major party filing deadline and the primary election.
In order to capture the restrictiveness of this rule, I am forced to make an important
theoretical decision. Little has been written on primary timing, however, one source,
a report by the National Municipal League’s Committee on the Direct Primary (1951)
offers some guidance. In this report, which is decidedly placed within the tradition of
responsible parties, the committee suggests late and short primary elections. While the
report specifically suggests primaries be held within two months of the general election,
no states currently fall in this category. Further, the report suggests a primary election
season of roughly one month. Again, no states currently would fall into this category.
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Their reasoning for these suggestions, to prevent long campaigns which cause unnec-
essary expense, is well taken, but we cannot use these specific criteria. We can also
consider political events in our rationale for coding primary timing. Research on the
effects of primaries on general election outcomes is decidedly mixed with evidence at
different levels of government, and under different circumstances leading to positive and
negative prognoses. If we take the sum of this literature as decidedly mixed, we can still
say something regarding the length of a primary and the probable motivations of the
party. Regardless of positive or negative effects, I make the assumption that parties are
likely risk-averse, that is, not willing to risk any potential electoral gain due to a drawn
out election at the risk of the multitude of negative events that may happen in that
time. Thus, a party might be likely to forgo any potential benefits in strengthening their
candidate, increasing name recognition, or otherwise, in order to minimize the amount
of time where a primary candidate is open to attacks from inside the party, is utilizing
valuable financial resources to compete with intra-party rivals, and is open to commit-
ting an embarrassing political gaffe. Thus, with this argument, I make the theoretical
decision to code shorter political primaries as restrictive, and those which as longer as
permissive, as they reflect a party’s preferences (at least as argued here) thusly.
It is worth noting that some recent research, including work by Johnson, Petersheim,
and Wasson (2010) has found an effect that interacts with the timing of the primary.
Thus, divisive primaries which are further from the general election hurt less than those
that are close. This line of research seems promising, and may suggest that a future
update to this restrictiveness scale include some sort of interactive effect with the timing
of the election. One possibility would be that in order to reduce these effects, a party
would prefer short primaries if they are scheduled late in the year, but would not be
opposed to longer primaries early in the election season. For now, it seems that par-
simony dictate making the simplest assumption possible, that parties generally would
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prefer shorter primaries in order to minimize possible negative effects of the race on
general election chances.
Table 4.5: 2014 Campaign Seasons (in Days)
State Primary Date Filing Deadline General Primary
Alabama Jun 03 Feb 07 154 116
Alaska Aug 19 Jun 02 77 78
Arizona Aug 26 May 28 70 90
Arkansas May 20 Mar 03 168 78
California Jun 03 Mar 07 154 88
Colorado Jun 24 Mar 31 133 85
Connecticut Aug 12 Jun 10 84 63
Delaware Sep 09 Jul 08 56 63
Florida Aug 26 May 02 70 116
Georgia May 20 Mar 07 168 74
Hawaii Aug 09 Jun 03 87 67
Idaho May 20 Mar 14 168 67
Illinois Mar 18 Dec 02 231 106
Indiana May 06 Feb 07 182 88
Iowa Jun 03 Mar 14 154 81
Kansas Aug 05 Jun 02 91 64
Kentucky May 20 Jan 28 168 112
Louisiana n/a Aug 22 74 n/a
Maine Jun 10 Mar 17 147 85
Maryland Jun 24 Feb 25 133 119
Massachusetts Sep 09 May 06 56 126
Michigan Aug 05 Apr 22 91 105
Minnesota Aug 12 Jun 03 84 70
Mississippi Jun 03 Mar 01 154 94
Missouri Aug 05 Mar 25 91 133
Montana Jun 03 Mar 10 154 85
Nebraska May 13 Mar 03 175 71
Nevada Jun 10 Mar 14 147 88
New Hampshire Sep 09 Jun 13 56 88
New Jersey Jun 03 Mar 31 154 64
New Mexico Jun 03 Mar 11 154 84
New York Jun 24 Apr 10 133 75
North Carolina May 06 Feb 28 182 67
North Dakota Jun 10 Apr 07 147 64
Ohio May 06 Feb 05 182 90
Oklahoma Jun 24 Apr 11 133 74
Oregon May 20 Mar 11 168 70
Continued on next page
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Table 4.5 – Continued from previous page
State Primary Date Filing Date General Primary
Pennsylvania May 20 Mar 11 168 70
Rhode Island Sep 09 Jun 25 56 76
South Carolina Jun 10 Mar 30 147 72
South Dakota Jun 03 Mar 25 154 70
Tennessee Aug 07 Apr 03 89 126
Texas Mar 04 Dec 09 245 85
Utah Jun 24 Mar 20 133 96
Vermont Aug 26 Jun 12 70 75
Virginia Jun 10 Mar 27 147 75
Washington Aug 05 May 16 91 81
West Virginia May 13 Jan 25 175 108
Wisconsin Aug 12 Jun 02 84 71
Wyoming Aug 19 May 30 77 81
Examining the date in Table 4.5 on the previous page, it is striking to note that only
four states hold a primary in September. Expanding this cutoff to include August, we are
presented with considerably more states, but few of them also hold a short primary. How
can we classify these states into meaningful categories of restriction based on this data?
I suggest a modification of the criteria in the Municipal League report. While it is clear
that few states hold late primaries, it is equally notable that absolute calendar placement
of primaries is more relevant to a discussion of general elections, as the primary date
sets the length of the general election. Thus, we can capture short primaries regardless
of their placement on the calendar. With this in mind, I classify short primary states as
those with primary campaigns less than three months. No primaries are shorter than
two months, making a lesser measurement worthless, and the three month cutoff allows
for substantial variability across states.
Endorsement
The ability of parties to endorse candidates in the primary is an important and powerful
rule for the parties. While some state parties choose not to exercise this power, or do not
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exercise it regularly, the coding of this rule only signals that a law or rule exists to permit
pre-primary endorsement of candidates. This rule also captures the ability for candidate
to gain ballot access through pre-primary conventions. While this option is not often
used, gaining ballot access through the convention can also grant the candidate special
ballot designation such as preferential placement or a distinguishing mark. While these
rules vary in terms of their codification, no distinction is made as to whether it is state
statute or party rule. Finally, some of these endorsement methods which are not related
to ballot access also afford candidates special ballot designation rather than an informal
party endorsement. Again, as the use of endorsements and their specific benefit varies
across states, the only meaningful distinction that can be made is that some form of
party preference is given to candidates prior to the party primary.
Currently, pre-primary endorsements are permitted by state law or party rule in
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, and Vir-
ginia. In Colorado, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Utah,
candidates who receive this endorsement are usually entitled to some form of ballot des-
ignation, whether this is a notation of endorsement, reduced or eliminated ballot access
requirements, or preferential placement in the ordering of candidate names. In other
states, endorsement procedures are generally more informal, but it is unclear if there
are differential benefits to candidates. Considering the nature of this examination, and
it’s key focus, restrictiveness, it seems logical to treat all states which have some form of
endorsement equally, and to code this as a restrictive provision, as it affords increased
power to parties.
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Sore Loser Laws
The final rule that I incorporate into the summary measure of restrictiveness is the
existence of a sore loser law. Currently, all states with the exception of Colorado, Iowa,
and New York, have some form of prohibition on sore loser candidacies. This lack
of variance is methodologically troubling, however, the state of these laws in 2014 is
vastly different in earlier years. Given the theoretical importance of these laws, and the
desire to measure restrictiveness across time (including time periods when there is large
variance in sore loser law adoption) it is included in this analysis.
4.1.1 2014 Law Summary
With these 10 laws cataloged and coded, we can summarize all states across these cat-
egories as having either a restrictive or permissive form of the rule. Table 4.6 on the
following page shows each state and presents a check mark if the state has a restrictive
form of a rule. A dash represents either no rule, or a permissive form of the rule. The
rules described in this table follow the layout in this chapter. In all cases, state parties
are only designated when rules differ. If no party is designated, primary rules in the
parties are presumed to be the same.
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Table 4.6: Summary of Rule Restrictiveness by State (2014)
Party Party Ballot Public Unaffiliated Ballot Filing Primary Sore
State Enrollment Change Choice Declaration Prohibited Access Deadline Length Endorsement Loser
Alabama - - - X - X X - - X
Alaska X - - X - - X X - X
Alaska X - X X - - X X - X
Arizona X - X X - X X X - X
Arkansas - - - X - X X X - X
Colorado X - X X X X X - X -
Connecticut X X X X X X X X X X
Delaware X X X X X X X X X X
Florida X - X X X X X - - X
Georgia - - - X - X - X - X
Hawaii - - - - - - X X - X
Idaho - D X X - X - - X X - X
Idaho - R X X X X X - X X - X
Illinois - - X X - X - - X X
Indiana - - X X - X - X - X
Iowa X - X X X X - X - -
Kansas X - X X X X X X - X
Kentucky X X X X X - - - - X
Maine X - X X X X X X - X
Maryland X - X X X - - - - X
Massachusetts X - X X - X X - X X
Michigan - - - - - X X - X X
Minnesota - - - - - - X X X X
Mississippi - - - X - - X X - X
Missouri - - - X - - X - - X
Montana - - - - - X X - - X
Nebraska X - X X - X - X - X
Nevada X - X X X - X X - X
New Hampshire X X X X X - X X - X
New Jersey X - X X X X X X - X
New Mexico X - X X X X - X X X
Continued on next page
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Table 4.6 – Continued from previous page
Party Party Ballot Public Unaffiliated Ballot Filing Primary Sore
State Enrollment Change Choice Declaration Prohibited Access Deadline Length Endorsement Loser
New York X X X X X X - X X -
North Carolina X - X X - X - X - X
North Dakota - - - - - - - X X X
Ohio - - - X - - X X X X
Oklahoma X X X X X X X X - X
Oregon X - X X X - - X - X
Pennsylvania X - X X X X - - X X
Rhode Island X X X X X - X X X X
South Carolina - - - X - X - X - X
South Dakota - D X - X X - X X X - X
South Dakota - R X - X X X X X X - X
Tennessee - - - X - - X - - X
Texas - - - X - X - X - X
Utah - D X - - X - X X - X X
Utah - R X - X X X X X - X X
Vermont - - - - - - X X - X
Virginia - - - X - X X X X X
West Virginia X - X X - X - - - X
Wisconsin - - - - - X X X - X
Wyoming X - X X X X - X - X
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4.2 Restrictiveness: A New Measure
With a complete coding of primary laws in the states in hand. We can now begin the
business of constructing a usable measure of restrictiveness. In order to do this, the
ten rules were collapsed into five categories of rules - party registration, ballot choice,
ballot access, endorsement, and timing. First, party registration is composed of both
party enrollment rules and affiliation change deadlines, creating a composite measure of
the restrictiveness of party affiliation in the state. Second, ballot choice is a collapsed
measure of whether or not partisans can freely move between party ballots, whether or
not a public declaration of party intention is required, and whether or not unaffiliated
voters may participate. Third, ballot access is a composite of the measure of filing fees,
deadlines for independent filing, and the existence of a sore loser law. Endorsement
rules and election timing are both single measures of the aforementioned restrictiveness
of each rule category.
In building a measure of restrictiveness, I considered the possibility that all rules
are not created equal. Political science’s single-minded focus on rules pertaining to
party enrollment and ballot choice are a testament to this. Additionally, some rules are
necessarily predicated upon the existence of others, suggesting the increased importance
of these foundational rules. Examining the five aforementioned categories of rules, party
registration and ballot choice stand out as not only foundational rules, but rules which
have an existing importance within current scholarship and our existing understanding
of primary elections. It is wise not to completely throw out our conventional wisdom, and
the importance we place on traditional classifications. As such, these variables should
continue to have a prominent place in any future measures. Examining candidate ballot
access, which has both a party candidate, and independent candidate component, it
seems reasonable to place these variables in a second category of importance, as they
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still directly relate to the importance of how ballots are structured and how rules can
structure choice. Finally, endorsement and timing, round out these five categories of rules
as, tertiary considerations. While endorsements are likely very important rules, relatively
few states use them, and placing a large weighting on them would skew measures of
restrictiveness towards these states.
Given the relative importance of the rules which comprise a summary measure of
restrictiveness, I have chosen to weight the constituent components of the restrictiveness
measure. Table 4.7 on the next page presents two calculations of this restrictiveness
measures. In the first case, these five categories are weighted, with Party registration and
ballot choice each comprising 30% of the measure, acknowledging the preeminence of
traditional primary classification schemes. Candidate ballot access then makes up 20% of
the measure reflecting their importance in structuring ballot. Finally, endorsement and
election timing laws round out the measure at 10% each. While this weighted measure will
be used, raw additive scores across these five categories are also presented in the table.
In both cases, these scores range between zero and one, with zero representing the most
permissive primary theoretically possible (all permissive features) and one representing
a fully restrictive primary (all restrictive features). Finally, as in previous analysis, states
are only separated by party if party rules create substantive differences within the states.
In order to gain some understanding of how these scores relate to the traditional
classification of primary schemes, Table 4.8 on page 72 shows the relationship between
the categorization presented by McGhee et al. (2014), and the new weighted restrictive-
ness measure, collapsed into quantiles. We can see that the new restrictiveness measure
generally follows traditional schemes, however there are notable exceptions where the
restrictiveness of a state is belied by its traditional classification. Similarly, we see a
handful of closed primary states which exhibit many permissive features.
Notably, we can see an aforementioned example where Iowa and Missouri were
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Table 4.7: Weighted and Raw Restrictiveness Scores
State Weighted Raw State Weighted Raw
Missouri 0.2 0.17 Massachusetts 0.6 0.58
Alabama 0.25 0.22 Oregon 0.6 0.55
Hawaii 0.25 0.35 South Dakota - D 0.6 0.58
Michigan 0.25 0.35 Wyoming 0.6 0.55
Montana 0.25 0.35 Florida 0.65 0.50
North Dakota 0.25 0.45 Arizona 0.65 0.63
Tennessee 0.25 0.22 Kentucky 0.65 0.45
Vermont 0.25 0.35 Utah - D 0.65 0.63
Georgia 0.3 0.37 Kansas 0.7 0.65
South Carolina 0.3 0.37 Maine 0.7 0.65
Texas 0.3 0.37 Nevada 0.7 0.65
Wisconsin 0.3 0.40 New Jersey 0.7 0.65
Minnesota 0.35 0.55 South Dakota - R 0.7 0.65
Mississippi 0.35 0.42 Colorado 0.75 0.80
Arkansas 0.4 0.47 New Mexico 0.75 0.80
Illinois 0.4 0.43 Pennsylvania 0.75 0.80
Indiana 0.4 0.43 Utah - R 0.75 0.70
Ohio 0.4 0.47 Idaho - D 0.75 0.68
Alaska - D 0.45 0.47 New Hampshire 0.8 0.70
Virginia 0.45 0.62 Idaho - R 0.85 0.75
West Virginia 0.45 0.33 New York 0.85 0.85
Maryland 0.5 0.35 Connecticut 0.9 0.90
Alaska - R 0.55 0.53 Oklahoma 0.9 0.80
Nebraska 0.55 0.53 Delaware 0.95 0.95
North Carolina 0.55 0.54 Rhode Island 0.95 0.95
Iowa 0.6 0.55
classified together as semi-open, yet now occupy two different quantiles of restrictiveness.
Further, many states which are classified as closed or semi-closed, such as Maryland and
Oregon, being more permissive than their traditional classification suggests. In both
of these states, the only restrictive feature of their primaries were their ballot choice
restrictions and sore loser laws. In all other categories these states were classified as
having permissive rules.
This additional detail should help to shed light on the larger question of how primary
restrictiveness relates to electoral features such as candidate extremism, competition, and
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the adoption of the primary. The analysis of extremism and competition will be saved
for Chapter 6, where I will discuss how this new variable may offer a different view of the
negative effects of restrictiveness. However, for the time being it is worth focusing our
attention on the adoption of the primary to attempt to discern if these current patterns
can be explained by narratives of the initial adoption of the primary.
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Table 4.8: Traditional Classification and Restrictiveness Quartile
Less Restrictive More Restrictive
1 2 3 4
Open Hawaii Minnesota
Michigan
Montana
North Dakota
Vermont
Wisconsin
Semi-Open Alabama Alaska(D) Utah(D)
Arkansas Illinois Wyoming
Georgia Iowa
Indiana Virginia
Missouri
Mississippi
Ohio
S. C.
Tennessee
Texas
Semi-Closed Alaska(R) Arizona New Hampshire
Nebraska Colorado Rhode Island
N. Carolina Idaho(D)
S. Dakota(D) Maine
West Virginia Mass.
New Jersey
Closed Maryland Florida Connecticut
Oregon Kansas Delaware
Kentucky Idaho(R)
Nevada Oklahoma
New Mexico UtahR
New York
Pennsylvania
S. Dakota(R)
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Chapter 5
Adoption Traditions and Rule Inertia
Explaining the rise and development of the direct party vis-a-vis party power is not an
easy task. Given our understanding of the structure of rule systems laid out in Chapter
3, and their current form as discussed in Chapter 4, we are left with many questions
about its adoption and development. One key observations is that the direct primary is
governed by a large set of primary rules, some set by the state, some by the party, but
in all cases, taking a wide variety of forms. If we suggest that there is a model form of
primary, or at least a ‘more efficient’ form, why have states not converged on a singular
type of primary? I suggest that current primary rules are the product of an institutional
inertia which has propelled the primaries into their current form based on the events
surrounding their initial adoption.
Revisiting the traditional narratives laid out in the introduction to this dissertation,
we are presented with two competing (but not exclusive) reasons for the adoption of
the primary: anti-partyism and attempts by party elites to institutionalize their parties
and regain influence over an out of control convention system. Often, scholars have
been preoccupied with arguing for a preponderance of evidence in favor of one of these
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competing narratives. In this chapter, I will argue that there are actually three unique
adoption motivations which were in effect simultaneously. Additionally, I will then argue
that these three adoptive traditions have informed the development of the primaries in
the states and are, at least partially, responsible for the divergence in primary laws across
the states.
This chapter takes both adoption narratives and the proposition that the direct pri-
mary created public utility parties to task in light of a more nuanced understanding of
the primary. By examining the adoption and early forms of the primary, in combination
with contemporary and historical scholarship, we can reassess the veracity of the claims
that anti-partyism was the driving force behind the adoption of the primary. Further, we
can simultaneously address more recent claims that parties favored the adoption of the
primary to enhance the legitimacy of the two-party system and further the institution-
alization of the major parties. Finally, I will reintroduce a third strain of this argument
which is often overlooked. The adoption of the primaries in southern states is often
omitted from analyses of primaries due to their unique nature. I suggest that these one-
party southern states should not be omitted, but incorporated as a unique third adoption
tradition along with the progressive and party narratives.
5.1 Adopting the Direct Primary
As a starting point for a discussion of the adoption of the direct primary it is worthwhile
to take some time to examine the general timeline of adoption. While this may seem
a simple task, there are numerous hurdles to classifying the start of the primary in the
various states. Further, scholars have not agreed on an accepted timeline and various
recent scholarship on the adoption and impact of the primary, including Galderisi and
Ezra (2001), Ware (2002), Ansolabehere and Snyder (2007), and Lawrence, Donovan,
74
and Bowler (2011), all use dates of adoption which differ to some degree.
Examining these different codings, we can identify places of agreement and focus
on cases where disagreement exists in order to construct a more accurate timeline.
Delaware offers a good example of this process. While Ansolabehere and Snyder cite
1978, Galderisi and Ezra cite 1913 and Lawrence et al. cite 1903. As laudable as all
these efforts are to operationalize the start of the primary in Delaware, we must make
some sense of these dates. It is true that Delaware had a direct primary statute as early
as 1903, however the law was rudimentary in nature and did not apply to all offices
in the state. There would not be a law mandating primaries for federal offices until
1972, however no scholar cites this date. Ansolabehere and Snyder cite 1978, and in
doing so have captured the date that the first primary actually occurred in Delaware (no
primaries took place in 1974 or 1976). Given these details, I chose 1972 as the date of
adoption, as this is the date of the adoption of the law mandating the direct primary be
used for federal offices. Although a primary itself it did not occur for another six years,
this coding establishes a precedent of citing the year the state legislature adopted the
measure, not the first election year it went into effect.
In sum, my coding method used consensus dates when sources overwhelmingly
agreed with a date (often using Merriam and Overacker (1928) to confirm). When there
was a discrepancy, I referred to both Merriam and Overacker (1928) and to session laws
in the states to determine which law met a reasonable standard for being both mandatory
and sophisticated. To determine if the law is mandatory, I examined both the statute
and precedent. Precedent is important in some states such as Alabama, which still does
not have a mandatory law but has regularly used the primary since its 1904 adoption.
To determine sophistication I examined the offices and geographic locations to which
the law applied, selecting laws which encompassed a majority of major offices and were
used statewide rather than particular counties or towns. It goes without saying that this
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procedure did involve a fair amount of subjectivity, and the dates presented in Table 5.1
should not be seen as authoritative. Nearly all states moved rapidly through multiple
forms of the primary, thus varying arguments can be made. Given the framework of this
dissertation, however, a focus on statewide, broadly applied, and mandatory primary
laws seems justifiable.
Table 5.1: Date of Adoption of Mandatory Primary
State Date State Date
Alabama 1904 Montana 1912
Alaska 1958 Nebraska 1907
Arizona 1909 Nevada 1909
Arkansas 1909 New Hampshire 1909
California 1909 New Jersey 1911
Colorado 1910 New Mexico 1938
Connecticut 1955 New York 1913
Delaware 1972 North Carolina 1915
Florida 1913 North Dakota 1907
Georgia 1917 Ohio 1913
Hawaii 1959 Oklahoma 1908
Idaho 1909* Oregon 1905
Illinois 1910 Pennsylvania 1913
Indiana 1915 Rhode Island 1947
Iowa 1907 South Carolina 1915
Kansas 1908 South Dakota 1907
Kentucky 1912 Tennessee 1909
Louisiana 1906 Texas 1905
Maine 1911 Utah 1937
Maryland 1910 Vermont 1915
Massachusetts 1911 Virginia 1912**
Michigan 1909 Washington 1907
Minnesota 1912 West Virginia 1915
Mississippi 1902 Wisconsin 1903
Missouri 1907 Wyoming 1911
* Idaho abandoned the primary in 1919, readopting it in 1931
** Virginia abandoned the mandatory direct primary in 1971, allowing
the parties the option to select convention or primary election
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5.1.1 Party, Progressivism, or Both?
The adoption of the direct primary is generally seen as a predominantly anti-party de-
velopment. As mentioned in the introduction, contemporary observers of the adoption
generally saw it as a product of the progressive movement. Burnham (1970), Ranney
(1975), and Epstein (1986), all scholars of parties, have regarded the primary as a pro-
gressive reform which has weakened parties in America. However, in light of recent
developments, this conventional wisdom has been brought under scrutiny. Lawrence,
Donovan, and Bowler (2011) adeptly summarize the literature on the adoption of the
primary into two arguments. The first is this traditional progressive narrative, focused
on forces external to the party and championed by Merriam and Overacker (1928), one
of the first scholars of the primary. However, Lawrence et al. also identify a second
line of thinking proposed by Ware (2002) which suggests that internal party forces may
have prompted the advent of the primary as a way for parties to handle the problem of
unmanageable conventions.
While Ware argues that reformers had no control over legislators or parties, and
thus, no avenue through which to force the adoption of the primary, I suggest that this is
not wholly incompatible with progressive narratives. Indeed, Ware does credit reformers
for single-mindedly focusing on the direct primary. This suggested to party officials
that there was only one available alternative when attempting to reform their convention
systems. While progressives had no direct political power, it is presumable that they
did have influence via an agenda-setting power in many states. Thus, while they may
not have been able to explicitly cast votes in favor of primary laws, the strength of
the progressive movement in these states brought the issue of the direct primary to the
forefront of the political agenda. Further, in some states there was indeed the potential
for political action via direct democracy. In Oregon, we see an example of the progressive
influence over the adoption of the primary. Here, voters passed the first comprehensive
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primary law by initiative in 1904 before it was adopted by the legislature in 1905, clearly
showing the possibility for direct progressive influence. Thus, it seems plausible to
suggest that multiple influences were at work in the various states. Indeed, Lawrence
and his colleagues, who set down these two lines of thinking as being incompatible, end
up suggesting that although the weight of their statistical evidence was on the side of the
progressive narrative, they could not rule out Ware’s interpretation.
I suggest that the traditional line of thinking when examining the adoption of the
primaries has been shortsightedly focused on a grand theory of the move for adoption
and have not considered how varying adoption narratives may have influenced the par-
ticular form of rules which would arise in states. Additionally, I suggest that there were,
in fact, three unique factors at work during this time, setting the direct primary on its
course of widely varying implementation and effect. First, the progressive narrative does
ring true, especially in western states. Even without direct links to parties or legislators,
as Ware suggests, without strong parties and with a pervasive culture of progressivism,
it is difficult to suggest what obstacles would lie before these reformers. Second, it is
completely compatible with this view that party machines in eastern states simultane-
ously (or perhaps shortly after this) saw the benefit of the direct primary as a fix for their
inability to regulate and control an unwieldy convention system. While primary source
evidence to attest to this particular line of thinking is scarce, contemporary accounts of
the adoption of the primary such as those by Dallinger and Merriam and Overacker sug-
gest that many of the earliest primary reforms were taken up by party regulars to gain
legal leverage over convention nomination. For instance, after a particularly divisive
convention season between party factions in California, an 1866 optional primary law
was conceived (supported fully by the parties) that allowed for legal punishment of ballot
frauds in the convention. Even if this narrative does not ring true in later conversations
regarding the primary, I can reformulate a weak version of this argument that stands up
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to scrutiny. Given the evidence presented by Ware that parties such as the Pennypacker
machine in Pennsylvania and Tammany machine in New York put up little opposition
to the primary, it could be argued that this was because they saw little threat to their
control over nomination. I will argue in this chapter that whether their ability to forge a
complimentary primary system was necessarily apparent to party leaders at the time of
adoption, they quickly formed and maintained restrictive primary systems in their states.
Third, states in the south, as many academic observers note (see Key (1949)), were keen
to adopt the primary as a way of institutionalizing their one-party control over states.
We often, and easily, omit southern states from analysis due to this alternative narrative.
If we accept that non-southern and southern adoption narratives can exist simultane-
ously, why then do we discount the possibility for a progressive and party narrative to
also simultaneously exist. Unfortunately, our focus on the discovery of a grand theory in
northern states has partially blinded us to the potential for a reconcilable divergence of
motives between western progressive and eastern party states.
The following sections will examine party organization, progressivism, and finally
political culture in terms of adoption in an attempt to address the plausibility of this
tripartite view of the adoption of primaries. Examining the date of primary adoption
across multiple potential adoption narratives we can assess the plausibility that a singular
narrative drove adoption. In all three cases, however, I believe the relative lack of
difference in the year of adoption suggests that the adoption of the primary should be
viewed differently. All three of these adoption motivations could be working in tandem
in various areas of the country at the same time. I argue that we should expand our
inquiry to not solely examine the correlation between these narratives and the date of
adoption, but the relationship between the subsequent forms the primary takes when it
emerges from these various traditions. Given the limited analytical leverage we can gain
from the condensed period of adoption of the primary, perhaps our analytical efforts
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have been inefficiently allocated.
Party
The first narrative tradition that I will address is that of party. Were strong party
states recalcitrant towards the adoption of the direct primary? In order to examine
party and the timeline of adoption, we must measure party strength, or more aptly
described, party organization. Using Mayhew’s (1986) operationalization of Traditional
Party Organization (TPO) we can examine the timeline of adoption in strong versus
weak party states. One methodological hurdle to this analysis is that Mayhew’s measures
were intended to show the existence of traditional party organizations in the 1960s. Can
these scores be applied to earlier time periods? Theoretically, institutional features like
party organization are long lasting and durable, extending their utility beyond this one
time period. Further, these scores still correlate highly with later measurements of party
organization, suggesting that as they could still be used 50 years later, perhaps they could
be equally applicable 50 years prior. As a practical matter, no comparable measure of
party organization exists that could facilitate such an analysis, further demanding the
use of this measure.
While Mayhew’s initial scoring was done on a scale from one to five (one being the
weakest tradition, and five being the strongest) I have collapsed the scale to a binary
classification of strong and weak. This codes the two categories of ‘party organization’
and ‘persistently factional’ states as strong party states, and the remaining states clas-
sified as weak. It worth noting that Mayhew considered southern states separately in
his classification, being noted as highly individualistic and one-party dominant. How-
ever, literature including Key (1949) suggests that southern states had an incentive to
adopt the primary in order to institutionalize one-partyism in those states. It could
be suggested that while southern states lacked the traditional party organizations which
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Mayhew investigates, they were equally unconcerned with progressive considerations in
their adoption of the primary.
Examining this hypothesis, I investigated partisan balance in the state legislature
and the governorship from 1900-1919. There were no significant relationships between
one-partyism and adoption time, examining both the entire non-south sample and the
subsample of strong party states. Of the 13 strong party states, two (New Hampshire and
Pennsylvania) were dominated by a Democratic governor and majorities in both houses
of the legislature over the entire period. While these two states adopted the primary
early (in 1911 and 1913, respectively), other strong party states such as Missouri and New
Mexico experienced divided government over much of the time (seven years and eight
years, respectively) but adopted the primary early as well (in 1913 and 1907). While this
lack of a relationship does not satisfy, it does bear noting that one-party dominance in
non-southern states was distinct from its southern counterpart. Many southern legisla-
tures during this time had no out-party representation. Arkansas’ average Republican
seat share in the lower house was 3.5%. Non-southern states with one-party dominance
still had a modicum of competition, with average seat share splits ranging from 53/47
in Indiana to 78/22 in Rhode Island. Additionally, the motivations to adopt the direct
primary in the south versus other strong party states differed with respects to the issue
of race. Given this, we can likely set aside the contention that southern states should
be combined with other strong party states, and instead argue that they have their own
unique adoption tradition.
With the matter of the south settled, we can return to the discussion of strong versus
weak party states. Figure 5.1 on the following page shows the frequency of adoption of
the primary across non-southern weak and strong party states. Due to the difference
in sample size between categories, the proportion of states in the category is presented
rather than the raw number of adoptions. For reference, I have included the combined
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Figure 5.1: Primary Adoption by Party Organization
category of strong party states and southern states. Although it does not seem that
preserving a one-party system was a shared goal of both southern and non-southern
strong party states, the theoretical presumption remains that although their goals were
divergent, they were both motivated by party.
A cursory examination of Figure 5.1 does suggest that weak party states adopted
the primary before strong party states. Adding southern states to the strong party
states, this trend is less pronounced. Measures of statistically significant differences
aside, what is striking about this figure is the rapid adoption of the primary across all
states, regardless of party organization. In only five cases (Connecticut, Delaware, New
Mexico, Rhode Island, and Utah) was the adoption of the direct primary forestalled past
1920. While the latest of these five (Delaware, Connecticut and Rhode Island) are all
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strong party states, it is impossible to ignore the bulk of strong party states adopting
within just a few years of their weak party counterparts. Removing all five outliers and
not controlling for any further variables, the average date of adoption for weak party
states is only two years earlier than the average date of adoption for strong party states.
Again, setting aside any statistical concerns, a difference of this magnitude can hardly
be considered consequential or empirically significant. Given not only the small sample
size of these groups, but the restricted time frame, the timing of legislative sessions,
ambiguities in coding these dates, and a myriad of other political considerations, it
would be exceedingly difficult to gain any useful leverage over these small variations,
and it is unclear if they would be theoretically meaningful. Thus, I conclude that, while
there may be small differences between the date of adoption of the primaries in weak
versus strong party states, there is not enough to conclude that strong parties were the
sole impetus for the adoption of the direct primary.
This view, that parties may have not been wholly opposed to the primary is impor-
tant in terms of responsible party government. While Epstein remarks that “Americans
expected their parties to be open to participation like no other private associations in
the United States" (1986, 169) However, Epstein fails to remark on the nature of these
early primaries. Examining the earliest forms of the direct primary in the United States,
we see primaries that leave parties largely in charge of their own affairs. Ranney as well
discussed the idea that parties were “stripped of their private character" (1975, 75). It is
not clear, however, that parties ever had such a private character. Additionally, it is not
clear that they are stripped, so much as they abdicated any private character they had
in order to gain institutional legitimization. As Ware (2002, 90) notes - it is unclear that
parties ware forced to administer the primary in a way that was contrary to their desires.
This suggests, that a narrative of the adoption of the primary may well include parties
as well as progressives, however, parties may have molded the primary into a different
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form to suit party needs rather than progressive ones.
Austin Ranney defined the direct primary as "a system in which political parties are
required by law to choose their candidates through state-administered elections in which
any legally qualified person must be allowed to vote" (1975, 121) What Ranney does not
note is that a large number of states allow the parties to set the qualifications for voting.
Thus, while primaries restrict voting to legally qualified persons, parties may exert a
fair amount of discretion in the legal definition of a qualified person. If state parties
are allowed to choose whether or not to allow unaffiliated voters, they are playing an
important role in setting the legal qualifications for voting. This is a good example of
how Epstein and Ranney are both simultaneously right and wrong. They are correct
in their assessment that the direct primary has left parties as governmentally regulated
entities with diminished control over nomination. This argument supports a progressive
adoption narrative. However, they overstate the case that this is entirely due to said gov-
ernmental regulation. In many cases, parties retain wide latitude in the implementation
of the primary, whether this be endorsement procedures, voter qualification procedures,
pre-primary conventions or otherwise. Further, it seems unlikely that large party ma-
chines of the early 20th century could have been forced my minority progressive factions
to adopt a reform that would potentially limit or infringe on their nominating power.
Arguments about the specific motivations of strong parties, it does not seem likely that
they would, or could be compelled into a primary system that would dilute their power.
It seems much more likely that parties, given the potential for rules which would afford
them some control over nomination, would not have viewed primaries as being nearly
as anti-party as progressive reformers hoped. Additionally, any losses in direct nomi-
nating power may have been offset by gains in institutional legitimacy, further reducing
party opposition to the adoption of the primary. If this is the case, it stands to reason
that primaries arising out of strong party states may exhibit more restrictive qualities
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than their progressive counterparts. This notion provides for the suggestion that two
equally important traditions drove the early adoption of the primary. Given this, it
seems likely that the various rules of the primary may have been fashioned to suit the
political atmosphere of partyism or progressivism. However, before moving to consider
this argument, it is worthwhile to examine the progressive narrative of adoption. As
progressive reformers still played a large part in the adoption of the primary in other
areas.
Progressivism
Next it is useful to examine differences between states with a progressive impulse versus
those without. One key methodological hurdle is the coding of progressivism in the
states. Following from Lawrence, Donovan, and Bowler (2011) I operationalize progres-
sivism in the states using initiative and referendum laws. Using this coding, we can not
only capture the existence of a progressive element in the state but also the potential
for the use of initiative to drive adoption, as was the case in Oregon. Here, I code pro-
gressive states as those which adopted the initiative or referendum within the 1900-1920
window. Thus, later adopters such as Illinois or Wyoming are not included as progressive
states.
As with the first example, when examining progressivism, we would expect to see
marked and significant differences in the date of adoption of the primary if progressivism
was a singularly driving force in the adoption of the direct primary. Examining Figure 5.2
on the following pagethere does seem to be some credence to the notion that progressive
states adopted before non-progressive states, but as with our example of party, it is
unclear if this difference is significant enough to say that progressivism was the only
driving force for the adoption of the primary. In terms of an average date of adoption,
if we again exclude the five outlying late-adopters, there is even less difference between
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Figure 5.2: Date of Adoption by Progressivism
the average date of adoption between these categories as there was between strong and
weak party states. In this case, the difference between the average years of adoption
was less than one year. It is worth noting that it does seem that the rate of adoption
was much quicker in progressive states. While I can only speculate as to the reasoning
behind this, we could suggest that popular political pressures demanded quicker action
in progressive states than their non-progressive counterparts.
Thinking broadly, it seems unlikely in this case that progressivism was a singularly
driving force in the adoption of the direct primary. This, combined with the same
conclusion suggested by the party data seems to point to the notion that states may
have had unique motivations for the adoption of the primary. Thus, scholars who
have promoted the progressive and party theories are neither fully correct nor fully
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incorrect. Indeed, they may be telling two sides of the same story. Before considering
the implications of this view, it is worth taking a third look at adoption by examining
political culture, which may serve as a useful proxy for comparing all three traditions
simultaneously.
Political Culture
Attempting to further unlock any significant trends in adoption, we can look to political
culture. In this case, I utilize a measure of political culture from Sharkansky (1969), which
is an adapted form of Elazar’s (1966) original typology. This measure is a useful proxy
for a tripartite view of adoption as the Traditionalistic culture aligns well with southern
states, Individualistic culture maps well onto strong party states, and Moralistic culture
corresponds well with states with a progressive impulse. In effect, this allows us to sep-
arate all three categories out at once to compare their relative rates of adoption. While
these codings do not perfectly map to the above categories, they also provide a useful
check on those analyses. It is possible that the existence (or absence) of strong party
organization, or initiative and referendum belies the underlying motives for adoption in
a state. Thus, we can take political culture as a check on these previous codings by
offering a different measure of progressivism, partyism, and the motivations of southern
states.
Figure 5.3 on the next page shows the breakdown of year of adoption over the
three categories of political culture. To recap our previous arguments on the adoption
of the primary, we should expect moralistic states to adopt first if progressivism is a
singularly driving force, and individualistic states if strong party states led the way.
Traditionalistic states, which roughly overlap with southern states are also presented in
this figure, although no argument has been made in the literature that southern adoption
of the primary was a driving force in the adoption of the primary in other states.
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Figure 5.3: Date of Adoption by Political Culture
Again, in this case we do not see striking differences which would point to the
dominance of one adoption narrative. To reiterate a point made earlier, it is important
to note the relatively small window of adoption across all of these states. The adoption of
the direct primary occurred rapidly across all states regardless of party, progressivism, or
political culture. With this in mind, we should not completely dismiss a discussion about
the adoption of the primary, however, given the limited analytical leverage we have with
this restricted time window, and the apparent lack of evidence for one singular narrative.
Instead, we should look at how the possibility of multiple, simultaneous motivations have
informed the way the direct primary was shaped in the various states.
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5.1.2 Consequences of Adoption Motivations
What can be gained from a discussion of the motivations for the adoption of the pri-
mary? As I have argued, the lack of variance in the timing of the adoption across
substantively meaningful categories suggests little to gain in examining reasons for tem-
poral variance. Instead, I suggest an alternate line of inquiry based on the adoption
of the primary. Specifically, how has the adoption of the primary in the various states
affected its current state. As I suggest in the opening of this chapter, the fragmented and
diverse primary rules in the states presents a looming question: how did the primaries
become so different? I argue that these differences are directly related to the tradition of
adoption in the states.
Endogeneity
One difficulty with suggesting that any of these categories has a bearing on how primaries
currently look is that of endogeneity. This analysis is exposed to questions of endogeneity
from a number of sources. First is the problem that measures such as that of party
organization may be a result of the restrictive primaries that I suggest they create. I
do not completely refute the possibility that more restrictive systems led to a political
environment (or specifically, political parties) which either maintained or increased the
restrictiveness of that system. Likewise a less restrictive system may indeed produce
candidates (or parties) which perpetuate that openness. However, I find these scenarios
to be wholly compatible with my argument. Indeed, this logic begs the question of how
these systems were closed or open to begin with. My argument regarding the adoptive
tradition merely means to suggest that these primary laws were set on a path from
their origin, and the degree to which feedback within that system reinforces that path is
beside my point, or perhaps enhances its meaningfulness. Additionally, I will argue that
89
the degree of change within these primaries has been relatively small, which suggests
that any potential feedback within the system due to this endogeneity is minimal.
5.2 The Status Quo and Inertia
In order to analyze the evolution of primary rules in light of varying motivations of
adoption, I will present a two-part analysis. First, I will show that there has been a
relative lack of innovation and change in primaries since their adoption. This partially
addresses questions of endogeneity and partially shows the power of the inertia of the
various adoption motivations. Second, I will compare the restrictiveness of current pri-
mary systems across these adoption narratives to show that restrictiveness has emerged
out of strong party states, whereas permissiveness has emerged in both progressive and
southern states.
5.2.1 The (Relative) Status Quo
Since the mid 20th century there has been much stability in primary election laws and
a relative lack of innovation in rules. In order to demonstrate this, I examine change
in the rules of the primary at three historical cut points. Given the relative dearth of
information regarding the historical progression of rules, and the intensive research that
would accompany a year by year historical narrative of the primaries, I have chosen
three historic dates which are notable for particularly in depth surveys of primary rules
to combine with a fourth, current, data point. First, 1930, which corresponds generally
to the time period in which Merriam examines primary rules and catalogs the advent of
the direct primary (1928). Second, 1960, when the National Municipal League released
a fairly thorough compendium of the rules of the direct primary in every state (1960).
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Finally, 1990, utilizing Alexander Bott’s Handbook of United States Election Laws as a
guide (1990).
Examining one of the principal rules of this study, party enrollment, we immediately
have an example of the lack of change and innovation in primary rules. In 1930, 23
states are listed as having party enrollment, 27 have the feature in 1960, 28 in 1990, and
30 in my most recent collection of rules. It is with noting that in 1930, only 44 states
used a primary, thus, the increase in states using enrollment between 1930 and 1960 was
largely due to new adoption of the primary. With few exceptions such as West Virginia
early adoption of enrollment and Utah’s recent change, very little has been done to enact
or repeal party registration laws in the last 80 years.
Considering ballot choice, there have been considerably more changes than in the
case of party enrollment. However, many of these rule changes have taken place because
of a relaxing of party enrollment rules. As of Merriam’s writing in 1928, he classified 17
states as closed which currently could be classified as open primary states in some sense.
However, only one of these 17 states had party enrollment early on, North Dakota, and by
1939, they had eliminated party enrollment (Overacker 1940). Thus, the majority of this
movement over time was not a change to policies regarding ballot choice, but changes
in the enforcement of party membership. In many of these states, we can still see the
vestiges of their original laws. Two of these states were initially purely open, as they are
now: Montana and Wisconsin. In the remaining states, party enrollment was done by
either asking for a ballot (as is done today in some states) or by a challenge method,
some of which are still in statute (Illinois and Indiana) but seldom if ever enforced.
Speaking to unaffiliated voter participation, this has been a relatively recent trend.
The earliest mention of allowing unaffiliated voters to vote in a normally closed party
state was in Oregon in the late 1970s (Braafladt 1977) see the mention of ’hybrid’ sys-
tems which allowed unaffiliated voters to participate. Since the advent of this new phe-
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nomenon, relatively few states have allowed the participation of unaffiliated voters while
maintaining ballot restrictions on enrolled party members. Currently, only nine states
allow unaffiliated voters to participate and maintain their unaffiliated status, all of these
states are classified as weak party states. In two strong party states, New Hampshire
and Rhode Island, unaffiliated voters may participate, but their selection of a party then
subsequently enrolls them as members of that party until they disaffiliate. A striking
example of the difference in these states.
One trend that is interesting to note relates to ballot access restrictions. Examining
the history of signature and filing fee requirements, one trend is immediately apparent.
The stability of non-trivial ballot fees, (especially when a non-percentage based fee is
prescribed) suggests that these requirements have always been lax. However, we must
be cognizant of the relative buying power of these fees. In Missouri, for instance, there
has not been much movement in the required ballot filing fee between 1930 and the
present. In 1929, House candidates were required to pay $50 whereas Senate candidates
paid $100. Today these sums are a trivial (compared to other states) $100 and $200. A
cursory examination suggests Missouri has taken an relaxed stance on ballot fees over
their history, however, when adjusting these dollar figures with CPI inflation data, the
$50 figure equates to $684 in today’s dollars and the $100 fee, $1,368. Thus, states,
by not updating these figures, have actually relaxed filing fees significantly through the
progression of inflation. Examining neighboring Kansas, which has always prescribed a
fee of 1% of the salary of the position, 1930 and 2014 figures are much more comparable
- $1,368 and $1,740 respectively (given inflation and the $10,000 Congressional salary
in 1930). These figures are both, arguably, nontrivial sums. For the majority of states,
however, a basic coding into trivial versus non-trivial requirements would remain the
same from 1930 to today. Notable examples of change generally come in the form of
increasing extremely lax requirements. In Indiana, which had no ballot access fees or
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signature requirements in the 1930s and only required 10 signatures by 1960, an increase
to larger percentage based signature requirements came in more recent years, with a
requirement of 5,000 signatures by 1990. In Nebraska, a change from minimal signature
requirements (25) would eventually take place to require a 1% filing fee. Similarly, Okla-
homa only required two signatures as of 1960, but currently requires 1,000 for a Senate
candidate. These examples all show a general trend towards restriction, but generally
only in cases where signature requirements were so lax they could be considered outliers.
In the vast majority of cases, the triviality of ballot access restrictions has remained the
same.
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Figure 5.4: Days Between Primary and General Election, 1918-2012
Turning our attention to the primary calendar, Figure 5.4 shows the overall trend in
the calendar placement of primaries (that is, the number of days between the primary
election and the general election. As we would expect, the general trend has been a
move toward earlier primaries, although this aggregate movement is not very substantial.
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As mentioned earlier, however, another aspect of primary timing is the length of the
primary election itself; the length of time between the filing deadline and the primary
election. Unfortunately data on candidate filing dates is exceedingly difficult to come
by. FEC documents shed light on more recent elections (dating back to 1998) and CQ
generally published major party filing deadlines. Taking some dates from these sources
and examining the length of the primary season, there is an overarching trend toward
an expansion of the primary season, but the average growth from 1974 to 2012 is only
13 days. In many cases, change reflects a regression toward the mean, where states with
extremely long primaries, as in Connecticut (101 days), have sought to shorten this, and
states with shorter primary seasons like Kentucky (55 day) have sought to draw them out.
One notable exception to this narrative of the relative status quo has been the inno-
vation in sore loser laws. Relatively few states had these provisions at the time of the
adoption of the primary, and it shows an interesting progression of one primary innova-
tion. The timeline of adoption of these laws is show in 5.2 on page 96 and is adapted
from Kang (2011) with a few changes to reflect updates and corrections. Additionally,
Conneticut, Iowa, and New York are not shown, as these states have not yet adopted
any sore loser provisions. This table has been separated out by decade and by the pre-
vailing adoption tradition, whether progressive, party, or southern. States which did not
have a prevailing tradition are shown in the ”Not Classified" column. In cases where
both a progressive and strong party tradition existed, states were assigned to the strong
party column (Missouri, Maryland, and Ohio). It is also worth noting that Delaware and
Rhode Island both adopted the mandatory primary relatively recently. Thus, while they
are strong party states, and are shown late in the timeline, their lateness in adopting is
certainly due in party to their recent adoption of the direct primary. While the trends
shown in Table 5.5 are mild, these data do seem to suggest that strong party states were
in the vanguard of adopting sore loser statutes. Further, in terms of primary innovation
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generally, this table shows how this specific policy is one of the few examples of a rule
innovation that has promulgated throughout the states over a long time period. This is
contrasted with the relatively quick adoption of the primary, and the lack of innovation
in other areas, as previously discussed.
5.2.2 Adoption Inertia
Taking this general narrative of the relative status quo of laws over the past 100 years,
I argue that current systems are largely based on their original arrangements. When
changes have occurred, they have done so in a manner which reflects this original ar-
rangement. The example of ballot choice demonstrates this argument. In most cases,
states which restricted ballot choice through enrollment continue to do so. Those states
which have relaxed ballot choice restrictions have done so because their original en-
rollment mechanisms (usually asking for a ballot or a challenge method) have become
unenforcible. Thus, this original arrangement creates a path dependency when change
occurs, leading to relatively few, if any, drastic changes in primary laws. With this in
mind, it is worth revisiting the restrictiveness measures from Chapter 4 in light on these
three adoption narratives.
Figure 5.5 presents mean measures of restrictiveness for 2014 primary rules based
on adoption traditions. The tree first separates out southern and non-southern states,
clearly showing the difference in today’s rules between these two categories. Institutional
inertia has continued the fairly lax and unregulated southern primary, as evidenced by
their low restrictiveness score. Proceeding to the next level, we separate out progres-
sivism in the non-southern states, while the apparent relationship between progressivism
and less restrictive rules seems to come through, it is worth traveling down to the fi-
nal level of detail and add strong party history to the tree. Of these four final points,
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Table 5.2: Date of Adoption of Sore Loser Law By Decade and State Classification
Progressive Party South Not Classified
1900s MS 1906
1910s CA 1917 NJ 1915
WV 1919
1920s KY 1920
OH 1929
1930s NM 1939 PN 1937 CA 1932
OR 1939
1950s MD 1957 SC 1950
AR 1955
1960s CO 1963 IN 1967 NC 1967 HI 1967
NV 1963
1970s AZ 1970 DE 1978* FL 1970 WY 1973
ME 1973 MO 1977 TN 1975 WI 1977
ND 1975 AL 1977
ID 1976 LA 1978
MA 1976
SD 1977
1980s OK 1987 RI 1981* GA 1983 AK 1980
MI 1988 IL 1989 TX 1985 MN 1981
NH 1981
KS 1989
1990s MT 1991
NE 1994
UT 1994
2000s WA 2004
2010s VT 2010
the key comparisons should be made between non-progressive/strong-party states and
progressive/weak-party states. Here we do see the expected difference in restrictiveness,
with non-progressive/strong-party states having more restrictive primaries in 2014.
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Figure 5.5: Mean Primary Restrictiveness by Adoption Tradition
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.62
.51
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.70
1
0
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1 Has Strong Party Tradition - 0=No, 1=Yes
1 Has Progressive Tradition - 0=No, 1=Yes
0
.41
1 Southern State - 0=No, 1=Yes
While these cursory relationships are interesting, we must compensate for a lack of
empirical leverage with qualitative detail. The broad relationships of Figure 5.5 raise a
few interesting questions. One question in particular can be immediately drawn from the
stark difference between strong and weak party states within the progressive tradition.
Maryland, Missouri, and Ohio all fall into this combined category of both progressive
and strong party. While Maryland maintains a fairly restrictive system, Missouri and
Ohio are decidedly permissive systems. While I have no way of completely accounting
for this, we may find the answer when considering the interaction of progressivism and
strong parties. Examining the progressive tradition in western states, there were not
many strong party states in which to focus anti-party sentiment. Likewise, in eastern
strong party states there was not often a progressive tradition to mediate the behavior
of the parties. Additionally, while Missouri may have had vestigial remains of a southern
tradition, the competitive two-party system in Missouri was in stark contrast to southern
state at this time. Thus, while a southern tradition may be muddying the analytical
waters, it is not clear that Missouri should be classified into a southern adoption tra-
dition. These cases offer a view that suggests when in conflict, progressive efforts may
have won out, yielding a permissive primary. Anecdotally, Ware (2002) notes that Ohio
had a tradition of experimentation with direct nomination long before the adoption of
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the primary. Additionally, Missouri saw little opposition to the primary, with a partisan
legislature and divided government passing the bill with ease, and little fanfare. While
it is unclear what the underlying causal mechanism is, it does seem that in these cases
of conflict, the progressive tradition was able to dominate.
A second question raised by this figure is that of the relative restrictiveness of pro-
gressive and weak party states. In this case there are a handful of western progressive
states which have, of late, adopted restrictive primary measures. This calls into question
this narrative of path dependence from adoption. However, under further analysis, we
see that these states, Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Utah, all have some-
thing in common. These relatively young states had a progressive urge when adopting
the direct primary, but their lack of party organization was not due to anti-party senti-
ment, rather, it is possible that they just had not had the time to develop they type of
party organization that existed in older eastern states. With this assertion, I will proceed
to a discussion of recent primary experimentation in order to directly address this claim.
Finally, it is important to note that the measures used here leave much to be desired
in terms of classifying states according to progressivism and a strong party tradition.
In the case of progressivism, using the adoption of the initiative or referendum omits
states which has strong progressive impulses, but which failed to adopt these measures.
Minnesota and Wisconsin stand as compelling examples of states which had irrefutable
progressive traditions but would not be classified as progressive under this categoriza-
tion. Given that these states have adopted permissive primary systems, the expected
relationship between progressivism and permissive primaries would only be strength-
ened by altering their coding. Examining strong party states, it is also clear that some
northeastern states which had a strong party tradition may not be fully captured by the
Traditional Party Organization scores of Mayhew. Two examples of this are Maine and
New Hampshire. Ware cites Maine specifically as an example of how the Democratic
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party made a concerted effort to adopt the primary in an effort to become more competi-
tive against state Republicans. He specifically cited their attempt to adopt the primary as
a move to ”broaden an electoral competition" (182). Mayhew also gives short shrift to the
efforts of other New England party leaders to cobble together partisan activity that, in the
1900s, could reasonably be deemed to be party machines (Lockard 1959, Swenson 1982).
Again, their recoding as strong party states would skew the above findings in favor of
the conclusion that restrictive systems emerged in these party-centric states.
5.3 Recent Experimentation
While I have presented a narrative in this chapter which argues that primaries have
remained largely unchanged in terms of their restrictiveness, and when changed, they
have done so in a path dependent way based on their adoption, there have been recent
notable developments in primary laws which I need to address. These developments,
however, occur outside of my narrative of adoption inertia, as they have been driven by
other factors. While I do not examine these developments with the same veracity as my
adoption argument, they raise important empirical questions which have the potential
for exciting future analysis. I separate these developments into two general categories,
those being driven by judicial developments, and those being driven by recent party
development in newer states.
Judicial developments have occurred in the past 30 years which have prompted
changes from states. Court cases in California, Connecticut, Kansas, and Idaho have
all had impacts on these states’ primary schemes, sometimes against the will of the
states. This introduces a measure of error into these findings, as primary laws can be
abruptly altered from their course with a judicial decision. Much of the experimentation
with blanket primaries, for instance has caused numerous legal battles, prompting rapid
99
change in California and Washington. Rulings by the Supreme Court on the freedom
of association of parties has prompted rule changes in Connecticut, Kansas, and Idaho.
While these three states have generally been able to maintain their primary system,
broadly understood, statutes were forced to be rewritten as to allow parties to decide
who may participate in their primary, rather than the state. In Connecticut, some exper-
imentation was done in the 1980s, but in the end they maintained their closed primary
system. In Kansas and Idaho, parties took divergent paths, with the Democratic parties
in both states favoring more permissive systems (Kansas Democrats will return to their
closed system for 2014). Finally, the inertia of primary adoption can be seen very well
in Hawaii, a state which has long had open and permissive primaries. Recently, the
Democratic party of Hawaii has been attempting to close their primaries, but have been
hamstrung by the difficulty of changing state statute. We may very well see this battle
removed to the courts, prompting judicial rule change yet again.
A second recent trend has occurred in western states such as Utah, Nevada and New
Mexico. While these states did not have strong parties at the time of the adoption of the
direct primary, they have, in many ways, begun to develop them. Scholars of both party
and primary including Mayhew and Ware have noted that strong parties did not exist
in these states as they were generally too young to have developed them. Further, the
argument has been made that party control was not necessary through traditional party
organization, as rich natural resources and westward expansion of railroads provided
a means to exert party control without formal organization. Over the last 100 years,
it is possible that these states, adopting their primaries in a progressive tradition, have
begun to develop the strong party organizations that they were previously lacking. By
the time of Cotter, Gibson, Bibby and Huckshorn’s (1989) analysis of party organization
in the 1980s, parties in Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Utah had made it
into the ‘Moderately Strong’ category of their analysis. Given the development of these
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parties, this offers an impetus for a large break from the progressive path which their
primaries originally took. Indeed, all five of these states would currently be classified as
more restrictive, as can be noted in Table 4.8 on page 72. Surely, recoding these states
out of their original progressive category and into the party category would only serve
to bolster the results presented in Figure 5.5 on page 97.
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Chapter 6
The Correlates of Restrictiveness
This dissertation has shown that the direct primary is a complex institution of varying
rules and use across the states. Chapter 4 showed how we can categorize these rules into
a new measure of restrictiveness which takes account of a wide array of rules in order to
paint a broader picture of the primary. Next, Chapter 5 attempted to examine how rule
structures came to be, showing the relative lack of change and innovation over the last
100 years, and presenting evidence that varying traditions of adoption led to the varying
rules we currently see.
Coming to the end of this project, we must ask, given the complexity of rules and this
potential explanation for why they exist in differing forms, what substantive differences
do these rules create? Further, what impact do these effects have on the suggestion by the
American Political Science Association’s Committee on Political Parties’ suggestion that
restrictive systems should be used to promote party responsibility? While it is difficult
to directly test the argument that restrictiveness creates responsibility (responsibility is
a difficult to measure concept) we can examine if restrictiveness yields characteristics of
healthy democratic elections.
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Scholars of the direct primary have noted closed or restrictive systems as having nu-
merous ill effects (Kanthack and Morton 2001). Specifically restrictive primaries are cited
as reducing competition and fostering candidate extremism. To be sure, these negative
effects of restrictiveness do not comport with the narrative party responsibility. Indeed,
ideological extremism and cleavage is cited as a potential consequence of the lack of
responsible parties. With these competing arguments, we can develop somewhat of a
test of restrictive primary systems and responsible nomination by testing to see whether
or not increased restrictiveness actually fosters these negative phenomena. Given the
previous argument that strong party states adopted more restrictive systems and the
responsible party hypothesis that restrictive systems can enhance party responsibility,
these ill effects may cast doubt on the potential for restrictive primaries to facilitate en-
hanced responsibility. Further, these ill effects may normatively outweigh any gains in
responsible nomination that the Committee on Political Parties foresaw from restrictive
primaries.
In order to examine the potential ill effects of primary systems, this chapter will ex-
amine two potential correlates of restrictiveness; competition and extremism. If there is
any potential for the suggestions of the Committee on Political Parties to be worthwhile,
restrictiveness must not result in diminished electoral competition or increased candi-
date extremism. Framing testable hypotheses in such a way that they support restrictive
primaries, I suggest four main hypotheses.
First, restrictiveness should not correlate with a diminished candidate pool, preserv-
ing democratic principles of competition. While there is a desire for parties to increase
their control over nomination, this should not come at the expense of a lack of choice
for the electorate. As the National Municipal League points out in their study of the
model direct primary, to remove choice would be to return, for all intents and purposes,
to a nomination scheme that is open to the same abuses as the convention system. Thus,
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restrictiveness should allow for enhanced party control, but not diminished competition.
Second, restrictiveness should not lead to an abundance of uncontested primaries,
preserving the relevance of contesting primaries elections. Again, to remove all compe-
tition would be to effectively eliminate the primary itself, with the only obstacle to party
nomination being placement on the ballot. Thus, even if restrictiveness negatively effects
the number of candidates, it should not, at an extreme, completely eliminate primary
competition by encouraging uncontested races.
Third, restrictive primaries should not be associated with increased ideological ex-
tremism of candidates, allowing parties to continue to seek moderate national majorities
within a controlled primary framework. As the Committee on Political Parties suggested,
enhanced restrictiveness and party control should not necessarily lead to more ideolog-
ically extreme candidates. If party enrollment, a restrictive feature, is encouraged, a ‘big
tent’ effect should help produce candidates in line with average party ideology, and not
extreme candidates, as would be the case in situations where leaning partisans or inde-
pendent partisans (arguably the parties’ more moderate members) freely float between
the parties, potentially robbing the primary electorate of its more moderating influences.
The Committee on Political Parties suggested that as responsibility increases, and the
links between candidates and platforms become more apparent, party enrollment should
increase. They go on to suggest that “Americans will look upon the badge of party as an
honorable one. There will be less likelihood of continued resistance among independent
voters to enrolling as party members”(72). Again, this suggests an increase in party en-
rollment and a growth of the party platform, as independent and more moderate voters
grow less hesitant to join parties and participate in primary elections.
Finally, restrictive systems should not be associated with increases in the extremism
of candidates actually elected to the House. This final hypothesis works in tandem
with the third, again suggesting that restrictive primaries are not at odds with the party
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goal of maintaining moderate national majorities. Even if restrictiveness does end up
correlating with the average ideology of the primary candidate pool, we should still see
moderate candidates winning primaries, and general elections in restrictive systems. In
sum, these four hypotheses will allow us to reconcile recent literature which has critiqued
restrictive primaries with the responsible party nomination framework which endorsed
this restrictiveness.
6.1 Competition and Divisiveness
If there is any universal set of principles at the core of participatory democracy, meaning-
ful electoral competition must be among them. If enhanced party responsibility comes
at the cost of reduced electoral competition, this trade off may not be normatively worth
taking. Further, even with a large field of candidates, if there is not a competitive distri-
bution of votes in restrictive systems, the effect is the same.
In order to test for primary competition, I examine two features of House elections.
First, I examine the raw number of candidates who participate in the primary. This is
limited to non-write-in candidates for the major parties. This measure, however, does
not tell the whole story. I also look at election closeness as measured by vote fragmen-
tation and margin of victory. Data presented here on primary election outcomes from
2002-2012 come from the Federal Election Commission. The unit of observation in each
case is the year/party/district and each district is then assigned a divisiveness measure
which are recalculated by state and party each year to reflect any changes in state law
or party primary procedure. In all cases, data presented here are pooled across these
elections years, however, when data was clustered, there were no substantive or statis-
tical differences in the analyses. It is also important to note, as discussed earlier, that
some states utilize a pre-primary convention in order to nominate candidates. While
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these states vary in their use, they can statutorily limit the number of candidates that
can emerge from these conventions, rendering an analysis such as this moot. In Utah,
for example, statute mandates that the top two candidates emerge from the convention,
barring one candidate getting over 70% of the vote. Given this rule, field size and vote
fragmentation is a direct result of primary rules, but not informative in terms of restric-
tiveness as a whole. Given the focus of this dissertation on primary restrictiveness, writ
large, these convention states are excluded from the following analysis. Further, this type
of restriction is not endorsed by the responsibly party framework, and actually presents
an overreach of party restrictiveness. In all cases, even with pre-primary endorsement or
convention, competition should be encouraged and open to candidates through regular
petition or declaration mechanisms. Thus, to remove these cases from the restrictive cat-
egory does not weaken the argument that restrictiveness represents the preferred form of
primary in a responsible framework. It is worth noting that, generally, field size is mini-
mal, uncontested races common, and fragmentation of the vote, minimal, in these states,
which supports the argument that these hybrid-convention systems do not comport with
responsible nomination. This, however, is not due to either the overall restrictiveness of
the primary, or traditional classification of the primaries (open/closed), as they operate
within a wholly unique environment from primary-only states.
6.1.1 Competition as Field Size
A first aspect of competition and divisiveness to examine is the size of the candidate
field. As restrictiveness captures barriers to candidate entry, we would instinctively
expect to see a decline in the number of candidates in more restrictive races. Addi-
tionally, we would expect see an increase in uncontested races, even when controlling
for incumbency. This narrative is in keeping with the argument that restrictiveness di-
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minishes primary competition. However, within the responsible party framework, there
is no concern for reduced competition, in fact, the Committee makes certain note that
competition should be encouraged within the framework of the primary.
Table 6.1: Number of Primary Candidates by Restrictiveness
With Incumbents Open Races
Restrictiveness Mean N Std. err Mean N Std. Err
Least - 1 3.1 .09 3.5 .13
Below Mean - 2 3.2 .10 3.5 .14
Above Mean - 3 3.0 .07 3.2 .09
Most - 4 3.1 .10 3.5 .14
Table 6.1 shows the average number of candidates in contested primaries (primaries
with more than one candidate) across both open seat and incumbent races for quantiles
of restrictiveness. As mentioned earlier, if ballot access restrictions are working in con-
cert with other primary rules to unduly burden potential candidates, we should expect
to see a reduction in the number of candidates in these races. However, we do not see
significantly different means between the lowest and highest quantiles of restrictiveness.
While it can not be said that restrictiveness necessarily encourages competition, it does
not seem to restrict the entrance of candidates either. Thinking back to the range of
ballot access rules, this conclusion does not seem wholly surprising. While barriers to
ballot access were classified as trivial or nontrivial, even those highest of hurdles would
have been financially inconsequential to a modern competitive Congressional candidate.
Thus, while these restrictions may weed out the weakest of candidates, they do not stop
candidates from entering the race at the same levels as permissive systems.
While it does not appear that the field of candidates is restricted in contested pri-
maries, it is worth taking a look at the proportion of uncontested races and primary
restrictiveness as well. Table 6.2 shows the proportion of uncontested races across both
open and incumbent races for quantiles of restrictiveness. While the difference in the
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Table 6.2: Proportion of Uncontested Races by Restrictiveness
With Incumbents Open Races
Restrictiveness Races Std. err Races Std. Err
Least - 1 .57 .02 .49 .02
Below Mean - 2 .58 .02 .50 .02
Above Mean - 3 .58 .02 .46 .02
Most - 4 .61 .02 .51 .03
mean proportion of uncontested races in the highest and lowest quantile of races with
incumbents is statistically significant, the size of this difference is only 4%, suggesting
small but significant effects. With an expected proportion of uncontested seats of .59,
and an n of 750 races, this essentially translates to an additional 15 uncontested races
in restrictive systems across these six elections, or roughly two per election. Examining
open seat races, there seems to be a similar effect. The difference in this case is not sta-
tistically significant in this case, but the magnitude of the estimated difference is similar.
With an expected frequency of .49 across all open seat races, and an n of 390 restrictive
elections, the substantive increase is roughly 7 additional uncontested races, a little more
than 1 per election in this sample. Thus, it could be suggested that while restrictiveness
does not necessarily lead to a smaller field of candidates if the race is contested, the
incidence of uncontested races is slightly higher in restrictive-primary states.
Revisiting the issue of convention states, the above analyses only slightly differ with
their inclusion. In all cases, the relationships are preserved, with increases in the sta-
tistical certainty that the differences are significant. However, in both cases, the general
findings are that while there are statistically significant differences, they are marginal
at best, with both restrictive and permissive primary systems both allowing for uncon-
tested and crowded primaries. Extreme cases of more than 10 candidates have arisen
in restrictive Arizona, Nevada, North Carolina, and Maryland, as well as permissive
states Indiana, Missouri, Tennessee, and Texas over this time period, underscoring the
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argument that competition is not solely found in permissive primary states.
What, then, can be said about the impact of restrictiveness on field of candidates?
Similar field size in contested races paired with slightly higher rates of uncontested races
in restrictive states suggests the possibility that, all things equal, primary restrictiveness
does not impact the field of candidates when there is not a favored candidate or pre-
sumptive nominee. Higher rates of uncontested races in restrictive primary states may
signal the ability of parties to limit the entry of candidates, or perhaps discourage their
entry, if there is already a presumptive nominee. Given the nature of restrictive primary
rules, there may equally likely be a selection effect in that candidates do not choose
to enter more restrictive primaries when there is a favored candidate. A final potential
explanation that can not be tested with this data is that these uncontested primaries
occur in ‘safe’ districts of the opposing party. Thus, parties are unable to recruit can-
didates for primaries if they are likely to be defeated. This final suggestion does seem
appealing, however, it seems more likely that no candidates would enter a primary if a
district was so safe as to discourage more than one candidate from entering the primary.
While all of these conclusions are only speculation, the narrative fits the data and pos-
sible theoretical expectations of the consequences of primary restrictiveness. In order to
more fully unpack this possibility, it is worthwhile to examine another aspect of primary
competition, divisiveness.
6.1.2 Divisiveness as Vote Distribution
Switching gears from the size of the candidate field to vote distribution, we can see
whether or not there was actually meaningful competition associated with larger fields.
As mentioned earlier, even with a crowded field of candidates, we can not normatively
speak to the quality of this competition without an understanding of how votes were
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distributed. A crowded field of candidates may obscure a race where one candidate wins
80% of the vote. Conversely, a small field may obscure a 51/49 outcome. In order to
examine the distribution of the vote I utilize vote fragmentation as defined by 1 -
∑
pi
2
where pi is the proportion of the vote received by the i
th candidate in a given House
district and for a given party. Thus, higher scores reflect closer races, although the
measure favors close races with many candidates over a close two-candidate race. This
measure will help to determine whether or not a larger field of candidates actually meant
more competition for nomination. An additional candidate in a race has no meaningful
impact on the election if that candidate only garners a minuscule number of votes. Thus
we can look for election closeness as a measure of primary competition.
Table 6.3: Vote Fragmentation by Restrictiveness in Contested Races
With Incumbents Open Races
Restrictiveness Fragmentation Std. err Fragmentation Std. Err
Least - 1 .47 .01 .55 .01
Below Mean - 2 .48 .01 .56 .02
Above Mean - 3 .46 .01 .54 .01
Most - 4 .49 .01 .55 .01
Table 6.3 shows the fragmentation of the vote across quartiles of restrictiveness in
races with and without incumbents. Interestingly, in open seat races, there is not a
significant difference of means between the most and least restrictive categories. Likewise
in races with incumbent races, the mean fragmentation is not significantly different
between the most and least restrictive states. These results suggest, again, that restrictive
primaries may not live up to their poor reputation as either destroyers of competition, or
bastions of divisiveness. Across all categories, means are relatively similar, and do not
suggest that restrictive primaries foster and more or less vote fragmentation than their
permissive counterparts.
Another way of examining fragmentation of the vote can be done by examining the
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winner’s margin of victory. This is calculated across all races as the difference in vote
proportion between the first and second place candidates, regardless of field size. Again,
uncontested races are omitted from the analysis. This gives us leverage on the absolute
level of competition in the election, without privileging a larger field of candidates, as is
the case when examining vote fragmentation.
Table 6.4 shows the average margin of victory across races with and without incum-
bents across quantiles of restrictiveness. Interestingly, in races with incumbents, it does
seem that the winner generally does so by a slightly smaller margin of victory in restric-
tive races. However, it is worth noting that even though this is a statistically significant
difference, the magnitude of the effect is small, and the substantive effect electorally
insignificant given the high margins of victory. Examining open seat races, there is not a
significant difference in the margin of victory across all of the quantiles of restrictiveness,
suggesting no effect of restrictiveness on margin of victory.
Table 6.4: Margin of Victory by Restrictiveness
With Incumbents Open Races
Restrictiveness Margin Std. err Margin Std. Err
Least - 1 36.7% .01 23.5% .01
Below Mean - 2 35.3% .01 23.6% .01
Above Mean - 3 37.2% .01 24.4% .01
Most - 4 32.7% .01 23.0% .01
It is possible that I am not capturing meaningful differences in competition in these
seats due to the overwhelming number of primary races which are not competitive. Any
difference in the number of meaningfully competitive races would be hidden by the
large number of uncompetitive races. In effect, large margins would obscure differences
in competitive races which have small margins of victory. In order to compensate for this,
I pull out all races in which the margin of victory was less than 5%. It is reasonable to
suggest that these races are competitive. Looking at the proportion of these close races
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across restrictiveness, we can see that while there seems to be a small increase in compe-
tition in the most restrictive states, these differences are not statistically significant. Table
6.5 shows these proportions. When this analysis was performed again with a threshold
of 1%, the results in Table 6.5 remained substantively unchanged. These results bolster
previous analysis that suggested that restrictive primaries did not reduce competition.
Again, it is worth noting that restrictive primary systems did not enhance competition
either. However, this conclusion still debunks popular notions that restrictive primaries
are detrimental to electoral democracy.
Table 6.5: Proportion of Close Races by Restrictiveness
With Incumbents Open Races
Restrictiveness Margin Std. err Close Races Std. Err
Least - 1 .12 .02 .17 .02
Below Mean - 2 .10 .02 .15 .02
Above Mean - 3 .11 .02 .16 .02
Most - 4 .16 .02 .21 .03
6.2 Extreme Candidates
A second set of hypothesis that deserve examination relate to the ideological extremism
of candidates. A central tenet of theories of responsible parties rely on the desire of
parties to build and maintain moderate national majorities. If restrictive primaries are
actually correlated with an increase in candidate extremism, a large argument of this
framework would be undermined. With this in mind, I set to examine the relationships
between restrictiveness and ideological extremism in House primaries.
Examining the ideological positions of primary candidates is not a simple task. Our
best estimates of the ideology of House candidates only cover those candidates which
actually are elected to office and cast roll call votes. However, we are interested not only
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in the general election winners, but also the losers, who have no voting record. Thus,
we are left with a dearth of information regarding the ideology of the vast majority of
primary candidates which pursue nomination and fail. A current project by Andrew
Hall and Jim Snyder at Harvard University attempts to combat this lack of votes with
information from FEC donor databases. Using this data, they have developed a method
which creates networks of donors and candidates, allowing for the creation of an ideo-
logical score similar to NOMINATE scores for House members. While their work is not
yet published, they were kind enough to share their preliminary scalings for this analysis.
The data for primary candidate ideology in U.S. House races is used in this analysis
and covers the years 1998-2010. It is important to note that these scalings only cover
candidates who receive a minimum of 20 unique donations, and donors are dropped
who give to fewer than 20 candidates. Thus, this analysis does not include the full pop-
ulation of all House primary candidates. While this does exclude some candidates from
the analysis, and more importantly, probable extreme candidates, these candidates are
generally the weakest candidates (as they received relatively few donations), who are not
realistically in the running for their party’s nomination. Excluding these candidates does
bias against possible extremism, however, due to their probable electoral failure and the
lack of more complete data, this omission seems justified. Candidate ideological scalings
are then paired with the appropriate measures of restrictiveness which are calculated for
each state, party, and year of the analysis. Thus, each primary candidate is assigned a
restrictiveness score for the specific primary system that they competed in.
A cursory examination of this data can be found in Table 6.6 on the next page.
Here, I have shaded cells darker to indicate a higher cell frequency. In order to capture
extremism, the difference is calculated between the candidate’s ideological score and
the average ideological score for all party candidates in a given year. In this table,
both restrictiveness and extremism are placed into quantiles to aid examination. Thus,
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Table 6.6: Frequencies of Extremism and Restrictiveness
Extremism
Quartile
Restrictiveness
Quartile 1 2 3 4 Total
1 - Most Moderate
322 199 184 182 887
9.1% 5.6% 5.2% 5.1% 25.0%
2 - Below Mean
345 186 223 135 889
9.7% 5.2% 6.3% 3.8% 25.0%
3 - Above Mean
239 159 248 243 889
6.7% 4.5% 7.0% 6.8% 25.0%
4 - Most Extreme
259 178 245 205 887
7.3% 5.0% 6.9% 5.8% 25.0%
Total
1165 722 900 765
32.8% 20.3% 25.3% 21.5%
Percentages represent cell frequencies
Darker shading represents higher frequency
for extremism, those candidates in the first two quantiles are more moderate than the
party/year average, and those in the second two quantiles are more extreme. While this
table does seem to show a weak relationship between extremism and restrictiveness, it is
worth noting that the cell percentages are skewed by the unequal number of states with
unrestrictive primaries. To combat this, Table 6.7 on the following page shows these
data with column percentages, effectively controlling for the size of the restrictiveness
quantiles.
Again, it seems that there may be a small relationship between restrictiveness and
the ideological extremism of candidates, however we must also note that looking at the
category of most restrictive primaries, a large proportion of candidates in these primaries
are still very moderate. Thus, it is important to qualify this relationship by stating that
while there may be a small correlation between extremism and primary restrictiveness,
this is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition. There is only a 4% difference in the
percentage of the most extreme candidates arising out of the most permissive versus the
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Table 6.7: Frequency of Extremist Primary Candidates by Restrictiveness Quantile
Extremism
Quartile
Restrictiveness
Quartile 1 2 3 4 Total
1 - Most Moderate
322 199 184 182 887
27.6% 27.6% 20.4% 23.8% 25.0%
2 - Below Mean
345 186 223 135 889
29.6% 25.8% 24.8% 17.7% 25.0%
3 - Above Mean
239 159 248 243 889
20.5% 22.0% 27.6% 31.8% 25.0%
4 - Most Extreme
259 178 245 205 887
22.2% 24.7% 27.2% 26.8% 25.0%
Total
1,165 722 900 765 3,552
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Percentages represent column frequencies
most restrictive systems, suggesting that extreme candidates arise out of permissive and
restrictive systems, as do moderate candidates.
Looking at these relationships more closely, we can identify the most extreme candi-
dates. Ideological variation around a party mean is to be expected, however, in terms of
primary systems we are most concerned about those candidates who are furthest from
their party mean. Thus, I identify extreme candidates as those whose ideological score is
more than one and a half standard deviations away from the party mean for a given year.
As negative values indicate a more conservative ideology and positive scores indicate a
liberal ideology, Republican extremists are coded as such if their ideological score is one
and a half standard deviations below the party/year mean, and Democrats are coded as
extremists if this score is one and a half standard deviations above the party/year mean.
This coding identifies 9.4% of candidates as being extremists.
Examining the occurrence of these extremists versus primary restrictiveness, the
uncontrolled bivariate correlation is .013, indicating a very small positive relationship.
What is important to note, however, is that a large percentage of the most moderate can-
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didates still arise out of restrictive systems. Thus, it seems reasonable to suggest, that
while these data show a slightly higher proportion of extreme candidates in restrictive
systems, this relationship is small, and does not preclude extremists arising in permis-
sive systems, nor moderates arising in restrictive systems. Figure 6.1 shows a scatterplot
of this data, sorted by party. Again, the trendline does show a slight increase average
extremism for Republican primaries, but also suggests a slight increase in moderation
among Democrats. Looking at these data broadly, it is striking that a large number of
both moderate and extreme candidates arise in both systems. Looking at more substan-
tively relevant data, we can place our restrictiveness measures into quartiles to determine
the proportion of extremists arising out of each category of primary restrictiveness. Ta-
ble 6.8 on the next page shows these percentages across all four quantiles. The least
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Table 6.8: Percentage of Extremist Candidate by Restrictiveness Quantile
Quantile Extremists
1 8.8%
2 9.7%
3 9.2%
4 11.0%
restrictive states do show a smaller percentage of extreme candidates, but it is notable
that these differences are not statistically significant.
Examining candidate extremism in another light, we can examine the percentage of
extreme candidates in those states which use some form of convention or hybrid system
versus those states that do not. In non-convention states, the percentage of extreme
candidates is 9.1% while in convention states it is 10.5%. This is not a large difference,
nor is it statistically significant. Performing the same analysis as that in Table 6.8 but
withholding convention states, there is not a significant change in the results either.
While a common criticism of restrictive primary systems is their potential to attract
ideologically extreme candidates, these data do not tell a story that corresponds to those
fears. While there is some evidence for a modest relationship overall, it is important to
note that the magnitude of the relationship is small, and if there are important substan-
tive reasons for the emergence of extreme candidates, they are not likely to be found in
primary rules.
Taking this analysis further, it seems prudent to examine those candidates which are
actually elected to Congress. While certain primary systems may or may not produce
extreme candidates, this does not tell us which candidates are successful, and further,
which of these candidates actually bring their potential extremism to Washington. In
doing this, I examine DW-NOMINATE scores for the 108th through 112th House of Rep-
resentatives. As before, the year/party mean ideology is used to calculate an individual’s
distance from their party mean. Table 6.9 shows the breakdown of extremist House
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Table 6.9: Frequency of Extremist House Members by Restrictiveness Quantile
Extremism
Quartile
Restrictiveness
Quartile 1 2 3 4 Total
1 - Most Moderate
141 96 149 122 508
22.9% 27.1% 28.8% 33.2% 33.2%
2 - Below Mean
161 90 103 89 443
26.2% 25.4% 19.9% 24.3% 24.3%
3 - Above Mean
138 95 124 94 451
22.4% 26.8% 23.9% 25.6% 24.3%
4 - Most Extreme
175 73 142 62 452
28.5% 20.6% 27.4% 16.9% 24.4%
Total
615 354 518 367 1,854
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Percentages represent column frequencies
members by restrictiveness quartile over this time period.
Interestingly, and perhaps, revealingly, we do not see the expected relationship be-
tween extreme candidates and restrictive systems, and see significant and fairly large
differences between the most extreme and most moderate candidates in the highest
quartile of restrictiveness. While conventional wisdom would suggest the inverse of the
relationship presented here, this chart presents strong evidence to at least suggest that
restrictive systems do not encourage extreme candidates. Taken further, it suggests that,
in fact, more moderate candidates are likely to emerge from the most restrictive systems.
Thus, while there may not be a relationship between extremist primary candidates and
restrictiveness, it does seem that primary restrictiveness can have a moderating effect on
general election winners in the House.
6.2.1 Tea Party Candidates
One final examination of extreme candidates can be done by looking at successful Tea
Party candidates. Unfortunately there is little data to examine regarding tea party can-
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didate emergence in primary elections, however, we can examine where tea party can-
didates have won successful election to the House. Testing the 112th House, I identify 53
members of the Tea Party Caucus. Separating these members out into the quartiles of
restrictiveness as discussed previously, we are presented with the distribution shown in
Table 6.10.
Table 6.10: Tea Party Members by Restrictiveness
Entire House Republicans Only
Primary Caucus Size Seats Tea Party % Seats Tea Party %
Least - 1 24 123 20% 83 29%
Below Mean - 2 6 83 7% 50 12%
Above Mean - 3 10 92 11% 49 20%
Most - 4 6 73 8% 32 19%
This table shows the size of the total Tea Party caucus distributed across the four
quantiles of primary restrictiveness. This total does not sum to the 53 identified mem-
bers, as Non-Partisan California (4) and Louisiana (3) also have Tea Party members of
the House. Putting these numbers into perspective, the first set of columns show the
proportion of Tea Party members out of the entire House contingent for these states.
As the data show, there seems to be a much larger proportion of Tea Party members of
the House in those states which have the most permissive primaries. If we would expect
Tea Party success to be equally distributed across all categories, we should see a 14%
percentage in all categories.
Given that Tea Party success is likely to only occur in areas where a Republican
would win an election, the second set of columns in Table 6.10 shows means based
on the Republican seat count in the 112th House. Again, we see a similar relationship
even controlling for likely Republican seats. With an expected mean of 25% if Tea
Party success were to be randomly distributed, we see an negative relationship between
primary restrictiveness and Tea Party Success. It is worth noting that Texas (a least
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restrictive state) and Florida (an above-mean restrictive state) both had high levels of
tea party success. However, disentangling the effects of primary laws versus other state
specific features is not possible. Much more research on the Tea Party movement itself is
necessary to determine if it is a state-specific trend, or a broader phenomenon. However,
even a very strict interpretation of these results suggests that the emergence of Tea Party
candidates is not solely a product of restrictive primary systems, nor is it mitigated by
more permissive systems.
One potential explanation for the data shown here can be found in the responsible
party framework. If restrictiveness, as argued by the Committee on Political Parties, can
enhance responsible party nomination, we should expect that party fissures or factions
like the Tea Party should be less likely to emerge within restrictive systems. Given that
restriction affords parties more control over nominating processes, it is unlikely in these
systems that insurgent or ‘maverick’ elements of a party would arise. The data presented
here do indicate that, at the very least, Tea Party candidates were less likely to win
general elections in more restrictive systems. Again, without data on Tea Party primary
candidates, we can not be sure that restriction reduces their primary victory chances, but
this data does raise important questions about our understanding of this phenomenon,
and should encourage future work on the subject.
6.3 The Ill Effects of Restrictiveness?
One of the broad arguments of this dissertation is that responsible party government
and responsible party nomination are not incongruous with the direct primary. Having
examined how strong party organizations may have embraced the primary and shaped
it into more restrictive systems, I have shown that the direct primary is not a wholly anti-
party reform. Further, there has been much made of the idea that restrictive primaries
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have negative political consequences. This conclusion is at odds with a theory of respon-
sible parties, as restrictive nomination is seen as positive development. Examining two
potential downfalls of restrictiveness, decreased competition, and candidate extremism,
it does not appear that increased restrictiveness deserves its negative reputation.
While it may seem that I attempt to heap praise upon restrictive systems in light of
the evidence presented in this chapter, I must qualify all of these findings by pointing out
that restrictive systems do not, in any way, increase competition or drive candidate mod-
eration any more than their permissive counterparts. Thus, while I can rule out fears of
the negative consequences of restrictiveness, it is difficult to fully endorse restrictiveness
over permissiveness with this data alone. Thus, what I can present here are essentially
two equivalent options in permissiveness and restrictiveness with regard to competition
and candidate extremism. If we seek a way to make normative suggestions as to the
proper or model form that a primary should take, we must look elsewhere for more
evidence. This disclaimed is not intended to minimize the impact of these findings, as
competition and extremism are common points of argument in this discussion. Putting
these fears to rest does much to advance this discussion, but it must now move to other
arenas.
Presented with this problem, Chapter 7 will conclude the dissertation by articulating
the main arguments of this dissertation, identifying areas of its relevance in the current
political environment, and addressing areas where future research can contribute to this
discussion.
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Chapter 7
Discussion and Conclusions
This dissertation has addressed three aspects of the direct primary. First, the adoption
of the direct primary, second, the forms it takes, and third, the implications of these
forms. By first explaining the various rules that exist, and by then cataloging them and
classifying them based on their restrictiveness, we were able to look at what forms the
primaries in the states take. With this information in hand, we then looked back to the
adoption of the primary and examined two competing narratives of adoption. Finally,
this dissertation readdressed extant literature on the ramifications of primary systems
using this new data. Bringing all three pieces of this dissertation back together, it is
possible to make a few statements about the direct primary.
First, the direct primary in the states is a complex and unwieldy amalgamation of
laws, some set by the state, and others by the party. Traditionally, political scientists have
classified these rules based on the choices voters are offered at the polling place. Thus,
open systems allow all voters free choice between the party primaries and closed systems
restrict voting to party members. This open/closed classification does well to inform us
of the practical implications of rules on voters, however it fails to completely capture
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the entirety of primary systems. When discussing the correlates of primary systems, we
often look to this classification when controlling for primary effects. This is done as the
assumption is made that these rules structure the electorate and the choices offered to
different voters. While this is indeed true, this analysis leaves out many other variables
which structure the primaries.
Approaching the classification of parties from a different angle, I have cataloged a
wide array of rules which all have a bearing on the restrictiveness of primaries. When
combined they tell a richer and more nuanced story of the nature of primary laws in the
states. This new restrictiveness variable allows us to capture many ways in which primary
rules structure the choices of voters and election outcomes. By incorporating the ability
of candidates to place their names on the ballot, we gain leverage over how the ballot
structures choice. Incorporating the ability of primaries to endorse candidates or give
them special ballot designation also brings clarity to the discussion. This dissertation has
addressed a wide variety of different rules and classified them according to their relative
restrictiveness, which indicates party control over primaries and, potentially, nomination.
These rules, along with others, all have a hand in structuring the choices presented to
voters, and the outcomes of elections. By studying the restrictiveness of primary systems
we gain a more complete understanding of how these institutions work and their effects.
Second, examining the adoption of the direct primary, I examined two traditional
narratives regarding the adoption of the primary in the states. First, a progressive
narrative, and second, a party narrative. These traditions of adoption are often seen
as mutually exclusive, or contradictory in that the goals of the progressive movement
do not align with the goals of strong party organizations. While I do not refute the
contention that these groups have divergent goals, I suggest that they found the same
solution, the primary, in their attempts to meet their goals. With the varying sets of rules
and the malleable way in which the primary can be constructed, they were both able to
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construct unique primary systems to meet contradictory goals.
In the first case, it is argued that the primary was a largely anti-party reform, driven
by progressive influences. In the second case, the possibility is opened that parties sought
to implement the direct primary as a way to regain control over an unwieldy convention
system and legitimize parties as an institution through governmental regulation. By
examining these two narratives, it did not seem to be the case that any one tradition had
a decisively singular impact on the adoption of the primary. Instead, both strong party
states and progressive states rapidly and comprehensively adopted the primary within
a very small window of time. I suggest that multiple motivations may have prompted
the adoption of the primary in the various states during the same time period. While
progressive tradition and reform prompted the adoption of the primary in the west,
strong party interests in eastern states saw the primary as a way to find legal control
over the primaries. Both of these groups had a desire to control an unwieldy convention
process, however both groups had different preferences in terms of the end result of the
primary. Further, southern parties looked to the primary to codify their one-party power
and find legal strategies to control voting in nominations.
Taking this analysis further, I have shown that these adoption traditions also influ-
enced the way primaries were structured from their outset. As progressive reformers
and eastern parties had divergent goals beyond the implementation of a primary, they
sought to structure what was a very malleable institution in ways which would serve
their goals. In western, progressive states, ideals of openness and participation guided
the implementation of permissive primary systems. In eastern, strong-party states, re-
strictiveness afforded parties a continuing influence over nomination while still giving
them the privileged place in politics they sought through institutionalization. Showing
that these rules have remained largely the same over time, I presented evidence that
these adoption traditions continue to inform the way primaries are structured in the
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states. Further, in some younger and previously progressive states, strong parties have
begun to emerge, and as we would expect, these primaries have begun to take on a more
restrictive form.
Finally, I have examined hypotheses about the effects of primaries to show that com-
mon criticisms of increased restrictiveness, such as reduced competition and increased
candidate extremism, seem to be unfounded. Further, I examined the ideological extrem-
ity of successful general election candidates, and the emergence of Tea Party members
of the House to conclude that, again, restrictiveness was not associated with increased
extremism in either case. While there was not evidence that restrictiveness increased
competition, or was associated with more moderate candidates, this examination does
much to shed light on traditional criticisms of primary restrictiveness. Further, this
speaks to a contradiction in theory that relates to how responsible parties and primary
restrictiveness interact with candidate extremism. In the responsible party framework,
restrictive primaries are a way to build durable moderate national majorities. However,
we have also been confronted with arguments that suggest that primary restrictiveness
is a troubling cause of increased extremism due to polarized electorates. Showing that
restrictiveness did not seem to have a relationship with candidate extremism, and that
parties may be able to successfully defend themselves from party fracture and insur-
gent campaigns, also lends credibility to the responsible party framework. Continuing
research needs to be done to determine the full extent of these relationships, and per-
haps suggest a return to the suggestions of the Committee on Political Parties, which
advocated increased restriction as an avenue towards enhanced party responsibility.
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7.1 The 21st Century Primary
This dissertation’s findings are based largely on an understanding of parties, elections,
and politics as they have existed for the majority of the 20th century. However, the
evolution of politics in America have brought, and will continue to bring, changes to
these understandings which will greatly impact the importance and relevance of this
work. As our political environment changes, so too will the role of primaries. Currently,
four broad political changes or trends may impact our view of the direct primary, its
operation, and its relevance in today’s political environment. First, the continuing shift
from party centered nomination to candidate centered nomination promises to continue
to alter the relative importance of parties in the nominating process. Second, recent
judicial decisions on campaign finance laws such as the Citizens United and impending
McCutcheon cases show a trend toward a decreasing reliance on parties for financial
resources, and the potential for insurgent candidates to operate with the support of
wealthy donors. Third, the Tea Party movement may give the Republican Party cause
for concern about their control over candidate nomination. While the totality of the
relationship between primary systems and this movement is unclear, it is an interesting
development that may increase the attention paid to nominating rules. Finally, recent
judicial developments, independent of the aforementioned campaign finance cases, have,
and will likely continue to influence the way primary systems are structured. These
external forces have brought about a very recent resurgence in primary innovation from
Idaho to California, and should continue to be monitored.
7.1.1 The Candidate Centered Environment
The relative importance of party versus candidate is an important factor when discussing
the primary, especially in light of responsible party nomination. To be sure, the over-
126
arching trend in this balance has skewed toward the candidate over the past 60 years.
Thus, as campaigns continue to become more candidate focused, and less party focused,
the rules which govern the primary may receive more interest from parties interested in
regaining some control over nomination. One difficulty with this proposition is that the
development of a candidate-centered electoral environment may stymie efforts of parties
to change or increase the restrictiveness of their primaries. Our traditional notions of
tripartite party organization include the party in government as a vehicle for legislative
change. However, it may be the case that the goals of party as organization and party
in government are not aligned in a candidate centered electoral environment. If this is
the case, party organizations may find themselves with a diminished capacity to affect
change in election statute. In only a handful of states are parties allowed to set rules of
the primary without statutory action, as has been discussed in this dissertation. Often,
since these rules are set in statute, it would require action on the part of the legislature
to affect change. If the goals of the party organization do not align with the party in
government we should not be surprised to see a lack convergence on a strong party
primary. Indeed, the rise of candidate centered politics may create the impetus for rule
change which benefits incumbent candidates or diminishes the influence of party.
7.1.2 Citizens United vs. The Direct Primary
A second trend which will surely have an impact on candidate nomination related to
campaign finance. As early as 2002, with the passing of the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act (BCRA or McCain-Feingold Act) the importance of party money has been
changing. Capping party use of soft money, the ‘golden age’ of unlimited soft money
in party organizations ended, reducing candidate reliance on parties for many of the
voter registration and turnout activities that this money funded. Although BCRA also
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banned electioneering communications from corporations and non-profits, the decision
in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission overturned this ban in 2010. Thus, there
has been a recent increase in money being moved through super-PACs (as non-profit
advocacy groups have been called) and other non-party entities. These new avenues of
campaign money surely changes candidates’ relative reliance on political parties. Further,
the court has recently overturned aggregate limits on campaign donations in McCutcheon
v. Federal Election Commission. This change has the potential to effect revenue streams to
both parties and candidates, but we will have to wait to see the full effect of this decision.
Given these developments, how might new campaign finance regulations interact
with primary rules? One suggestion for future research could focus on candidates who
can be identified as large recipients of outside financial help. If instances can be iden-
tified where party favorites compete with candidates financed by outside organizations,
we could test their success across restrictiveness to determine if primary rules either
encourage or discourage these types of races and if they have an impact on candidates’
electoral success. It is unclear how this relationship might look, as, generally, party con-
trol over nomination in the responsible party framework has not been tied explicitly to
party money. Indeed, the only explicit endorsement of candidates incorporated into the
restrictiveness measure introduced here involves ballot designation of an endorsed can-
didate. Parties, therefore, would be largely unable to financially compete with unlimited
advocacy on the part of an outside group. One example of the interplay between rules
and outside money can be seen in the 2012 Republican presidential primaries. It is clear
that party rules had little impact on the ability of an independently financed candidate
(such as Newt Gingrich, or perhaps later in the primary, Rick Santorum) to continue
to compete in the primary well after they would have otherwise been eliminated from
competition. In sum, while it is unclear how changes to campaign finance may interact
with primary rule systems and the potential for responsible party nomination, increases
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in outside money clearly complicate the picture for parties, and these complications may
prompt innovative thinking on the part of parties to compensate. Only time, and more
data, will be able to complete this story.
7.1.3 Tea Party Insurgency
Another recent trend that this dissertation attempted to address was the emergence of
the Tea Party movement within the Republican Party. While recent research has done
well to begin to explain this new phenomenon, we are still largely unsure of its future.
In this dissertation, I examined the claim, directly related to party responsibility, that
this fracture of the Republican party was actually occurring in restrictive primary states.
However, as data presented in Chapter 6 showed, it seems that the Tea Party movement
has actually gained the majority of its traction in permissive primary systems. For
advocates of responsible primaries, this should not be a surprise, as restrictive systems
should allow for parties to exert control over nomination, perhaps limiting the ability of
insurgents or party factions from gaining political leverage.
One could speculate that if the Tea Party movement continues to gain traction, and
if the Republican party finds the movement incompatible with its goals, that state parties
may look toward reevaluating primary rules in order to curb this movement. One in-
teresting recent development, however, has shown some incompatibility between restric-
tiveness and the power of parties. In some states including Delaware, Indiana, Missouri,
and Texas, sore loser laws have precluded the ability of establishment Republicans to
challenge Tea Party candidates in the general election if the party is unsatisfied with the
results of the primary. As it is likely that the most viable candidates participated in the
party primary, any losing candidate (even if a party favorite) would be excluded from
participating in the general election. Such would have been the case where Christine
129
O’Donnell (DE), Richard Mourdock (IN), Todd Akin (MO), and Ted Cruz (TX) won their
respective primaries but received the ire of the Republican Party establishment. It is
worth noting that three of these states, Indiana, Missouri, and Texas, have fairly per-
missive primary laws outside of their sore-loser law, suggesting that a sore loser law in
the absence of strong party control over nomination may be a hindrance to responsible
party nomination. Such was not the case in Connecticut (which does not have a sore
loser law) in 2006 when Joseph Lieberman was able to run in the general election as an
independent and beat primary winner Ned Lamont. However, in this case it is not clear
that Ned Lamont was particularly distasteful to party regulars. Thus, in cases where
states have generally restrictive primaries, but no sore-loser law, this omission may work
against parties. In order to counter this hurdle, parties in the future would do well to
examine the interplay between restrictiveness and sore-loser laws.
7.1.4 Primaries from the Bench
One recent trend in the development of primaries has been the increase of judicial
rulings regarding primary rules. Supreme Court cases such as Tashjian v. Republican
Party of Connecticut (1986), California Democratic Party v. Jones (2000), Washington State
Grange v. Washington State Republican Party (2008), as well as district and circuit court
cases in Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, and Virginia have all made various rulings on the
legality of certain primary rules. In the case of Tashjian, the Supreme Court ruled
that the state could not force political parties into holding open primaries. While this
prompted temporary change in Connecticut, the ruling opens the door to other potential
challenges to state statute. In Idaho, a district court ruled in Idaho Republican Party v.
Ysursa that the state could not compel parties to have open primaries, which quickly
prompted a large change in state primary rules. Conversely, the Democratic Party of
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Hawaii has been stymied by the courts in their attempt to close the state’s primaries.
In Democratic Party of Hawaii v. Nago the court rejected what was essentially the same
argument made by Idaho Republicans. However, as the Idaho case never made it out of
District courts, there is no national precedent for the case.
These trends highlight not only the importance of external players in the formation
of primary rules more recently, but also a new trend in reexamining these rules. Perhaps
encouraged by court actions in other states, more attention is being paid to primary
law, which may spark a resurgence in interest in the direct primary. Indeed, the 1986
ruling in Tashjian has been largely ignored by the vast majority of states, however it is
likely that should another party decide to challenge on the same grounds (opening a
closed primary) the state would then be forced to grant parties more purview over the
operation of their primaries. Whether recent developments in Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas,
and Mississippi are the start of a larger trend is yet to be seen. However, the history of
the primary written in this dissertation, one of relative stability, may soon need revision.
7.2 Bringing Back Responsible Parties
Reevaluating the suggestions of the Committee on Political Parties, we can make a few
suggestions and observations based on the data presented in this dissertation. First, and
most generally, a majority of states have not adapted their primary rules to follow the
suggestions of the Committee. Second, it seems that those states which have adopted
restrictive primaries likely did so upon their adoption, as the vast majority of rule struc-
tures have remained the same over time. There has been little movement over time
and traditions of adoption, like a progressive urge or strong parties, may have been the
operative factor in designing these rules. Third, I have examined some criticisms of re-
strictive parties and found them to be largely exaggerated. Thus, the suggestions of the
131
Committee do not come at the cost of reduced competition, or extremism. Finally, recent
developments may be prompting a reevaluation of primary systems, and it is worthwhile
to consider the arguments made about responsible parties if states set out to refashion
their rules.
Examining this first claim, it is interesting to note that no state was coded as restric-
tive across all primary rules. Thus, no state primary can be regarded as fully restrictive
in this sense. It is not clear, however, that a fully restrictive primary would be necessary
in order for responsible party nomination to emerge. At the very least, the scaling pre-
sented in Chapter 4 would suggest where responsible party nomination would be most
likely to emerge, but not where it would necessarily emerge. Still, many states remain
at the lower end of this restrictiveness scale, and there are particular rule structures
which exist in the states that contradict directly with the suggestions of the Committee
on Political Parties, namely, party enrollment.
It is also telling that the discussion in Chapter 5 showed little movement in the
rules of the primary over the last 100 years. This speaks to the second point, that
even in light of scholarship suggesting a particular path for the primaries, few states
have altered their rules. In cases where this has happened, it seems most likely that
this is done as a response to political events, court decisions, or even changes in the
nature of party systems within a state. It is also unclear whether or not parties would
look to political science for guidance on this issue. It seems more likely that increased
restrictiveness would not come out of a reasoned academic argument, but out of a more
natural desire for parties to enhance their control over nomination. Thus, restrictiveness
may arise more naturally, and not as a result of scholarly commentary. Given this,
perhaps we should not be surprised by the general lack of movement toward responsible
party nomination.
One potential problem for the future of responsible party nomination is the potential
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for this movement to be derailed by suggestions of the ill effects of restrictiveness. While
this dissertation has shown some of these claims to be exaggerated, we again run into the
problem of the disjunction between the practice of politics and political science. While
political scientists may suggest that restrictiveness has normatively positive implications
for electoral democracy, a general unease with restriction and regulation may thwart
efforts within the states to move to more restrictive systems.
Finally, one hope for the reevaluation of primaries comes from the aforementioned
political developments in this concluding chapter. Increased discussion and considera-
tion of primary systems can only be seen as a positive development for responsible party
nomination. If the issue of primaries becomes a more salient topic of discussion within
both scholarship and the policy arena, this may spur innovation and change within state
rule structures. It is worth noting, however, that the majority of recent change, includ-
ing that in California and Washington, has come in a decidedly permissive fashion, as
primary rules have almost completely eliminated the place of parties in the nomination
of their candidates within these states. These continuing experiments, however, may
still shed light on the larger issue of primaries as we gain new insight into permissive
nominating systems with these unique examples.
7.3 Concluding Remarks
The direct primary was conceived as a cure to the ills associated with the convention
system. While it seems that the primary emerged from distinct areas of the country
with distinct political traditions, all were responding to a loss of control over nomina-
tion. Whether the primary took a permissive form in western progressive states or a
restrictive form in eastern party-centric states, the aim of both groups was to move be-
yond convention nomination. The primary remains an entrenched political institution,
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mandatory in many states, and still often used even when not required. One certainty
uncovered in this dissertation is the unique way the primary can be fashioned. What
remains to be seen, it how it will be fashioned to suit the needs of an evolving political
system.
Sixty years ago, an emphasis on responsible parties was advocated by political sci-
entists, yet many states continue with permissive systems. Modern lamentations on the
polarized state of politics ignore the conclusions of the responsible party framework and
even blame extremism on restrictiveness. At the very least, it is time to reevaluate pri-
maries and our political system and recognize the importance of this institution in our
electoral system. Often we focus too much on the election of candidates, and not the
selection of nominees. If our decisions are structured by our choices, we would be wise
to pay close attention to the selection that occurs before election.
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Appendix A
State Narratives
A.1 State Narratives
This appendix presents the current status of primary rules in the states. In all cases,
rules are taken from relevant election codes and state statutes. Often, State Secretaries of
State and their staff were very helpful in interpreting statute. Finally, state party offices
aided in the interpretation of some rules. Election dates are taken from the Federal
Election Commission.
Alabama
Alabama uses a primary in which there is no party registration; however voters are re-
quired to choose one ballot publicly at the polling place. If you do not want to declare,
you are not allowed to vote in partisan races. In the case of a runoff, Democrats re-
strict runoff voting to those who have voted in their primary, while Republicans do not.
Therefore, if you vote in the Democratic Primary, you may then vote in a Democratic or
Republican runoff. However Republican primary voters are excluded from voting in a
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Democratic runoff. The Filing deadline for candidates is two months before the March
primary and voter registration ends 10 days before the mid-March election. AlabamaŠs
sore loser law prohibits major party candidates who are defeated from running as inde-
pendents in a general election. The filing date for independent candidates is after the
filing date for the party primary, allowing the party field to be set before independents
enter the race.
Alaska
Alaska uses a primary in which there is party registration. The determination of who is
allowed to vote in the party primary is left to the parties. At this time Republicans have
opted to allow party members and unaffiliated voters, but disallow Democrats, whereas
the Democratic Party primary is open to all registered voters. Alaska law requires
independent candidates to register by the date of the primary, effectively disallowing
sore loser candidates. Voter registration ends a month before the late August primary,
and roughly 2 months after the candidate filing date. The filing date for independent
candidates is on the day of the party primary.
Arizona
Arizona offers party registration during voter registration, and does restrict voting in
primary elections. Registered party members are allowed to vote in their partyŠs re-
spective primary only. Unaffiliated voters are allowed to participate in either primary
but must request a party ballot. Arizona holds a Late August primary and registration
closes a month before the election, and two months after the candidate filing deadline.
The filing date for independent candidates occurs on the party primary day. ArizonaŠs
sore loser law prohibits losing party candidates from running as independent candidates
in the general election, however it does not prohibit a candidate from running in both
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party primaries.
Arkansas
Arkansas administers a fairly open primary system in which the state has offered optional
party registration since a constitutional amendment in 1995. According to the stateŠs
Deputy for Elections, very few voters opt into party identification. Voters must publicly
request a ballot at the time of the primary and optional party registration is not binding,
thus registered party members, unregistered party members, and unaffiliated voters alike
may request a ballot for either party. Arkansas utilizes a runoff system, and primary
voters may only participate in a runoff of the same party they voted for in the primary.
Voter registration is required one month before the late-May primary, and filing deadlines
are on March 1st, or the next business day. The filing date for independent candidates
is the same as for obtaining primary ballot access. This is a recent change and may
be subject to legal challenge. Arkansas law has an outright prohibition against losers of
party primaries appearing on the general election ballot.
California
California is one of three states to use a nonpartisan primary. The state still allows for
party enrollment, however this is not a condition for voting in the state’s primary. Ballot
access requirements are nontrivial, and due to the nature of the top two primary, filing
dates are standard across all candidates and parties. The state does have a sore loser
law and allows for party endorsement designation on ballots.
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Colorado
Colorado has a hybrid primary/convention system in which candidates gain ballot access
by receiving 30% of the convention ballot. If no candidate reaches this threshold, the
primary is contested between the top two vote getters. If one candidate reaches a
50% threshold, no primary is contested. Colorado performs party registration and has
provisions for unaffiliated voters. For those who register as a particular party member,
they may only vote in that partyŠs primary. Unaffiliated voters are allowed to vote in
either party primary but must publically ask for one ballot and this effectively changes
their party affiliation on Election Day. If they wish to reregister as unaffiliated they may
do so after the election. Party members who wish to change their party affiliation may do
so up to 29 days before the primary. Voter registration for new voters is allowed online
and on Election Day, but voters must be a resident for 22 days before this. Independent
party candidates may file for the general election after the party filing date, and after the
actual party primary, however third parties must file at the same time as major parties
file for the primary. This is done roughly 3 months before the late June primary.
Connecticut
Connecticut performs party registration and also has provisions for unaffiliated voters.
For those registered as a party member, they may only vote in their partyŠs primary.
These rules are set by the party and may be changed to allow unfettered access by
unaffiliated voters but both parties have declined to do so. Connecticut voters may
change their affiliation up to the normal voter registration deadline and the change in
affiliation will take effect immediately, allowing them to vote in a party primary. Likewise,
a voter may change from their party affiliation to unaffiliated and the change will take
effect immediately. For party members or for unaffiliated voters who have previously
138
affiliated with a party, changes in party affiliation must be made three months before
the primary. Voter registration is now available on Election Day but this takes place
at specific registration locations which are separate from polling places. Connecticut
uses a convention system to select party nominees, but beginning in 2004 they enacted
a ‘dual-track’ system, also allowing nomination by petition. Party filing deadlines for
ballot access are two months before the August primary, and Independents and third
parties are allowed to file for the general election after the party primary filing deadline,
however the independent deadline is before the actual primary date. The third party
filing date is after the party primary date. Connecticut does not have a sore-loser law.
Delaware
The state of Delaware performs party registration as a part of voter registration and
does not have any provisions for unaffiliated voters. Delaware is a good example of a
traditional fully closed primary. Party registration is required and members are restricted
to voting only in their party primary. Further, changes in party affiliation for voters who
have already registered are barred after the last Saturday of May. The Delaware primary
takes place on the second Tuesday after the first Monday in September, making this
S´waiting periodŠ for a change of party affiliation roughly three months, and placing
the deadline before the deadline for party ballot access. New voters must register at
least 24 days before the primary. Filing dates are in early July, and the independent
filing deadline is a week after the major party ballot deadline, but, obviously, before the
party primary. The Delaware sore loser law prohibits candidates from running as an
Independent in the general election after losing a party primary, but interestingly does
not prohibit a candidate from running in two primary races at once.
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Florida
Florida provides for party registration of voters and restricts voting in their primary elec-
tions. Party members may only vote in their party primary and there are no provisions
made for unaffiliated voters. Party affiliation change requests and new voter registration
deadlines are both 29 days before the primary election, and well after candidate filing
dates. Florida holds an August primary, placing these registrations in July, one month
before the final June filing deadlines. Florida has complex rules regarding independent
and third party ballot access. Deadlines are set depending on the method of ballot ac-
cess (filing fee or petition) and on the level of office sought. Signature petitions are due
a month before petitions for candidates paying fees. Additionally Florida charges peti-
tion candidates a fee for signature verification (0.10 per signature which can be waived
so long as the candidate does not pay for signature collection) which must be paid in
advance. In all cases, Independent and third party candidates have lower signature and
fee thresholds than major party candidates, but the deadlines are the same as those for
major party candidates. Florida law does not allow a candidate to participate in the
primary of more than one party, however, it does not specifically prohibit a candidate
from filing as a party candidate and as a S´no partyŠ candidate. Thus, if a candidate
had the resources and foresight to complete two petitions, a failed party candidate could
continue in their S´no partyŠ general election campaign.
Georgia
Georgia does not provide for party registration during voter registration and generally
operates a fairly open primary system. While primary voters must state which ballot
they would like to receive, any voter can vote in either partyŠs primary. In the case of a
runoff, voters must vote for the same party as they did in the primary. Independent and
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third party candidates ballot access deadlines are after the major party filing deadlines,
and after the party primary, allowing these candidates ample time to enter the general
election. The state has traditionally had a late summer primary, most recently in July
during the 2012 election season, but a recent court ruling mandated the state move the
primary earlier to allow military and overseas voters time to vote in a potential runoff
election. The date is now in May. Georgia sore loser laws prohibit both filing in two party
primaries as well as an outright prohibition on running as an independent candidate if
the individual ran in a party primary.
Hawaii
Hawaii does not provide for party registration and operates a very open primary process.
Voters from either party are given one ballot, upon which they select, in private, the party
they wish to vote for and their nominees of choice. This open primary is constitutionally
protected since a state constitutional convention in 1978. Prior to this, Hawaii operated
a closed primary. There have been recent efforts by the Democratic Party to close the
primary, and due to the difficulty of constitutional change, they have attempted to have
the open primary ruled unconstitutional in the courts. Their latest effort to do so failed
in 2013. Some confusion may exist in that the Hawaiian presidential nominating caucuses
are nominally open only to party members (membership as defined by the party, not the
state). Independent and third party candidates must file for the general election on the
same days as the deadline for major party primary ballot access. This deadline, in early
June, is two months in advance of the August primary. Voters are required to register for
the primary a month in advance. Hawaii prohibits filing in multiple party primaries and
maintains a prohibition on failed party nominees seeking general election ballot access
through an independent label.
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Idaho
Idaho has a legislatively mandated closed primary system and provides for party regis-
tration and unaffiliated registration; however the actual implementation of the primary
system is much more nuanced. Due to a recent court ruling, the Idaho legislature has
implemented a primary system in which, by default, party primaries were open only to
registered members of that party. The law, however, allows for parties to choose whether
or not to open their primary to members of the other party, or to unaffiliated voters.
IdahoŠs primary, therefore, is essentially a party controlled system, with a legislatively
mandated default option of S´closed.Š As Idaho had never before registered party affili-
ation, voters in the 2012 election were allowed to declare a party at the polls, and those
who did not declare by that time were registered as unaffiliated voters. Party members
may change their affiliation up to the day candidate primary filings are due, but unaf-
filiated voters may declare a party affiliation up to, and on Election Day. Interestingly,
if a party member reverts back to being unaffiliated between elections, the Election Day
deadline again becomes their deadline to change their party membership This is dif-
ferent from other states such as Connecticut, which track this behavior and maintain
waiting periods. New voter registration must take place 25 days before any election.
The Republican party has opted to only allow registered Republicans to participate in
their primary whereas the Democratic party primary is open to unaffiliated electors and
members of other parties. Unlike other states, casting a ballot as a Republican or unaf-
filiated voter in the Democratic primary does not automatically change the voterŠs party
membership. Independent and third party candidates must file for the general election
on the same day as the deadline for major party primary access. Idaho sore loser laws
are explicit and prohibit anyone who has lost a party primary from appearing on the
general election ballot.
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Illinois
Illinois does not maintain party registration lists and operates a fairly open primary
system. While state law does state that voters must ask for a party ballot in a loud
enough voice that all present at the polling place can hear. In practice, and perhaps
disappointingly, there is no yelling at the polls, and voters ask for their ballots in the
same way as they would in any other state that mandates a voter request one party
ballot or the other. There are mechanisms to challenge voter party affiliation, but again,
this is rarely done in practice. Independent and third party candidates are allowed to
file for the general election well after the December party primary filing deadline, and
the March party primary. Illinois sore loser laws bar losing primary candidates from
appearing as an independent on the election ballot and prohibiting filing in more than
one party primary.
Indiana
Indiana does not maintain any party registration data when registering voters, however
there are unique challenge mechanisms in place during the primary. When voters sign
the poll book at the polling place they are, in essence, attesting that they have voted for
the majority of that partyŠs general election candidates in the last election. If the voter
did not vote in the last election, then they are attesting that they intend to support that
party in the upcoming election. Poll workers are allowed to challenge this party affili-
ation, but voters can immediately sign an affidavit attesting to their party membership
and cast a regular ballot, which is not held separately or provisionally. These affidavits
are kept and could be used for later prosecution, but in practice challenging and pros-
ecution rarely occurs. Thus, while the individual may be subject to legal ramifications,
the vote is cast and there is no electoral remedy. Interestingly, this system does not
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allow for sincere party membership change. The only conceivable route to follow the
law and change parties would be to sit out one general election in order to be clear of
the requirement to have voted for a party in the last election. The voter would then
be pledging to support the new party candidates in the upcoming election and would
seemingly be clear of any legal ramifications. Independent and third party candidates
are allowed to file for ballot access until July of the election year, well after the February
party filing deadline and May party primary. Indiana sore loser laws are explicit and
do not allow any losing party primary candidates from appearing on a general election
ballot for the same office.
Iowa
Iowa voter registration does provide for party and unaffiliated registration, however the
state runs a fairly open primary system. While those who register as unaffiliated are not
allowed to participate in the primary of either party, all voters are allowed to change
their party affiliation up to, and on, Election Day. Therefore, while voters may not
maintain unaffiliated status and vote in a party primary, voters willing to temporarily
change their voter registration may essentially vote in any primary. This highlights a key
problem with traditional primary classification schemes, as the state regards its primary
as closed, yet it retains many open features. Independent and third party candidates are
allowed to file for the general election until August, which is well after the March party
primary filing deadline and the June primary. Iowa does not currently have a sore loser
law.
Kansas
In Kansas, there are provisions for party registration, including for unaffiliated voters.
The state code provides for a strictly closed primary system, however, due to recent court
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challenges, that closed system is now only a default position, and parties may opt for
more open voting in their primaries. While the Republican party has chosen to maintain
a closed system, the Democratic party temporarily experimented with an open system,
allowing both independents and Democrats to vote in their primary. However, as of the
2014 election, Democrats will also conduct a closed primary, only allowing registered
Democrats to vote. Independents are permitted to file for the general election until the
day before the party primary. Independents and third party candidates can register after
the major party deadline but they must do so before the primary. Kansas maintains a
sore loser law.
Kentucky
Kentucky has an interesting mixture of restrictive and permissive primary features. The
states provisions for party registration, and disallows unaffiliated voters from participat-
ing in partisan primaries. Additionally, Kentucky requires all party changes to made
by December 31st of the preceding year. However, many other features are permissive.
Independents are allowed to file for the general election until August, well after the May
party primary. The state only requires a trivial fee in order to gain access to the ballot.
The primary season in Kentucky is particularly long at nearly 4 months. Kentucky has
a sore loser law.
Louisiana
Louisiana is one of the three states which utilize a nonpartisan primary system. The state
still maintains provisions for party enrollment, as the state previously used a ‘closed’
primary system. Now this registration is optional, and has no bearing on participation
in the nonpartisan primary. Independent and major party filing deadlines are the same,
and the state has nontrivial ballot access requirements. The state also has a sore loser
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law to prevent losing primary candidates form participating in the general election.
Maine
Maine has provisions for party registration and also restricts unaffiliated voters from
participating in the partisan primaries. Unaffiliated voters may affiliate with a party on
election day, but they are then locked into this decision for a minimum of three months
before they can change their affiliation back to independent or unaffiliated. Independent
candidates are allowed to file for the general election until roughly a week before the June
party primary, and well after the March party filing deadline. The state has nontrivial
ballot access requirements, and does have a sore loser law.
Maryland
Maryland has provisions for party registration and prohibits unaffiliated voters from
participating in the partisan primaries. This option is left to the parties, however they
have generally declined to open their primaries to independent and unaffiliated vot-
ers.Independent and third party candidates in Maryland must register by August, which
is well after the March party primary filing deadline, and the subsequent June primary.
This yields a long primary season of over three months. Ballot access requirements in
Maryland are trivial and the state has a sore loser law.
Massachusetts
Massachusetts has provisions for party registration but allows unaffiliated voters to par-
ticipate in the primaries. The state also allows parties to endorse candidates in pre-
primary conventions although they can not seek ballot access this way, and must meet
nontrivial filing requirements. In Massachusetts, independents must file by July, which
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is after the May party deadline, but before the September primary. This also makes for
a relatively long primary season of nearly four months. Massachusetts also has a sore
loser law.
Michigan
Michigan has a very permissive primary system. The state does not provide for party
registration when registering to vote and thus has no restrictions on ballot choice. Ad-
ditionally, voters have the ability to make their ballot selection in private. Independents
and third party candidates must file a month in advance of the August party primary,
but this date is well past the April party filing deadline. This makes a fairly long primary
season, at just under four months. The state has nontrivial filing requirements, and does
have a sore loser restriction. Informal pre-primary endorsements do occur on occasion
in the state however their use is sporadic.
Minnesota
Minnesota operates a very open primary process. The state does not provide for party
registration when registering to vote and thus has no restrictions on ballot choice. In
addition, voters are allowed to make their ballot selections privately. Parties may officially
endorse candidates at pre-primary conventions but ballot access is gained through trivial
ballot access declarations. In Minnesota, the independent and party filing deadlines are
on the same day in June, roughly 2 months before the party primary. The state does
have a sore loser law.
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Mississippi
Mississippi operates a fairly open primary system. The state does not provide for party
registration when registering to vote, however voters must publically declare their ballot
preference at the polling place. Additionally state statute technically requires that a voter
shall not participate in a party primary unless they intend to support the party nominee,
although it is unclear how, if ever, this is enforced. In Mississippi, filing deadlines for
independent and third party candidates coincide with the March deadlines for major
party candidates.
Missouri
Missouri has a permissive primary system. The state does not provide for party registra-
tion when registering to vote but does require voters to make a public declaration when
requesting a party ballot. Missouri independent and third party candidates are allowed
to register until July, a month before the August primary and well after the March filing
deadline. This makes for often the longest primary season in the United States, over
four months. The state has trivial ballot access requirements and maintains a sore loser
statute.
Montana
Montana operates a very permissive primary. The state does not provide for party
registration when registering to vote and thus does not have restrictions on ballot choice.
The ballot choice decision is made privately by the voter. Independent and third party
candidates in Montana must register in May, which is after the party deadline, but before
the June primary. The state requires a nontrivial ballot access fee and maintains a sore
loser law.
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Nebraska
Nebraska has an interesting set of primary laws. The state does have provisions for party
registration but allows unaffiliated voters to participate in the primaries. Nebraska allows
third party and independent candidates to register for the general election in September,
well after the March party deadlines and subsequent May primary. Additionally, it
is worth noting that Nebraska requires incumbent candidates to register two weeks in
advance of party challengers, a feature unique to the state. The state has nontrivial
ballot access fees, and maintains a sore loser law. In addition to this primary, the state
also utilizes a nonpartisan blanket style primary for nominations to their nonpartisan
legislature.
Nevada
Nevada law does provide for party registration and unaffiliated voters are prohibited
from participating in the partisan primaries. Independents and third party candidates
are treated differently in Nevada. Independent candidates must file nearly a month in
advance of the major party filing deadline, third parties are allowed to file until a month
after the major party deadline, creating two starkly different ballot access requirements.
The state has only trivial ballot access fees, but does have a sore loser law.
New Hampshire
New Hampshire has a relatively restrictive primary system. The state has provisions
for party registration and officially disallows unaffiliated participation in the primaries.
However, unaffiliated voters may affiliate with a party at the polls. Officially this changes
the voters registration, but the may immediately disaffiliate if they choose to do so. New
Hampshire requires independent and third party candidates to register for the general
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election on the same day in June as major party candidates, three months in advance of
the September primary. The state has trivial ballot access requirements and does have a
sore loser law.
New Jersey
New Jersey has a relatively restrictive primary system, The state has provisions for party
registration and does not allow unaffiliated voters to participate in the primaries. Ad-
ditionally, parties may endorse candidates at pre-primary conventions, although there
is a nontrivial ballot access requirement. The state allows independent and third party
candidates to file until the day of the June primary, and it has a sore loser law.
New Mexico
New Mexico has a mixed primary/convention system. Candidates can gain access to the
primary ballot by garnering 20% of the convention vote, or through standard petition
filings. These requirements are nontrivial and are dependent on whether or not the
candidate sought and failed to get convention designation or only sought ballot access
through petition. The state has provisions for party registration and prohibits unaffiliated
voters from participating in the party primaries. New Mexico sets the independent and
third party filing deadline roughly three weeks after the early July primary and has a
sore loser law.
New York
New York has a mixed primary/convention system. Here, candidates can reach the ballot
by receiving 25% of the convention vote, but they do not receive a party endorsement or
special designation unless they receive a majority. In addition there is regular petition
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access to the ballot as well, although these requirements are nontrivial. The state has
provisions for party registration and disallows unaffiliated voters from participating in
party primaries. New York allows independent and third party candidates to file for the
general election into August, over a month after the July primary. The state is one of
the three in the United States without a sore loser law.
North Carolina
North Carolina has provisions for party registration but allows unaffiliated voters access
to partisan primary ballots. Parties are allowed to restrict access to the primaries but
both have chosen to include unaffiliated voters. North Carolina allows independent
candidates to file a month after the party primary, but it is worth noting that this date is
before any potential runoff election. Ballot access requirements are nontrivial in North
Carolina and the state has a sore loser law.
North Dakota
North Dakota operates a very permissive and mixed convention/primary hybrid system.
Candidates can gain ballot access at pre-primary conventions, and also through filing
standard petitions, which require a trivial 300 signatures. The state does not provide
for party registration, and thus has no restrictions on ballot choice. Additionally, the
choice of ballot is made privately, requiring no public declaration. In North Dakota,
independent and third party candidates are allowed to file until early September, well
after the June primary. There is a sore loser law in the state.
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Ohio
Ohio operates a fairly permissive primary. The state does not provide for party regis-
tration when registering to vote but does require a public declaration of ballot choice at
the polling place Ohio sets a deadline for independent and third party candidates the
day before the party primary, and has trivial filing requirements. The state has, at times,
utilized pre-primary party endorsements, although their current use is sporadic. The
state also has a sore loser law in place.
Oklahoma
Oklahoma operates one of the most restrictive primaries in the United States. The
state has provisions for party registration and disallows crossover voting and unaffiliated
participation. Additionally, registration change deadlines are set at March 31st, well in
advance of both the April filing date and June primary. Oklahoma sets the same deadline
for major party, third party, and independent candidates and has non-trivial filing fees.
The state also has a sore loser law in place.
Oregon
Oregon is a unique western state with fairly restrictive primary laws. The state has provi-
sions for party registration and currently disallows unaffiliated voters from participating.
There have been recent efforts to both open the primary and switch to Washington-style
top two primary, but these measures have been soundly defeated by both the legislature
and voters. In 2012, the Republican Party experimented by opening its primary to unaf-
filiated votes, but only the offices of Attorney General, Treasurer, and Secretary of State
were covered. Oregon allows independent and third party candidates to file until late
August, well after the May party primary, and has nontrivial filing fees. The state does
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have a sore loser law in place.
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania has provisions for party registration and disallows unaffiliated voters from
participating in the primary. Independent and third party candidates in Pennsylvania
are required to file in August, well after the May party primary. While there is no
nomination through convention, parties do sometimes use a pre-primary endorsement
process. There are sore loser laws in place in the state, and filing fees are non-trivial.
Rhode Island
Rhode Island has a hybrid convention/primary system, where candidate can be placed on
the primary ballot through convention nomination or standard petition. The State has
provisions for party registration, and disallows unaffiliated participation. Additionally,
party change deadlines are significantly in advance of the primary, with these changes
needing to be filed 90 days in advance of the primary. Rhode Island sets the same
deadline for major party, third party and independent filing. The state has a sore loser
law in place and generally has a late year primary, and short primary season.
South Carolina
South Carolina does not provide for party registration when registering to vote, however
at times in the past, the parties have been allowed to declare requirements for party
membership. Currently there are no requirements. There has been recent discussion
within the state about closing the primaries, however legislative efforts have failed, and
the Republican Party recently abandoned an effort in the courts. Thus, any voter may
choose any party’s primary so long as they publicly declare their preference. South Car-
153
olina allows independent and third party candidates to wait until a month after the June
party primary to file for the general election. The state has trivial filing requirements,
and has a sore loser law in place.
South Dakota
South Dakota has provisions for party enrollment, however parties are left to decide
who may vote in their primaries. Currently the Democratic Party allows unaffiliated
participation, but the Republican Party does not. Members of parties are banned from
the opposing party’s primary. South Dakota treats independent and third party can-
didates differently in terms of filing deadlines. Third party candidates share a filing
deadline with major party candidates, however, independent candidates are allowed to
file a month after this deadline, albeit still before the party primary. South Dakota has
non-trivial filing requirements and has a sore loser law in place.
Tennessee
Tennessee operates a fairly permissive primary. The state does not provide for party
registration when registering to vote, however voters must make a public declaration of
ballot choice at the polling place. In Tennessee, independent and third party candidates
must register on the same days as major party candidates. There are non-trivial ballot
fees for candidates, and the state has a sore loser law in place.
Texas
Texas operates a fairly permissive primary system. The state does not provide for party
registration when registering to vote, however voters must make a public declaration
in order to receive a ballot. Texas previously used explicit loyalty oaths although this
154
practice is no longer in place. Texas treats independent and third party candidates
separately in terms of filing deadlines. Third party candidates must file on the same
day as major party candidates, but independent candidates are not required to file until
June, three months after the primary. Texas has only trivial ballot access requirements
but does have a sore loser law in place.
Utah
Utah has a mixed primary and convention system. Parties utilize pre-primary conven-
tions in which the top two voter getters proceed to a primary runoff unless one candidate
garners 70% of the primary vote, in which case no primary is held. Utah does have pro-
visions for party registration and voters must be a party member in order to vote in
the Republican primary. The Democratic Party of Utah has opened its primary to both
Republicans and unaffiliated voters. In Utah, independent and third party candidates
must register by the same March deadline that applies to major party candidates. Utah
requires non-trivial ballot access requirements, and does have a sore loser law.
Vermont
Vermont operated a very open primary process. The state does not provide for party
registration when registering to vote, and additionally, voters need not make a public
declaration at the polls when selecting a ballot. They are allowed to make this choice
privately. Independent and third party candidates in Vermont must register for the
general election by the day of the June primary, and there are sore loser laws in place,
however Vermont was the most recent state to enact these provisions.
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Virginia
Virginia does not provide for party registration when registering to vote, and participa-
tion in primaries is generally unrestricted with the condition that voters make a public
declaration as to the ballot they wish to vote. The Republican party has considered
utilizing loyalty oaths, however, this change seems unlikely at the current time. Changes
to the primary law in 1971 provide that parties can choose to nominate by convention
rather than primary election, thus a primary does not always occur in Virginia. In 2014,
the Republican party will use a convention to select its Senate nominee. In the majority
of cases where the primary is used, the state requires independent and third party can-
didates to register by the day of the party primary. The state does have non-trivial filing
fees and a sore loser law.
Washington
Washington is one of the three states which operates a nonpartisan primary wherein the
top two vote getters are placed on the general election ballot. The state does not provide
for party registration when registering to vote, and thus, does not prohibit unaffiliated
participation. Independent candidate filing deadlines are moot in Washington due to
the nature of the top-two nonpartisan primary. The state does have a sore loser statute
which prohibits write-in candidacies if a candidate appeared on a primary ballot.
West Virginia
West Virginia law provides for party enrollment, however laws concerning ballot access
are left to the parties. Currently, both parties allow unaffiliated voters participate in
the primary election, however an explicit declaration must be made at the polls. Ballot
access requirements are non-trivial, and the state has a sore loser law. Independents
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and third party candidates in West Virginia may register until August 1st, well after the
January party deadline and subsequent May primary. This span makes for a relatively
long primary season; over three months.
Wisconsin
Wisconsin operates one of the most permissive primaries in the United States. There
are no provisions for party enrollment, and at the polling place, voters receive ballots
of both parties, allowing them to chose their party of choice privately. Ballot access
requirements are non-trivial in the state, and there are sore loser laws. Wisconsin requires
independents to file in June, on the same day as major party candidates. The primary
season is generally short, and the state holds an August primary.
Wyoming
In Wyoming, the state has provisions for party registration, however these regulations
are relatively lax, as voters are allowed to change their party registration up to, and on,
Election Day. Wyoming technically disallows unaffiliated voters from voting, however,
the Election Day registration change deadline does allow unaffiliated voters to enroll
and vote at the polls. Wyoming has non-trivial filing fees and a short primary season.
In Wyoming, independent and third party candidates must file by the week after the
August party primary, and there are sore loser provisions in place.
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